Some experts say that "orange revolution" in Ukraine was merely a successful imitation of peaceful regime change strategies already tested in Georgia and the former Yugoslavia while others maintain that the massive manifestations of Ukrainian people were true democracy in action. In any case, Ukraine was transformed into a true battlefield of power where Russia, the European Union and the United States struggled to exert influence in this strategically-located Eastern European country.

There is no question that foreign funding and political savoir faire played a great role in the presidential election campaign and culminated in a fight between the two leading blocs of oligarchic business in Ukraine. Despite this fact, the outburst of the people themselves was of integral importance.

The "Ukrainian scenario" was just replayed in the Kyrgyz Republic, however, in a very different and violent way. Other political leaders in former Soviet Republics such as Kazakhstan, Moldova and even, to some extent, Russia, are extremely wary of a replay of the "Ukrainian scenario" in their countries. From this fact springs a compelling question: Do these fears have real grounds, and - if so - will these nations be able to escape the fate of Kutchma and Yanukovich?

Ukraine is a country of vital importance to Russia, considered a close and friendly neighbor by most Russians. A former Soviet Republic, Ukraine is a now a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), as well as smaller economic alliances in the post-soviet arena, including GUUAM (uniting Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova) and Common Economic Space (uniting Russia, Byelorussia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan). Partnership with Ukraine guarantees Russia access to strategically important Black Sea ports and provides Russia a market to expand its oil and gas business, now firmly gripped by the state. According to Russian information agency RBC, Ukraine was the 4th-largest recipient country of foreign investment by Russian business.

The European Union also regards Ukraine as an important neighbor, considering it an alternative to Russia as a source of natural resources. According to the new EU Neighborhood policy, Ukraine is treated the same as the EU's numerous other neighbors, which range from Morocco to Libya. The EU is unwilling to start negotiations on Ukraine's membership in the near future (some say such talks might be possible in a decade), but this does not prevent the rapid growth of trade volume both ways across the border. Yuschenko stated that he aims to begin EU membership negotiations by 2007, a goal deemed unrealistic by a European Parliament representative. In his speech in European Parliament in February 2005, President Yuschenko stated that "Ukraine's move towards Europe is no problem for Russia, since it also advances Russia to Europe We would never use our membership in the EU and NATO against Russia and its people. We need a stable Ukraine; equally we need a stable Russia." Meanwhile, the United States seeks to find a reliable ally in this large Eastern European country, rich in both natural and human resources. In October 2004, the International Herald Tribune called the elections in Ukraine a "test case" for Russia-US relations.

The nascent Yuschenko administration resembles that of early Putin, enjoying the support of a great share of population. These supporters hope that the President will undertake more efficient social and economic reforms, curtail corruption, and advance relations with NATO and the EU. Both Presidents formed Councils of Investors in their first year of rule, at the same time rethinking and restructuring privatization in the energy sphere carried out by previous political leadership. For these and other reasons, Ukraine will be increasingly compared with Russia in terms of democratic development and, at least in the short run, this comparison will most probably favor Ukraine.

Political changes in Ukraine stretched "orange sentiments" far beyond Eastern Europe. The U.S. Senate is discussing the withdrawal of the Jackson-Vending Amendment to restrict imports from Ukraine. Political leaders of Central Asia now fear the spread of "orange sentiment" to their own countries. As a result, opposition NGOs, political parties and foreign development assistance organizations have been closely watched, subjected to tax and other inspections, and, in some cases, their leaders detained. However, the irony is that such repressive actions may further contribute to the spread of revolutionary spirit, human rights, and citizen activism.

Bidding on the existing political leaders is not just a Russian foreign policy mistake. It is also a misjudgment typical of the pro-government "Edinaya Rossiya" (United Russia) party. Over the course of the recent governors' elections in six Russian regions last winter, Edinaya Rossiya supported the incumbent leaders, while the population clearly demonstrated that it was tired of old regimes and wanted a change; in most cases, voters favored independent candidates. These elections were some of the last before new legislation that ends popular elections of governors takes effect in Russia.

Citizens' protests in Ukraine, carried out with the help of organized civil society groups, were based on genuine desire for change and frustration with corruption and poverty. According to Dmitry Trenin, the Deputy Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center,the major decisive factor in the Ukrainian elections was the massive and unprecedented self-mobilization of citizens.

A primary shaper of public opinion both in Russia and Ukraine is national television. During the election campaign, all but one TV channel were clearly biased towards outgoing President Kutchma and his chosen successor, Yanukovitch. However, even this powerful instrument was unable to curtail citizen protests in Ukraine.

Russian public opinion on all issues, including Ukrainian elections, is largely formed by the three federal TV channels, each of which are to varying degrees controlled by the state. According to analysis of Russian television coverage of the Ukrainian elections performed by Kommersant Vlast weekly magazine, however, only one channel, "ORT", provided clearly biased coverage of the campaign, favoring Janukovich, probably due to the channel's commercial interest in the Ukrainian media market. None of the channels dared criticize the Russian President when he congratulated Janukovich upon the results of exit polls, nor did the channels repeat this fact much afterwards.

According to data provided by the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center, WCIOM, the focus of Russian television quickly shifted from analysis of the situation in Ukraine to the questions of "How democratic is this revolution?" and "Could something similar happen in Russia?". The majority of people believe that nothing of a similar magnitude will happen in Russia in the foreseeable future. Poll data supports this view: 40% of Russian respondents prefer democracy over dictatorship, 24% believe that under certain circumstances dictatorship may be more effective, and 27% do not have a preference between democracy and dictatorship. At the same time, however, 56% are not satisfied with the way democratic institutions "work" in Russia.