While war is a permanent fixture of human existence, it is also the most effective catalyst for significant changes in the structure of the international community. The manner in which order is reestablished and power is redistributed after a war is the topic of many theories on international politics – from constructivism, to neo-liberalism, to institutionalism. The chief aim of this essay is to discuss the institutional model of postwar power distribution and apply that theory to the current problem of postwar order and stability in Iraq. The regime change is now complete in Iraq, but stability has not been achieved and long-term solutions that will guarantee a favorable US-oriented regional order in the Middle East have not been implemented. In applying this model to the Iraq question, it is the author’s intention to suggest a policy that will move both US national security objectives toward a more stable and long-term power distribution arrangement in the Middle East. If the United States is to create the conditions for lasting peace in the region, it must start with stabilizing and binding multilateral institutions. In the words of Arendt, “The chief reason warfare is still with us is neither a secret death-wish of the human species, nor an irrepressible instinct of aggression, nor finally and more plausibly, the serious economic and social dangers inherent in disarmament, but the simple fact that no substitute for this final arbiter in international affairs has yet appeared on the political scene.”

Institutionalism: Its Roots and Concepts

After the end of World War II, the world entered a period of asymmetric power distribution that has never been seen before in history. The United States emerged as the clear benefactor of this power imbalance and remains so today in spite of a 40-year Cold War, economic globalization, and the regular eruption of numerous regional and trans-regional conflicts. The various international institutions established after World War II (and carried through the Cold War) still hold a significant position in international political affairs and these institutions have served to maintain notable stability in political relations. Although not originally designed for purposes of stabilization, both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) are excellent examples of institutions that evolved from postwar orders and have created stability while preserving the power positions that resulted from war. These institutions have helped to create a set of long lasting and stable US-European and US-Japanese relationships. Institutions such as these represent concessions to asymmetric power and are determined to be in the best interest of both the primary power and secondary nations.

In his book, After Victory, G. John Ikenberry identifies the framework and underpinnings of the institutional theory of postwar international relations in a compelling and descriptive manner. Ikenberry identifies the current existing power inequity and the need for the United States to be informed about the nature of stable orders via institutions. The model presents the institutional theory in contrast with neo-liberalism and constructivism, offering “an argument about the general sources of stable political order, domestic and international. Stable orders are those in which the returns to power are relatively low and the returns to institutions are relatively high. If the argument in this book is correct, US foreign policy makers need to be reminded what characteristics of the postwar order have made US power reasonably acceptable to other states and peoples during and after the Cold War." Ikenberry’s work forms the foundation for the arguments expressed in this policy recommendation piece.

That the United States was unrivaled in power in 1945 was not nearly as evident as it became in 1989 with the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, the fact that European powers saw the great inequity at the close of WWII and strove to achieve lasting institutional bonds is significant. In retrospect, postwar US foreign, economic, and national security policymakers had three basic choices in response to the existence of a new asymmetry of power: dominate the international community (become a hegemon), abandon the battlefield (revert to isolationism as they had following WWI), or transform its position (institutionalize the environment). Unique to the US choice, according to Ikenberry, was that “removed from both Europe and Asia, the United States was able to conceive of security relations more broadly and with an eye to the long term." Additionally, the United States distinctly believed that economic inequality and closed markets were the largest contributors to political instability and conflict abroad; both presented a fertile seedbed for postwar world order commitment.

Thus, the idea of transforming its position as a world power became a particularly attractive option for the United States throughout the Cold War – and it remains so today. Transformation requires constant redress of approach to the three spheres of US National Security concern: foreign policy; economic, trade, and environmental issues; and enlarged national security policies. The post-Cold War approach must continue to include ideals central to the institutional theory framework: collective security, alliances and coalitions, and dominance of international law- which, according to Amos Jordan et al, are all components of democratic values. Similarly, the nature of US democracy and capitalism in Ikenberry’s view presents itself as both an objective and a catalyst for international transformation.

Road Signs to Institutionalism

Ikenberry posits that the choices the United States made in choosing institutionalism were affected by the character of the postwar order and the dominance of two competing ideologies (capitalistic democracy and communism); the extent of the asymmetries and the types of states involved in institution building (industrial democracies); the remarkable effect of industrialized democracies on post-war order (transmission of democratic values and globalization of economies); and the two great fears of secondary states (abandonment or domination by US power). On one end of the spectrum, the idea that the United States could remain isolationist in its approach to global order remained strong following WWI. On the opposite end of the spectrum, the United States might have chosen to dominate the international community, but it is fair to argue that the democratic form of government played a significant role in preventing this outcome.