According to recent reports from the Center for International Development and Conflict Management, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, and the Peace Research Institute of Oslo, the world is a less risky place to live in than it was 10 and even five years ago. Three positive trends contributing to this transformation have been identified. First, the number and magnitude of armed conflicts within and among states have significandy decreased since the early 1990s. Second, ethnic groups are gaining greater autonomy and power. Third, democratic governments now outnumber autocratic governments twoto-one and continue to be more successful in resolving violent societal conflicts.

Despite the system-wide decline in overt conflict, the demand for innovative, long-term, and effective conflict-management strategies has never been greater. Some conflicts are being brought to a close or are slowly winding down as a consequence of concerted peacebuilding efforts and exhaustion. However, state failures in sub-Saharan Africa, emerging conflicts in Central Asia and Southeast Asia, and long-standing protracted conflicts in the Balkans, the Middle East, and South Asia will continue into the indefinite future. The pressure to respond to these problems is unlikely to go away, and if past performance is any indication, the prospects of relieving this pressure are not good. Over the last decade, the international community's track record has been neither farsighted nor strategic, failing to resolve conflicts in four ways.

First, it has failed to prevent the slow collapse of states in Central and West Africa, despite a clear understanding of when and where such events would occur and the availability of forecasts for predicting and explaining their causes and manifestations (as in the Congo, Guinea, and Sierra Leone). Second, it has failed to anticipate the moral hazards that are generated by efforts to address refugee flows, ethnic cleansing, and clan warfare (as in Rwanda and Somalia). Third, it has failed to understand the way biased interventions can accelerate conflict between combatants (as in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Liberia). Fourth, it has failed to produce credible responses to warring factions, thereby generating even greater violence (as in Rwanda and Bosnia).

When examining these failures, the question to ask is: Why? What do these failures suggest about when and under what conditions the United Nations or regional organizations should intervene to prevent tensions from escalating out of control, and how to manage crises when they do?

Status Report

After 10 years of "wandering in the void," the academic and policy communities are finally generating answers to these questions. We now know that post-Cold War peacekeeping operations differ from their predecessor missions in a number of important ways. For one thing, the central characteristics of traditional peacekeeping missions-the use of force for self-defense only, the interposition of troops after a cease-fire, and the maintenance of tactical and strategic impartiality-no longer provide the boundaries for presumed mission success. Second, intrastate conflicts are more complex and more deadly for both peacekeepers and ordinary citizens caught in the fray. Third, in order to perform functions such as guaranteeing the safe passage of humanitarian aid and assisting and protecting displaced persons, peacekeepers have had to resort to more forceful actions. These changes have led some observers to conclude that the key principles underlying conventional and essentially peaceful missions are problematic, if not anachronistic, in an era dominated by armed conflict within rather than between states.

We also know that regional politics should be recognized as a serious influence, if not a constraint, on peacekeeping effectiveness. Today's intrastate conflicts are seen too much as internal problems. They need to be placed in a regional context, with respect to how regional rivalries, "bad neighbors," and refugee flows affect conflict dynamics and how arms flows and local support for insurgencies undermine efforts to establish a stable environment in which peace can be fostered. When faced with a regional conflict, the United Nations is unlikely to engage in costly strategies at the outset, because the Security Council lacks sufficient "political will"-interest, consensus, and resources-to fulfill broad open-ended commitments. Slow escalation of violent conflict will evolve as a result of this unwillingness or inability to become involved at the earliest stages.

The consequences of not acting early are obvious. Effective peacebuilding-that is, picking up the pieces after a violent conflict has torn a country or region apart-is a costly and time-consuming process. The peacebuilding experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo clearly show that the termination of violence and the subsequent shift to long-term economic, social, and political measures require the military backing of major powers as well as their political support. Interventions of this kind demand close coordination of military, diplomatic, and nongovernmental assets, a coordinated campaign plan, and considerable resources. Few states other than the major powers are capable of providing these resources. But even when these resources are available, action rarely occurs. Responses to recent crises have unfolded selectively, only when those who have the capability to respond also have the motivation to respond. Many of the world's conflicts have been ignored as a consequence.

Policy Insights

Several initiatives have been undertaken to advance the debate on collective security and peacekeeping. These include the Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (also known as the Brahimi Report), which builds on the Secretary-General's Millennium Report, and the recently launched International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (KISS).

Among the many ambitious recommendations in the Brahimi Report, the most important include the development of meaningful criteria and techniques to identify and respond to conflicts in a more robust fashion; an increased role for regional organizations in peacekeeping; and greater coherence and coordination among security, trade, and development institutions in conflict prevention. The report may be right in concluding that, post-Kosovo, more interventions with the United Nations as a secondary actor will continue. This is not necessarily a bad thing if commensurate efforts are taken to strengthen the capacity of regional organizations to prevent and manage local problems. With its years of peacekeeping experience in logistics and training, the United Nations and its member states could be expected to do more in shoring up regional efforts. UN support will not only have the effect of counterbalancing the perception that "regional hegemons" are at the forefront of local peace initiatives, but could also enhance the global organization's influence and reputation. Organizational reforms of this kind will require the formation of coalitions of governmental and nongovernmental representatives who can act together to provide leadership and who are willing to tolerate increased organizational complexity at the regional and global levels.