The three great global commons are not equally at risk from the WTO. Unlike the first global commons of the seas discussed above, the atmospheric/climate system probably can only be preserved by international agreements, because the emissions that threaten this system are not usually linked to specific exported goods and because the actions of the world’s most populous and prosperous nations will determine whether the climate is stabilized. Rogue nations are only a limited threat to climate. As I indicated, marine ecosystems are at the greatest risk from the WTO’s rules because they are the most vulnerable to rogue states, which are largely motivated by export markets.

The third great global commons, the genetic diversity of the biosphere, is barely recognized as a commons by most observers. Endangered-species treaties such as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) have been effective at protecting diversity, but only where supported by import restrictions. Unlike the atmospheric/climate system, the biosphere can be severely degraded by the action of rogue states. A single nation in a migratory-bird corridor can wipe out species that are the common inheritance of dozens of nations. Yet the United States, the world’s most powerful trading nation, insists that the WTO should be able to restrict the use of trade restrictions to enforce international environmental treaties that protect the global commons. It is true that trading blocs with rich consumer markets, like Europe and the United States, will have greater leverage over the rules of exploitation of the global commons in this scenario. But the consumption of rich individuals is already driving the demand for such exploitation. To say that individuals in rich nations can encourage the strip mining of the ocean in the pursuit of cheap shrimp, while communities that wish to protect sea turtles cannot act collectively in the pursuit of ecological sustainability, is to privilege material consumption above all other values.

On the Road to Disaster

As long as environmental standards are set domestically, a set of international trading rules that makes it preferentially easier to achieve the goal of enhancing exports at the expense of the environment will tend to lower environmental standards. Global environmental treaties, while usually too late, are indeed the best solution for protecting the global commons. Environmentalists cannot support a system of global trading rules that restricts the ability of those communities that have been mobilized on a given environmental issue to exercise leverage globally by using market access, at a time when other values (e.g., intellectual property rights) are being enhanced by market-access preferences.

Regrettably, trade versus environment conflicts may worsen before they improve. The draft declaration for the next round of WTO talks merely pays lip service to environmental protection, recognizing the rights of governments to “take measures to uphold and enforce the levels of health, safety, and environmental protection they deem appropriate,” but it then proposes a series of negotiations that could do precisely the opposite. For instance, talks on “services” could force developing countries to open domestic mining sectors to transnational companies, increasing pressure on, say, rainforests that happen to be situated above deposits of copper and gold. In addition, the service talks are likely to give the WTO oversight over domestic technical standards and licensing requirements, potentially weakening standards for oil tankers’ safety or for hazardous-waste disposal.

C. Fred Bergsten, president of the Institute for International Economics, cites the “bicycle theory” of trade negotiations to explain the need to press ahead with further trade talks before existing trade rules have been fully implemented. The theory holds that trade negotiations must move forward without stopping in order to keep ahead of governments’ tendency to create new protectionist barriers. Without a rapidly moving schedule of talks, the entire trade system will simply tip over. A theory that might better fit the facts is the “bum’s rush” theory. In this theory, the trade establishment wants to craft a comprehensive framework of trade restrictions on domestic law, which deals with investment, services, agriculture, intellectual property, and more, before citizens realize that many principles of constitutional government have been traded away.

World trade is not in jeopardy. Trade, after all, has grown steadily at twice the rate of the gross national product for the last 50 years. However, a more deliberate pace to trade negotiations would ensure adequate scrutiny of the WTO’s agenda and might curtail the ability of corporate interests to outdo democratic governments. Properly balanced, a rules-based trading system could be environmentally neutral or even environmentally protective. But the particular set of doctrines and rules set by the WTO are detrimental to the environment. They constitute a trade-driven regime that elevates material consumption and the interests of multinational producers above such values as the ecological heritage of future generations. Economic integration can have beneficial or detrimental effects, depending on how it occurs. Even the multinational titans who meet annually in Davos, Switzerland, have come to realize that the world they are creating may not be safe for life. Economics should catch up with the real world.