On September 2000, the US Senate voted 83-15 for a controversial bill to extend permanent normal trading relations (PNTR) status to China.

The bill effectively guaranteed China equal trading status with the United States; PNTR meant that this status no longer had to be renewed annually. Proponents of this move, largely the free-trade centrists of both major US parties, argued that PNTR would improve both economies, ease tensions, and even foster improvements in China's human-rights policies. Opponents from both the left and the right argued that granting PNTR was tantamount to appeasement and would only condone China's flouting of human rights and democracy.

In truth, beyond merely providing an opportunity to take economic advantage of the world's largest market, the granting of PNTR is a marked departure from the more antagonistic US policies of the past and is a crucial step in establishing sounder relations and spurring democratic change in China.

During detente, Sino-US relations flourished as both states found themselves united against the Soviet Union.Yet as this enemy disintegrated, so too did the relationship. In the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre, congressional Democrats urged US President George Bush to intensify pressure on the Chinese government to change its policies on human rights, arms sales, and other issues. Specifically, Congress supported linking the issue of human rights with China's annually reviewed Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status: if China did not comply with certain deadlines in improving its humanrights situation, it would lose MFN status and face high tariffs on exports to the United States. Linking was ultimately implemented in 1993 under US President Bill Clinton.

The results were disastrous. In retaliation to what it saw as nothing less than belligerent provocation, the Chinese government jailed a number of dissidents, and Sino-US relations soured. Consequently, Clinton was forced to renege on his policy, and trade status and human rights were delinked in 1994. Clinton then became one of the strongest proponents for normalized trade relations. Even so, the SinoUS relationship continued to erode as the Clinton administration failed to provide a coherent policy toward China, instead dealing with different situations on what seemed to be a case-by-case basis.

Unfortunately, the Clinton administration's missteps stoked the flames of anti-US sentiment in China. In 1996, five former pro-democracy Chinese intellectuals published the book China Can Say No, which marked a profound reversal of opinion-a shift from hailing Western ideals in 1989 to, seven years later, a renewed urging for Chinese assertiveness and for independence from the "ways of the West." The authors stridently opposed Clinton's initial approach to the region, arguing that "America is seen as bestowing favors upon China and, for that reason, gains the right and obligation to intervene in the Chinese historical process."

As these authors demonstrate, the problem with the linkage policy and with containment is that it ignores China's history. From its defeats in the Opium War, the Boxer Rebellion, and World War II, China has a history of being bullied by foreign nations, particularly those in the West.This historical mistreatment, coupled with the desire to be a fully respected player on the world stage, has resulted in resistance to the attempts by foreign power to dictate its behavior. For this reason, Western attempts to force human-rights improvements have proven fruitless and even counterproductive.

PNTR, on the other hand, along with its corresponding policy of positive engagement, promises to be far more productive for improving relations. Unlike containment, engagement recognizes China's history and aspirations by making it an equal trading partner rather than a second-rate country that can be manipulated. By normalizing trade relations, the United States has moved toward stabilizing diplomatic relations.

Even more importantly, free trade will benefit the proponents of democracy in China. Because PNTR displays respect for China, the United States can avoid alienating the Chinese populace. Additionally, by boosting the Chinese economy with mechanisms not under the direct control of the state, free trade can help strengthen the middle class in China, the very people who will ultimately provide the impetus for reform.

Many scholars argue that the beneficiaries of China's free trade will be state enterprises and not the middle class. But the Chinese leadership has become increasingly cognizant of the need to privatize industries in order to compete in the global economy. Thus, the increase in free trade will in fact allow the Chinese middle class to flourish,thereby cementing its role in the Chinese economy.

The argument that economic freedom will lead to increased political freedom is particularly supported by the increase of information technology and the subsequent rise in the popularity of the Internet. Today only 0.1 percent of China's population uses the Internet, but as trade with the West and the United States increases, so too will the influx of information technology products, thereby increasing the access of the Chinese people to the Internet.

China has demonstrated in the past decade that it will not allow itself to be changed from the outside. The United States simply will not be able to pressure China into democratic change and improvements in human rights. The best alternative, then, is to use trade to establish friendly ties, thereby avoiding conflict while spurring democratization from within.The future of democracy in China seems promising, as can be seen with the popularity of recent grassroots village elections. By granting PNTR, the United States has expressed its willingness to support this project rather than rashly thinking it could speed it up.