From Daniel Yergin's famous book The Prize to Kent Calder's less notable but still influential Asia's Deadly Triangle, authors who have tackled the difficult subject of energy have tended to emphasize the competition for scarce resources as the force driving energy geopolitics. As Calder warned, "Expansionist, confrontational strategies, not to mention the acquisition of nuclear weapons, offer some attractive prospects of gain to regional powers, such as preferential access to energy resources and sea lanes in the South China Sea." In an analysis that became accepted wisdom among China watchers, Calder noted that this strategic rivalry, if unchecked, represents a recipe for disaster and will increase the likelihood of conflict in Asia.

Breaking this mold, Robert Manning of the Council on Foreign Relations offers a different view of the role energy issues play in Asia in his new book The Asian Energy Factor. Manning sets out to debunk the projections that the world is running out of oil. He begins by systematically highlighting the errors of the so-called "Club of Rome," a group of prominent scientists and public figures who published a highly influential report about resource scarcity called Limits to Growth in 1972. For his part, Manning takes a more sanguine view of the rapid growth in energy demand expected to come from the rise of the middle class in Asia. While he argues that this growth might indeed be large, he also makes the case that available resources will be able to meet it.

Asia as a whole appears poised for a period of sustained expansion, with important ramifications for world energy consumption. By 2005, Asia--defined to include the Indian subcontinent, Southeast Asia, East Asia, Australia, and New Zealand but not the countries of the former Soviet Union and the Middle East--could consume more energy than Europe. Five years after that, its energy consumption could top one-third of the global total.

Asia's rapid economic growth, explosive urbanization, dramatic expansion in the transportation sector, and politically important electrification programs will have a particularly strong effect on Asian consumption of oil and natural gas and the region's dependence on oil supplies from outside the region. Already at over 19 million barrels per day (b/d), Asia's oil use exceeds that of the United States, and about 60 percent of this amount must be imported from outside the region. By 2010, total Asian oil consumption could reach 25 million to 30 million b/d--of which 18 million to 24 million b/d must be imported from outside the region. China alone is expected to see its oil imports rise from their current level of around one million to 1.5 million b/d to three million to five million b/d by 2010. It is this latter eventuality that has awakened fears in Tokyo, Seoul, and New Delhi of competition or even confrontation over energy supplies and lines of transport.

The Asian Energy Factor acknowledges this emerging state of affairs and clearly articulates its implications for the region. The quest for fuel will create new economic and strategic challenges and alter geopolitical relations. But Manning carefully builds his case, arguing that the outcome could be constructive rather than divisive depending on the policy choices made by the key players in the region and by the United States.

Asia's rising energy needs will almost certainly compel it to strengthen its ties with the Middle East, leaving open the possibility of new alliances and tighter commercial and economic links. Manning acknowledges that this economic necessity could create naval competition in the sea lanes between the Persian Gulf and Northeast Asia, where the United States now holds a dominant position. In discussing this divisive influence, Manning presents a solid outline of the longstanding territorial disputes and strong animosities that still color interactions among the key Asian powers.

But Manning leaves room for optimism, noting that the expanding Middle East-Asian nexus will also wed together Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Indian, and US interests in Middle East political stability and safe passage. This could potentially encourage alliance building and free-riding off current US naval power. He also notes that the need for a new energy infrastructure in Asia will be so great that Asian countries will be forced to work together. The challenge of mobilizing capital (over US$1 trillion Manning estimates) will require regional cooperation, potentially pressing the region's leaders to put aside historical, ideological, and nationalist imperatives in the interests of economic integration, cooperation, and regional energy security. Manning specifies potential areas for cooperation, including cross-border natural gas pipelines; electricity grid link-ups; cooperative strategic oil stockpiling associations; joint activities in fighting maritime piracy and in establishing sea-lane security; and cooperation in nuclear energy, including the management of nuclear waste problems.

Although Manning takes on the faulty wisdom of the oil establishment in his early chapters, the strength of his book lies in the chapters about the unique, culturally and historically driven mindsets regarding energy-security policy in China, India, Japan, and South Korea. In particular, his astute analysis of how South Korean and Japanese leaders cope in completely different ways with the same paucity of resources lends great insight into the factors that have inhibited Japan's progress. To make his point, Manning quotes an unnamed senior Korean diplomat: "The difference is that we think of ourselves as a small continental power surrounded by giants and will find a way to get by, while the Japanese have the mentality of an isolated island."

Japan has been obsessed with its energy security for much of the past century, and its foreign and economic policies have been driven by the mythology of self-reliance. This has led Tokyo to favor costly government intervention in the energy sector that some say now prevents the Japanese economy from recovering after its recession and hurts the long-term global competitiveness of Japan. By contrast, South Korea seems resigned to the fact that it cannot control its own energy fate, leading to policy-making that is less concerned with avoiding dependencies, and more concerned with relying on alliances to provide protection from supply disruptions.

Manning puts forward convincing economic statistics and political details to support his contention that 19th-century neomercantilist terms of competition for territory and diminishing oil reserves are unlikely to fit neatly in the world of the early 21st century. He notes that US oil imports grew from 1.8 million b/d in 1960 to 8.8 million b/d more recently "without creating crisis competition with other importers." But he is realistic about what he terms the "pathologies of Asia" and notes that issues of territory loom large as defining issues in Asian interstate relations. In his opinion, territory and nationalism, not resource scarcity, are more likely to be catalysts of conflict in Northeast Asia. The events of the past decade and even the details of conflicts in the resource-laden South China Sea seem to fit more accurately into Manning's thesis than into Calder's.