The ICISS is expected to produce a report later this year. Although its expert advisors are likely to cover a number of interesting questions (such as problems of financing and the relationship between humanitarian intervention and sovereignty), its single biggest contribution will be in providing a strategic framework that addresses the somewhat more practical questions of when and how to intervene. This may be achieved through a closer examination of conflict thresholds and early-warning indicators, as well as current constraints in international law. Taking its cue from the Independent International Commission on Kosovo, the ICISS should be in a position to elaborate on basic criteria justifying intervention, e.g. civilian suffering due to human-rights violations or the breakdown of government, the commitment to protect the civilian population, and the prognosis that the intervention has a reasonable chance of ending the conflict.

Out of the Void

The Brahimi Report, the work of KISS, and earlier studies on the utility of a rapid-reaction capability conducted by Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade indicate a trend toward a norm of collective intervention in a wide range of situations, including genocide, interference with the delivery of relief, violation of cease-fire agreements, collapse of civil order, and irregular interruption of democratic governance. These studies raise a number of important challenges and questions.

While there is an emerging agreement that states have an obligation to intervene in such circumstances, the bigger challenge is in identifying and implementing actions against them. The assumption that those who intervene must be perceived as impartial and act as such is now seriously questioned. Faced with extreme instances of political violence, a coalition of states or an organization should not be discredited for wanting to see a conflict reach a specific outcome. However, the use of force must be closely linked to the mediation process. In this context, force should be seen not as an end in itself but rather as a means to a political and diplomatic end. Force and the threat of force constitute the coercive side of negotiating a peace plan in which the fear of even greater costs motivates combatants to make concessions at the bargaining table. An obvious prerequisite for success is a political foundation that clearly specifies the responsibilities of the warring parties before obliging the intervening countries or organization to commit forces to any military operation.

Rare is the situation where third parties-whether they be ad hoc coalitions of the willing, the United Nations, or regional organizations-have not relied on a mix of force, coercive diplomacy, and mediation to bring warring factions to the negotiating table. It is useful to think of conflict management as a continuum of techniques and strategies. Different techniques are set in motion at different points within a conflict. Interventions generally begin with low-cost, peaceful tactics such as mediation and condemnation. Key elements in mediation and other pacific forms of conflict management are the nature and level of consent and the level of coercion required to reach a settlement. If peaceful measures fail, escalation may ensue. Thus, intervention "progresses" in the following way: reassurance and preventive diplomacy, verbal appeals to not use force, inducements, deterrence, and finally compulsion and pre-emption. Actions taken early on in the life cycle of a conflict are positive strategies, whereas later negative strategies are more coercive in nature.

A Matter of Credibility

In addition to questions regarding the use of force, there are uncertainties about peacekeeping strategy. In today's conflict environment, the choice of any peacekeeping strategy is dependent on the nature of the strategies with which it must interact. Effective peacekeeping is neither static nor reactionary. Conflict is a dynamic process, and those who intervene must be prepared to adapt to conditions on the ground. All peacekeeping strategies involve risk, but doing nothing may precipitate undesirable outcomes. Forceful intervention may lead to further escalation and unnecessary costs for those who intervene, but a weak response will not only produce undesirable results for the third party, it may also promote further violence.

Questions of credibility and resolve relate directly to developing effective and dynamic strategies as well as to generating an effective reputation for credible response over time. Security institutions and organizations are not just things that evolve structurally. Their reputations and credibility also change over time. Any strategy that is weak in capability will not be taken seriously as a credible deterrent and is more likely to fail under extreme and hostile conditions. This means that peacekeeping forces must be prepared to implement robust mandates when necessary, acquiesce and possibly withdraw in the face of stronger counter-forces in other instances, and if incapable of mustering the necessary resolve, be prepared to not get involved in the first place.

For example, the credibility of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) evolved in response to ethnic violence in Bosnia, creating a set of conditions that made the fighting unacceptable to all sides. But that credibility was generated only after four years of sustained conflict in the region and only when NATO was able to bypass the United Nations's "dual key" approach to crisis management. Having learned from its bitter experiences in Bosnia, NATO demonstrated much greater resolve in responding to the violence in Kosovo. The net result was a comparatively short campaign that succeeded in achieving most of the original objectives: stopping the violence, separating the warring factions, and providing a secure environment for the return of refugees.

For would-be peacekeepers, there is considerable value in establishing a reputation for resolve and commitment. High initial investments pay long-term dividends. For the United Nations, overcoming the burden of its mixed record has proven very costly in two ways. Intervening forces under UN guidance have had to intensify their efforts to re-establish their lost credibility (for example, through supporting but not leading forces in West Africa and Bosnia), or they have been circumvented altogether by regional efforts and coalitions of the willing (as in Kosovo and East Timor).

In short, the lesson learned is simple: if an organization or coalition responds quickly and effectively, it will generate a corresponding reputation for being resolute. Consider the impact that failed interventions have had on the United Nations's reputation as a security organization. Having acquired a reputation in this past decade for relative "weakness," the United Nations may find it useful to avoid areas of low salience and concentrate resources on conflicts that it is determined to "win." By avoiding circumstances in which it is unlikely to stand up to a challenge, the global organization at least avoids sending any more discomforting signals of incapacity, while concurrently conserving limited resources.