The key to GWOT success will lie in the United States’ ability to develop and sustain an alternative avenue for moderate Muslims to address their grievances. Current counterterrorism policies effectively deny the legitimacy of Muslim grievances. Extremists can be marginalized and reduced to mere exhortation if moderates are able to articulate an alternative non-violent strategy that presents greater potential for success than that offered by the extremists. The United States should cultivate and support viable, appealing, alternative strategies organically developed within aggrieved Muslim communities. In this way, local and regional movements would be decoupled from the Salafi jihadist movement’s global insurgency.

Recommendation 4: Methodically attack Al Qaeda’s organizational cohesion

The United States should aggressively exploit the weaknesses of Al Qaeda’s new decentralized structure. It must degrade the trust in the organization’s systems, among its activists, and between its leaders. Al Qaeda is now critically dependent on a high degree of trust for cohesion among its many elements.

Paralysis of Al Qaeda’s critical organizational systems and the degradation of its most important relationships will not eliminate the Salafi jihadist terrorist threat. It will, however, reduce the ability of the organization to execute operationally complex, high-impact, spectacular attacks. By targeting the trust that keeps Al Qaeda functioning, the United States can effectively remove the mortar from the foundation that supports the Salafi jihadist movement.

Recommendation 5: Refocus national counterterrorism resources squarely against the most serious threats to the United State's national security

The decentralization and amorphous transformation of the terrorist threat combined with decreasing federal funding allocated to state and local homeland security programs have made it more critical than ever that the United States mount the most vigorous and efficient possible defense against terrorist attacks. Policy makers at all levels of government must take two basic actions to improve the US’ homeland security in spite of these growing challenges. .

First, they must differentiate between high- and low-consequence terrorist threats and counter each in the most appropriate manner. High-consequence threats should be countered methodically with a layered defense of objective security measures. Low-consequence terrorist threats should be objectively countered at the state and local level. However, in this realm, the federal government should limit its activity to intelligence and law-enforcement support. Instead it should align its efforts to reduce the subjective psychological, economic, and operational impact of low-consequence terrorist incidents on the national welfare.

Second, policymakers must be absolutely clear about what type of terrorist threats the US government is determined to counter and reduce. Homeland security resources should be directed predominantly against the most devastating, high-consequence, catastrophic terrorist threats judged plausible by national intelligence authorities. The increasing global incidence of comparatively low-impact terrorist attacks, the US Department of Homeland Security’s growing emphasis on “all-hazards” preparedness in the wake of the flawed Hurricane Katrina response, and the politicized nature of the state and local grants distribution process have diffused homeland security dollars to reduce a wide range of threats that do not necessarily present a legitimate threat to America’s national security.

Simply put, the US government cannot realistically expect to defeat terrorism or prevent all terrorist attacks. In order to effectively counter the full spectrum of terrorist threats, policymakers must focus on the discernible consequences of various types of terrorist activity and perceived probabilities of highly terrorist events. Policymakers should direct the vast majority of counterterrorism resources against the high-consequence, “black swan” events that truly present a strategic threat to the survival of the American way of life.

CONCLUSION

An increasingly decentralized Al Qaeda has redefined the locus of activity for its senior leadership. Ironically, the battle-hardened senior ranks of the organization are now almost exclusively engaged in the exercise of “soft power.” The primary challenge of leadership in this new environment is to ensure organizational survival through the development and marketing of an appealing ideology and an effective strategy.

For perhaps the first time since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States is in a position to decisively redefine the nature of the struggle against Salafi jihadist terrorism. Thoughtful examination of the roles of strategy, ideology, and the ever-growing leadership challenges and tradeoffs of Al Qaeda’s decentralization reveals a window of opportunity for powerful counterterrorism policy reform. It is time for the United States to lead, encourage, and support the growing chorus of critics of Al Qaeda’s strategy of violent confrontation with the West. This is the true battle of ideas that moderate Muslims, dissenting extremists within Al Qaeda’s own ranks, and free peoples everywhere have been waiting for the United States to fight for far too long.