Much is left to be done in Iraqi politics, however. Recent legislation notwithstanding, progress has been uneven with crucial issues such as election reform, a resolution on the status of Kirkuk, and hydrocarbon legislation showing little promise of near-term resolution. For the sake of sustainable stability in Iraq, its leaders must build on the nominal gains made thus far to create a political culture in which Iraqis view themselves as a single people working together to build a new nation and addressing their inevitable differences legislatively, rather than violently.

Economics

Often forgotten in our policy toolkit are economic actions. Students of counterinsurgency and nation-building know that a country's economy, as much as its security situation and political environment, is one of the key pillars to successful stabilization efforts. In fairness to the Bush administration, the United States has pumped a good deal of money into Iraq. But much of this early funding went to large-scale infrastructure projects that could not flourish in the dangerous security environment that has prevailed in Iraq for so long.

Recently, there has been some progress, including a beefing up of US provincial reconstruction teams. The high price of oil has obviously not hurt Iraq either. That said, overall the situation remains mediocre. Thankfully, electricity production has finally risen to roughly 20 percent above typical levels under Saddam Hussein, not counting the additional growth in the informal Iraqi electricity market, which probably adds another 30 to 40 percent. Supply has not increased as fast as demand, but progress is real and significant. In addition, as has been the case for years, telephone usage has skyrocketed. Inflation has been stabilized, and gasoline prices have also been partially rationalized, reducing the drain that subsidies impose on Iraq's national coffers and introducing at least a modicum of free-market discipline into how fuel is consumed in Iraq.

It is not clear, however, that there is comparable progress in any other major sector of the economy. Data from both the US and Iraqi governments on water and sewage is undecipherable and discouraging. The best evidence indicates that there has been no net progress nationwide since the invasion. Anecdotes tell of children returning to school in light of the improved security environment, but no systematic data source we are aware of tracks this alleged progress. The health care system remains largely broken, and any progress is invisible in the mess of piecemeal statistics put out by authorities in Iraq. Job creation remains weak and unemployment floats in the 30 to 40 percent range, although recently established "micro-loan" programs are beginning to provide assistance to Iraq's burgeoning entrepreneur community.

These statistics are not abysmal compared with those from Saddam's era or even other countries in the Mideast. But they do reveal that Iraq's economy is not providing any major boost to our overall mission. For most of the past five years it was at best a slight drag on progress, contributing to people's unhappiness and sense (of fairness) that the United States was not doing right by the Iraqi people. More recently, economic conditions may have provided a slight lift, but improvements have been very modest overall. Essentially, the economy has been a wash, neither significantly helping nor significantly hurting our overall efforts to contain the violence and help construct a working political system.

Conclusion

Iraq's bottom line is simple to summarize. The economy is improving but still fairly weak. Its security environment is far better than in 2006, and the debate is basically over whether the surge has "worked" on Iraq's streets. But the country remains in a state of war: 2004, 2005, and 2006 were so violent that major reductions from the levels of those years do not mean that the situation is anywhere close to stable. And by the surge's ultimate goal of success-fostering political reconciliation, or at least a spirit of pragmatic compromise, among Iraqis-it has not yet worked adequately. Individual provinces show progress, but national level cooperation among Sunni, Shia, and Kurds, the ultimate requirement for stability, remains limited. In the end, however, even though the political process is heavily flawed, it is starting to show modest momentum, giving reason to hope that the overall mission can still succeed-or at least avoid defeat.

For more statistics and sources, visit www.brookings.edu/saban/iraq-index.aspx.