A Multifaceted Approach

If command structure and a reliance on a coalition of forces have been factors contributing to mission effectiveness, then UN-led interventions need to be reconsidered. Either their structure must change, or the United Nations should continue to refrain from leading high-intensity missions, at least temporarily, until some means can be found to build up its reputation.

This is not a suggestion that largescale robust missions should be taken as an automatic guarantee of success. A variety of peacekeeping operations-both large and small-that match the extensive array of belligerent strategies may be more appropriate. Sometimes the problems in the world create a need for a large-scale high-intensity mission. But that does not mean that we should seek to eliminate less intense forms of involvement such as fact-finding, observer missions, and information gathering through early-warning networks.

Information gathering is particularly crucial in determining belligerent intentions and strategies. Astute leaders, aware that overt tensions may lead to escalation, will prefer a lowintensity war, effective enough to accomplish specific objectives without attracting outside involvement. For example, the Serbian-dominated government of Yugoslavia, led by Slobodan Milosevic, seems to have calculated that as long as it kept its efforts below the level of ethnic cleansing, the world would focus on ending violence in Bosnia and would tolerate repression in Kosovo. As long as Milosevic could oppress the Albanian minority without creating large refugee flows that might destabilize the region, the world was largely uninterested in the Kosovo issue. When the refugee issue could no longer be ignored, Kosovo became a symbol of a test of wills between NATO and Milosevic.

Similar patterns of low-intensity political strategies (localized killings and political assassinations) were carried out by Rwanda's Hutu leadership as a lead-up to the planned genocide in 1994. The failure of the UN Security Council to authorize a robust response to the deteriorating situation in Rwanda (despite dire warnings of impending genocide from a variety of monitoring groups) was a clear signal to Rwanda's Hutu leadership that it was free to escalate the killings with impunity and deliberation.

When Intervention Backfires

Finally, we come to moral hazard and bias. Moral hazard relates to the question about whether the effect on belligerent behavior is necessarily beneficial. Can actions taken by third parties to forestall violence actually encourage it? The security provided by peacekeepers and humanitarian agencies can be understood as a public good available to belligerents and civilians alike. This paradoxical consequence occurs if outside involvement to limit damage also reduces the risks that combatants face in pursuit of gains through violence. The difficulty in many cases is separating combatants from noncombatants.

In other cases, peacekeepers may be unable to determine which group or groups should be held responsible for instigating the violence, and in the hope of alleviating suffering they provide benefits to all regardless of their role in the conflict. For example, food aid directed through nongovernmental organizations is often provided to warring factions as well as to the victims. Emergency health care is given to both combatants and noncombatants alike.

The effects of bias are more readily discerned. Unfortunately, there is no easy cure for dampening the unintended consequences of taking sides. There may be instances where biased interventions encourage more violence, and there may be instances where de-escalation results. For example, NATO statements and action before the bombing phase in Kosovo served to bolster the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in terms of tangible military growth, strengthened numbers, and increased international legitimacy. In turn, the KLA used the cease-fire obtained during the Rambouillet talks to increase their fighting capacity. They also used the cease-fire and the presence of international verifiers to reoccupy all the territory lost in the previous year and to keep up a series of small-scale attacks against Serbian security forces.

Similarly, NATO air strikes have been identified as a catalyst for the acceleration of the conflict. But the conflict was accelerating before bombings began. By March 1999, Yugoslav authorities already had a clear plan in place for the expulsion of Kosovars, indicated by how Yugoslav forces were situated and their subsequent precision in clearing paths to the borders and speedily driving out ethnic Albanians. The implementation of this plan was not merely a spontaneous reaction of anger to the NATO bombing. The bombing gave Milosevic a strong incentive to be in control of as much territory as possible before sitting down to negotiate a settlement.

Given the problems in developing effective strategies, including the negative impacts of bias, moral hazard, and loss of reputation, should we conclude that force is an inappropriate component of modern peacekeeping? Not really. It may simply be necessary to recognize that effective peacekeeping is not likely to be cheap and is unlikely to lead to immediate compliance and de-escalation. But the evidence is clear-the costs of effective conflict management are far outweighed by the consequences of war and violent conflict.