The unspeakable sequence of terrorism in New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington, DC on September 11, 2001, was a crime against humanity that sent a wave of revulsion throughout the civilized world—a world that will never be the same again. The lives of many people and many nations are now on the threshold of change. Pakistan’s entrance into the international coalition against terror mirrored a broader worldwide development. Forces unleashed by the events of September 11 leave nations no choice when it comes to choosing where they stand. US President George Bush put it succinctly when he said, “Either you are with us or you are against us.” Pakistan’s cooperation re-invigorated its long-standing interaction with the United States, but the relationship will have moments of strain in these new circumstances. The dilemma that Pakistan now faces is that while it stands on the side of the forces aligned against international terror, it finds old linkages difficult to leave behind.

Tough Breaks

The first repercussion of September 11 was the end of the Taliban regime that harbored Al Qaeda, but the engine of change in Kabul was the Northern Alliance’s General Dostum rather than the Pakistani president, General Pervez Musharraf. The inability of Pakistan to engineer change in its own backyard where it previously enjoyed influence is significant. The military establishment has long viewed the Muslim Brotherhood as an ally because of its close alliance with the Pakistani military and security apparatus during the Cold War and its prevention of domestic socialist revolt. But the external forces unleashed by September 11 are forcing new political alignments that have led Pakistan to abandon some of its cherished policy goals. The first welcome casualty of the new Pakistani-US relationship was the long-standing romance between Pakistan’s security apparatus and the rigid, extremist Taliban leadership. Yet the first tension in relations between the United States and Pakistan comes from their diverging viewpoints on the new Afghan interim government led by Hamid Karzai. Although Pakistan welcomed the Karzai government, it is uncomfortable with the leading role of the Northern Alliance.

The Pakistani military regime joined the US-led coalition against terror less from conviction than compulsion. Soon after September 11, President Musharraf appeared on state television to explain that he chose “the lesser evil” by joining the coalition and justified the move by saying that failure to do so could have damaged the country’s nuclear assets. The notion of “compulsion” explains the inability of Pakistan to engineer the downfall of the Taliban or even to quickly break relations with it after the rout began. The long-term ties with the Taliban make Pakistan wary of the new internationally supported Afghan government. The ruling elites in Pakistan will seek an opportunity to re-assert their influence in Kabul by continuing linkages with some of the most extreme factions of the former mujahideen, the freedom fighters that forced the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan.

Pakistan formulated its policy toward Afghanistan on the basis of “strategic depth.” It saw in a pliable Afghan regime a foil to its uneasy relations with India, a country against which it has fought three wars since gaining its independence. Pakistan fears that its policy of strategic depth in Kabul will collapse if it discontinues support for the extremist factions. The Pakistani government does not believe that a friendly Afghan government is a sufficient guarantee of a secure border. The support for the Taliban produced linkages between the military and religious and militant groups. The ruling elites are finding it difficult to absorb the changes required of Pakistan as domestic linkages mesh with external requirements.

The second factor that causes concern in Pakistan is that breaking the linkages between the military, security apparatus, and religious groups could undermine its political support for the people of Jammu and Kashmir. The cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign policy is the dispute with India over control of this territory, leading both countries to seek weapons of mass destruction. While the United States may expect its ally to move against domestic groups related to Al Qaeda, Pakistan may find such a move impossible due to its own Kashmir policy. Ironically, even as the military regime joined the international coalition against terror, the groups closest to the Pakistani government took to the streets. The leaders of the religious parties with ties to militant groups held small, violent demonstrations, and some were put under house arrest. Those who remained free printed posters to recruit Pakistanis to fight the “holy war” on the side of the Taliban. They gathered young men who crossed into Afghanistan to fight in defense of Al Qaeda.

The principal reason General Musharraf’s military regime was not overthrown by hard-liners in the military was the role played by the democratic forces in Pakistan. While the religious establishment’s supporters took to the streets, their democratic opponents lent public support to the Musharraf government in its decision to join the international coalition. Surprisingly, the regime still treated the democratic forces harshly, keeping their popular leaders exiled.

The break with the constituency that backed the extremist Taliban has yet to come, and, unless it does, strains will persist in the Pakistani-US relationship. There are few signs so far that the present military regime plans to break links with the military, intelligence, political-religious, and militant groups. During the Cold War, the United States often supported dictators as the lesser evil in the war against communism. Now the United States is confronted with Pakistan as a military ally that it wishes to reward but that does not share its commitment to democratic values. Pakistan borders both Iran and Afghanistan—homes to two of recent history’s Islamic revolutions. In Iran, it was the Ayatollah-driven Shia, and in Afghanistan it was the extreme Sunni movement that brought Mullah Omar to power. The forces unleashed by these events left their own impact on Pakistan.

The Democratic Alternative

Too often the people of undemocratic countries find a democratic alternative lacking. Squeezed between the Western-backed dictator and the promise of change from the cleric-backed aspiring dictator, they turn to the clerics. For Pakistan’s stability, it is important that the third choice of democracy be available.