The change in the design of the baton rounds from PVC material to polyurethane went largely unreported. In 1994, a new weapon launcher was added to the inventory and the safety record improved substantially. Since the introduction of the new weapon system, 13,500 baton rounds have been fired, and there have been no fatalities. RUC Superintendent Colin Burrows, commenting on the development and use of baton rounds, highlighted the importance not only of technical design but also of highly organized conflict-management processes. Technology, combined with training and supervision, substantially reduces potentially life-threatening risks.

This is an important trend and points to a fundamental issue: nonlethal weapons can improve and meet progressively higher standards of safety. The difficulty is in determining when the initial deployment meets minimum standards, realizing that while many lives may be saved with a new weapons system, a few may be lost as well. For law enforcement, legal woes from inevitable lawsuits following the few unintended deaths or injuries often dissuade agencies from trying alternative and innovative systems. Unfortunately, it is easier to explain deaths by firearms than to explain even nonpermanent injuries from nonlethal weapons that have not been tested in the court system.

Militarily, nonlethal weapons are best known for their use in peacekeeping operations. However, they can be employed at all levels of conflict, including strategic applications. PostDesert Storm, no one doubts the military capability of the United States or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Nonetheless, potential adversaries may question whether or not there is both the intent and the will to use force in a given situation. Nonlethal weapons that are designed to attack an adversary's infrastructure can provide that message. For example, attacks on the communications or transportation systems would send a clear message about the intent to use the force necessary to achieve stated objectives. Such attacks also demonstrate the will to do so without the catastrophic consequences of lethal force. Of course, there should be cognizance of the potential for secondary or tertiary casualties. These issues must be factored into the decision of whether or not to use force at any level. In the event of escalation, nonlethal attacks against the infrastructure would have begun the process of degrading the enemy's capability to wage war. From a political perspective, it must be assumed that if nonlethal weapons do not achieve the desired goals, or the adversary immediately chooses a shooting war, the necessary forces and the war plans must be in place to respond instantly. Decisions about such use of force should not be made incrementally. In other words: no bluffing.

Relative Diplomacy

Several issues of international concern have been raised with respect to the increased emphasis on the development of nonlethal weapons. One is a perceived likelihood of premature armed intervention. This argument assumes that nonlethal weapons would make it easier for governments to authorize use of force in either internal or international situations. Inferred is a propensity for interference in the internal affairs of other nations. This notion suggests that, provided with weapons that would limit casualties, democratic politicians would act imprudently. In fact, leaders would continue to carefully contemplate the consequences of any intervention. If not, then the wrong political leaders have been elected or appointed.

Other expressed concerns are possible legal implications and treaty violations. This applies specifically to chemical and biological systems. Again, a paradox arises. The treaties were established to minimize the use of these inhumane agents that kill and maim indiscriminately. Without envisioning the possibility that some chemical and biological agents could actually be used to reduce casualties, emotionally based and broadly worded treaties were enacted to forbid the use of such agents. To further complicate the legal issue, certain agents were reserved for domestic use but forsworn in combat. Typically, riot-control agents are among those that are legal for controlling a civil population but cannot be employed against a combatant. Unforeseen when these treaties were ratified was the current situation, in which military units perform peacekeeping duties that bear a striking resemblance to those of civil law-enforcement agencies.

There are two schools of thought about adherence to existing treaties. One school, heavily favored in Europe and by many US politicians, advocates strict compliance to the letter of the law. Some political leaders cling tenaciously to the concept that laws and treaties assume the power of a preordained edict of God, when, in fact, they are drafted by fallible mortals. Another view believes that the treaties should be revisited and changed where applicable to meet today's circumstances.

While it is easier to support established protocols, it will prove impractical in several ways. First, existing protocols leave no alternative to unnecessary killing. Second, the basic chemical and biological technologies that degrade or destroy materiel will be developed in any case, through perfectly legal means. Transition from peaceful purposes to application in warfare exists only in the intent of the user, not in the technology. Third, many potential future adversaries are nonstate actors and thus not signatories to these treaties. Their host countries frequently cannot, or will not, control the activities of these rogue organizations that transcend national boundaries. Further complicating factors include the burgeoning concepts of asymmetric warfare typified by Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Chinese army colonels who co-authored the manuscript Unrestricted Warfare. As the title implies, the authors espouse attacking non-- military targets that disrupt the infrastructure of the enemy. Part of the Desert Storm legacy was to convince future adversaries that direct confrontation against US high-tech weapons was impractical.

A final argument against treaties is that they are almost always violated. The most significant example was probably the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. As revealed by Dr. Ken Alibek, first chief deputy of the Biopreparat (the supervising body of the Soviet biological-weapons program) from 1988 until his defection in 1992, despite signing the treaty, the Soviets created the most extensive biological-weapons program the world has ever known. That program was initiated the same year the treaty went into effect. It has been repeatedly demonstrated that verification of treaties on weapons of mass destruction is extremely difficult. In short, treaties often provide a false sense of security and can prevent prudent research. The same objectives can be accomplished without legal ramifications through internal policies on weapons development and use.