The administration’s declaration that the Kyoto Protocol was “dead” also produced unexpected results at the negotiating table. European governments that had rejected even minor modifications to the Kyoto emissions-reduction targets during The Hague talks were suddenly forced to confront the reality that the entire agreement might collapse if the Protocol were not completed in July at the next negotiating session in Bonn, Germany. And while Bush pledged not to obstruct the Bonn meeting, US administration officials identified Japan as the weakest link among industrialized nations and worked to convince the new government of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to await a US proposal before agreeing to anything in Bonn. In the end, this effort failed: in order to save the treaty, European governments made substantial concessions to the Japanese—concessions that would have been unthinkable six months earlier in the Hague—and an agreement was announced on July 23 that substantially completed the Protocol.

Dynamics of 2002

While there are no public indications today that the Bush administration is considering softening its position on the Kyoto Protocol or domestic emissions reductions, political pressures for it to do so are likely to intensify over the coming year. For one, 2002 is a critical congressional election year for both parties: Republicans control the House by a razor-thin margin and Democrats control the Senate only by courtesy of Vermont’s James Jeffords, now an Independent. While many of the Democrats’ most popular domestic issues were temporarily swept off the table by the September 11 terrorist attacks, it is unlikely that the 90-percent presidential approval ratings from which Republicans are benefiting will survive through next November. (Bush senior enjoyed similar ratings following the Gulf War in 1991, but went on to be defeated in his re-election bid the following year.) As the ship of state rights itself and elections loom, national security may remain by far the most prominent national issue, but it is unlikely to remain the only one of concern to voters.

The Bush administration certainly recognizes that a significant amount of repair work must be done to its environmental image. Bush’s flurry of press conferences in national parks during the spring and summer did not move his poll numbers on environmental issues at all; those in the White House arguing that the problem is not policy but presentation have now seen their message-only approach fail. One important early sign of preparation for the 2002 congressional elections was Whitman’s about-face on standards for arsenic in drinking water: in a Washington Post interview on September 10, she said she would not announce a new standard any less stringent than the one she inherited from the Clinton administration. With an EPA decision on the issue scheduled for February, neither Whitman nor the White House likely relished the prospect of kicking off an election year with another controversy about arsenic in the nation’s drinking water.

On both domestic and international fronts, the Bush administration faces the prospect that global warming will continue to be a prominent environmental issue. Jeffords’ departure from the Republican Party in May not only switched Senate control to the Democrats but also gained him the chairmanship of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee. As one of five often-isolated moderate Republicans, Jeffords was the principal author of legislation to establish the first mandatory carbon dioxide emissions-reduction program, which the White House was able to ignore. Now, as chairman, he is aggressively moving that legislation through his committee; by January or February, it is likely that the White House will face a committee-approved bill that will be debated on the US Senate floor sometime during 2002, placing carbon dioxide emissions reductions squarely in the middle of the domestic environment debate as US congressional elections approach.

At the same time, the international dynamic around the Kyoto Protocol has intensified. British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who has assumed the role of the administration’s strongest international supporter in anti-terrorism efforts, has made clear both publicly and in private meetings with US administration officials since September 11 that a cooperative US policy on global warming is a high priority to him. His views will be very difficult for the president to ignore. Germany and France, both of whom have been strong supporters in the aftermath of the attacks, offering participation by their troops, are also among the strongest backers of Kyoto.

Equally important, following legal text negotiations in Marrakech in October and November, the European Union and many other nations will proceed to formal ratification. Japan recently informed US State Department officials that Japanese ratification will swiftly follow the Marrakech talks. This creates a difficult international situation with potential domestic political consequences: in September 2002, less than two months before the US congressional elections, world leaders will meet at the second “Earth Summit” in Johannesburg, South Africa, to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the Rio summit. Global warming will be a high-profile issue at the meeting, and Bush faces the prospect of appearing at home to be isolated and out-of-step on the environment once again. Ironically, this is exactly the situation his father faced at Rio before the 1992 elections, when he rejected provisions of the draft UNFCCC that required binding emissions-reduction targets.

Getting Bush on Board

If international pressure is to be successful in softening the Bush administration’s position on agreeing to a binding international agreement on carbon dioxide emissions reductions, the United States must be given a face-saving means of rejoining the international community on this issue. There is a way to accomplish the above goal that, at the same time, acknowledges a fundamental reality. The United States cannot now meet the reductions targets agreed to in Kyoto four years ago. A reduction from business-as-usual emissions of more than 30 percent by approximately 2010 was ambitious, even if the Clinton administration had begun to press Congress immediately for action on domestic emissions reductions. Now, following the September 11 attacks, there is simply no indication that the United States can reach that goal. If Congress completed legislation mandating such reductions by the end of 2002—not in itself likely—completing regulations implementing the law would take at least two years. Industries facing reductions would then be only three years away from the Protocol’s first budget period (2008-2012) and meeting the targets would be physically impossible.