The Parliament building at Tbilisi. Courtesy of flickr.com

Introduction

Ninety years to the day after the Bolsheviks successfully set in motion events which would culminate with the communists taking power in Russia, on November 7, 2007 the world again witnessed a political uprising with the potential to reshape a nation; this time in Russia’s southern neighbor, the Republic of Georgia.

But whereas the 1917 Bolshevik coup d’йtat ultimately succeeded, the consequences of last year’s events in the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, remain less than certain. Four years after hailing the Rose Revolution as putting the former Soviet satellite on the road toward capitalism and democracy, observers in the West were stunned by the events of November 2007 – the suppression of a peaceful demonstration, the shutdown of opposition TV channels, and the declaration of a state of emergency. However, for those analysts following events from within the country, it was hardly a surprise.

Still, much was left to consider. Why were the events of November 2007 unforeseen by the international community, and in particular, the West? And why, until November 2007, did Georgia’s post-revolution leadership remain so attractive to observers in the West, even while analysts within the country grew increasingly disillusioned?

In this article, I seek to answer these questions by taking a closer look at developments in Georgia since the Rose Revolution. By doing so, I seek to demonstrate why the events of November 2007 were inevitable and how they stemmed from the Georgian government’s departure from the democratic ideals of the Rose Revolution.

Post-revolution Challenges and the President’s Centralization of Power

Georgia’s new, mostly young, and in many respects, inexperienced government inherited many problems from the prior Shevardnadze administration. An ongoing energy crisis meant yet another winter with electricity and heating shortages. An inability or unwillingness to collect taxes had left pensions and government salaries unpaid, and rampant corruption rendered the government inefficient and ineffective.

Citing the need to address these challenges, as well as the need to restore the country’s territorial integrity (two separatist regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, had declared independence in the early 1990s and a third region Ajara, while nominally loyal to Tbilisi, remained under de facto control of a local strongman), the post-revolution government of President Mikheil Saakashvili set about concentrating power in the executive from almost the moment it took power.

In February 2004, just a few weeks after the election, constitutional amendments were rushed through parliament granting the president the power to dismiss the government and, in the event of deadlock, to disband the parliament altogether and order for new parliamentary elections. The natural consequence was a parliamentary body loyal not only to the president but also to his government. This significantly weakened its independence and ability to check executive authority.

Although in late 2006, under pressure from the Council of Europe, Saakashvili proposed a further amendment to the constitution that would allow for an extraordinary presidential election in case of repeated dismissals of the parliament, it was largely a token reform. Despite this minor adjustment to the balance of power, other changes in the election schedule further strengthened presidential influence over the parliament. Previously, new parliamentary and presidential elections were due for spring 2008 and winter 2009, respectively, but the amendments rescheduled both to autumn 2008. Thus, although the president reduced his term by a few months, he extended the parliament’s term by more than half a year – an astute move guaranteed to bolster the president’s party which, though the majority, was losing public support every day. Additionally, prior to the events of November 7, 2007, Saakashvili had no significant competitors in the future presidential race. Hence, the change substantially increased the likelihood that those who would vote for Saakashvili would also vote for his party for parliament in future simultaneous elections.

Thus, even before the crackdown of November 7, 2007, the key plan of Saakashvili and his allies was greater concentration of executive power by maintaining parliamentary loyalty. Although some parliamentary opposition remained, it served more as a decoration; ironically necessary for the democratic image from the Rose Revolution which Saakashvili’s administration sought to maintain.

A Stronger Executive and a Stronger State

This concentration of power did little to advance democracy, but it was not entirely without benefit. For one thing, stronger presidential powers allowed Saakashvili’s government to restore financial order and increase tax revenues, overcoming the budgetary crisis inherited from the Shevardnadze-era, and allowing Georgia to pay off all accumulated debts to pensioners and public sector employees. Additionally, after the revolution in 2004 in the Autonomous Republic of Ajara, new opportunities emerged for arranging a normal budgeting process between the central government and the formerly separatist region. As a result of the changes that took place in Ajara, tax revenues of the national budget during 2004 significantly increased for the first time since Georgia’s independence in 1991. In the summer of 2004, the International Monetary Fund renewed its funding program which had been terminated in 2003 due to the incompetence and corruption of the Shevardnadze administration, further illustrating the country’s financial turnaround.

The new government also fought crime and corruption. Stronger presidential powers enabled it to abolish the much-detested traffic police, and to quickly create a Western-style police patrol. Targeting corruption in the energy sector also paid dividends, yielding a much more reliable supply of electricity. Additionally, to further reduce endemic corruption, the government introduced national examinations for admission to universities, abolishing the Soviet-era legacy of separate corruption-prone admission exams to individual universities. Former government officials and their relatives guilty of corrupt practices were arrested and only released upon paying the “price of liberty.” This created an additional revenue stream for the government, which was then paid into extra-budgetary “law-enforcement development accounts.” The practice was promoted as returning stolen state money and property, as well as creating an additional source of revenue. However, this practice is not a sustainable source of revenue.

Broad and ambitious economic reforms, such as large-scale privatization, simplified business-licensing practices, and the reduction of tax and tariff rates, have also accompanied the expansion of executive authority and garnered much international attention.