Eric Fish is a staff writer at the Harvard International Review.
Shortly after taking office as President of Bolivia in December 2005, Evo Morales went on a world tour with stops in Cuba, Venezuela, Spain, France, South Africa, and China. It may seem presumptuous for the new leader of a small, impoverished Andean country to begin his term in this fashion, yet Morales is anything but an arrogant politician. Consider his dress, for example: he is famous for the colorful striped sweater he wears in lieu of a suit, and for his visiting French president Jacques Chirac in the opulent Elysee Palace wearing jeans and a leather jacket. Why did Morales kick off his presidency like a rock star?
The answer is that Morales is more important for what he represents than for the position he holds, and he knows it. He is the leader of Bolivia’s “Movement to Socialism,” and could be the future of Latin American leftism. He has expressed admiration for Hugo Chávez and Fidel Castro, who, along with Morales, have been dubbed by US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld as the “Latin American Axis of Evil.” Yet Morales is more than just the newest iteration in the long line of leftist Latin American heads of state. He is also an Aymara, making him the first leader of Bolivia in over 500 years (since the Spanish conquest) to belong to this indigenous ethnic group that makes up more than 60 percent of the country’s population. In short, he represents the fusion of traditional Latin American leftist politics with a broad indigenous movement. If this political formula is successful, it could serve as a model for other South American countries with large indigenous populations, such as Peru and Ecuador.
The US foreign policy establishment however, is not pleased with Morales’ election. One of the key platforms of his campaign was to end the US-backed war on drugs in Bolivia. Coca, the plant used to make cocaine, is an important crop in Bolivia and is grown for use in teas and traditional medicines. Morales represented the Chapare region in Congress, which is home to a large number of coca growers and is the focus of most of the drug war’s eradication efforts. Morales has long been the political voice of Bolivia’s coca growers, and popular anger at the eradication policies pursued by previous governments was largely responsible for his emergence as a force in Bolivian politics. In the 2002 presidential election, this general discontent propelled him to a surprising second-place finish. Now, after two more failed presidential administrations, it has brought him to Bolivia’s seat of power.
At the top of Morales’ economic agenda is another source of major displeasure for foreign actors: the nationalization of some—or preferably all—of Bolivia’s oil and gas reserves. Fossil fuels are of vital importance to the Bolivian economy. Bolivia has at least 440 million barrels of oil reserves, making it the second most oil-rich country in South America after Venezuela. Additionally, Bolivia has the largest store of natural gas in Latin America, a resource that could immensely benefit the national economy. However, foreign companies own a large portion of these natural resources. Indeed, conflicts with multinational companies over the use of these resources have been the cause of recent political instability. In October 2003, rioting sparked by a deal to export gas through neighboring Chile led to the fall of the 2002 election winner, President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, forcing him to seek asylum in the US. In his efforts to restructure the oil and gas industries, Morales will face powerful opposition from the companies that control these industries and provide Bolivia with vital jobs and economic activity.
Morales is in a tough spot. Like Hugo Chávez of Venezuela before him, he campaigned primarily against foreign interests and won. Now he must undertake a difficult and risky balancing act: he must govern according to his campaign promises without causing a loss in foreign investment or US aid. He must also prevent a US veto that could bring an end to the IMF’s and World Bank’s loans to Bolivia. Unfortunately, the official US policy is to reduce investment and veto Bolivia’s much-needed loans if Morales pulls his country out of the coca eradication campaign. If Morales continues to work with the US to eradicate coca however, it would deal a major blow to the Bolivian economy. During the 2002 election Manuel Rocha, the US Ambassador to Bolivia at the time, publicly warned that “if you elect those who want Bolivia to become a major cocaine exporter again, this will endanger the future of US assistance to Bolivia.” Morales has been able to capitalize on comments like this for political gain in the short term, but if he is unable to deliver on his promises without isolating Bolivia economically, his new model of leftism may be short-lived.