In May 2005, I wrote an op-ed in the Washington Post entitled “Israel’s Lawyer,” making what I considered an incontestable point: if America wants to help reach an agreement between Arabs and Israelis, it must be an advocate for both sides.

The reaction to the article was fairly intense. The Arabs loved it; Israelis and American Jews loved or hated it, depending on their politics. Like everything else associated with Israel, Jews, and domestic politics, this issue has been misinterpreted, hijacked, and used in the struggle between Israel’s supporters and detractors over the US’ Middle East policies.

Nowhere is the confusion more apparent than in the discussion, or lack thereof, on how domestic politics shape US policies toward the Arab-Israeli issue. Former National Security Advisor Tony Lake told me that domestic politics is like sex to the Victorians: nobody talks about it, but it is on everybody’s mind.

It is time we start talking about it, but we should do so honestly, free from self-delusions or conspiratorial thinking. Unfortunately, too many of Israel’s supporters believe that domestic lobbying has little to do with what drives the US-Israeli relationship: shared values. On the other hand, too many of Israel’s detractors believe that it is all lobbying and has little to do with value affinity.

After over 25 years of observing our political system, I have come to some basic conclusions about the influence of the pro-Israeli community on the US’ Arab-Israeli diplomacy: in our system, domestic lobbying has a powerful voice but not a veto. The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) is the guardian of a fairly strong pro-Israeli predisposition among a sizable number of lawmakers who care passionately about Israel and a majority who do not feel nearly as strongly, but who have other legislative priorities. In any event, the farther one goes from Congress, the less expansive AIPAC’s reach is, and the more other factors influence the US’ decision-making.

At the same time, no conspiracy exists where a small number of Jews and an increasing number of evangelical Christians compel an entire foreign policy establishment to support Israel against its collective will. Israel has become part of the American story, resting on a foundation of shared values orchestrated by powerful advocates operating in very friendly circumstances.

The case for Israel is made by five predominant “lawyers”: first, a well-organized, affluent, and powerful community of 5.3 million American Jews, most unaffiliated and uninvolved, but a sizable minority for whom Israel is a non-negotiable issue; second, AIPAC, a powerful lobby which defines what it means to be pro-Israeli in Congress and defines the risks of departing from the consensus; third, millions of evangelical Christians who for reasons of eschatology and shared values are stunningly pro-Israeli; fourth, al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and non-Arab Iran, whose extremism generates sympathy and support for Israel; and fifth, the impact of Israeli prime ministers on the worldview of American presidents, which was most evident by Ehud Barak’s relationship with Bill Clinton and its disastrous diplomatic impact during the final years of the Clinton administration.

Together Israel’s lawyers advocate a case no administration can ignore. The fact is that the debate between Israel’s supporters and detractors in the United States is over, and the contest of whether the United States should maintain a special relationship with Israel has been concluded. The pro-Israeli community has won—big time—and support for Israel is very much in US national interest.

The problem is not support for Israel. US interests suffer when we allow the special relationship to become exclusive. Maintaining Israel’s trust and confidence is vital to our success in Arab-Israeli negotiations. It is quite another matter, however, not to expect reciprocity, not to speak out and impose costs when Israel pursues policies harmful to our interests, such as settlements and land confiscation, or to allow Israeli prime ministers like Ehud Barak and Ariel Sharon to determine US tactics and strategy on Arab-Israeli diplomacy.

The case for Israel is a compelling one, and despite the challenges it poses for the United States in an angry and turbulent Middle East, it is one worth making. We simply need to ensure that we make it in a way that is good for the United States. The real question, however, is whether presidents are prepared to lead in the service of national interest. When they do, domestic lobbies, albeit noisily, almost always follow. One can only hope the next president will understand that.