Two prominent Australian academics and former senior Australian Department of Defense officials Paul Dibb and Hugh White have argued that it is wrong to think Australia can continue to build strong links with China and not be forced eventually to make a strategic choice between China and the United States. Former Australian Foreign Minister Downer dismissed this view as “fundamentally mistaken” and “unthinking historical determinism.” Confrontational strategic rivalry will not develop between the United States and China, he argued, as both countries were dealing “sensibly with areas of friction.”

One of those areas of friction is the future constitutional status of Taiwan. The United States endorses a “one China” policy, that is, it recognizes the government on Mainland China as the sole government of all of China, including Taiwan. However, the Taiwan Relations Act requires the United States to “maintain the capacity … to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan” and empowers the President and Congress to determine an appropriate response by the United States in the event of the use of such force or coercion.

Australia has received a string of reminders from the United States that Australia’s ANZUS obligations extend to joining with US forces in preventing a forceful Chinese takeover of Taiwan and has threatened to abrogate the treaty should it fail to do so. Former Australian Deputy Prime Minister Tim Fischer has written that in late 2000 and in 2001, “Australia was told that it must automatically jump onto the US side in any conflict with China over Taiwan. Furthermore we should mold our defense force in preparation for this and not hesitate in doing so.” Former Foreign Minister Downer told an audience in China in August 2004 that Australia was not obliged to assist the United States in a military defense of Taiwan and that the ANZUS Treaty would only be invoked in the event of a land attack on the United States or Australia. This provoked a reminder from the US State Department that the provisions of the treaty also required Australia to come to the assistance of the United States if its armed forces, ships, or aircraft anywhere in the Pacific region came under attack.

A future Australian government could, therefore, face something of a dilemma should the issue of Taiwan’s constitutional status come to a head. There is the risk that if Australia does not join a US military action against China over Taiwan, the United States could abrogate the treaty. It is not clear what the implications of that would be for future military cooperation between the United States and Australia, particularly for Australian access to US intelligence and military technology or for the joint US-Australian communications and intelligence installations in Australia.

The risks to Australia in joining a US military action against China over Taiwan would be significant. Aside from the damage to Australia’s trading relationship with China, significant Australian casualties could be expected. Only 500 Australians died in the Vietnam conflict. Australia has had less than 1,500 troops in the current Iraq conflict at any one time and, to date, has suffered no battle casualties. A conflict involving China would be one of a very different order and Australian casualties could be significant. The government of the time could also face a political backlash. Recent polls show that only 21 percent of Australians would support Australian participation in such a conflict.

Conclusion

In signing the ANZUS defense treaty with the United States, Australia appeared to have succeeded in obtaining a degree of reassurance that, should Australia once again fall under military threat, as it had from Japan in the Second World War, it had a powerful ally to call on for assistance. The participation of relatively small numbers of Australian forces in the conflicts in Vietnam and Iraq and access to US intelligence and military technology seemed to represent insurance at relatively low cost against the day Australia might need to call on US assistance. But were Australia to be requested by the United States to provide forces to fight a war with China over Taiwan’s status, Australia may well find the increased premium unaffordable.

Two further considerations should shape Australia’s attitude to the alliance. First, military assistance from the United States should Australia find itself facing a military threat will only be forthcoming if the United States were to be satisfied that its own interests were also threatened. Second, with the end of the Cold War, and particularly since September 11, developments in Asia have become less of a US foreign policy priority and the United States may now be less willing to honor its alliance commitments in the region.

It is something of a cliché in discussion about Australian foreign policy that Australia needs to choose between its history, represented previously by its association with Britain and presently with the United States, and its geography as an Asia-Pacific country. Prudence suggests that now would be a good time for Australia to more closely attune its foreign policy to its neighborhood, starting by mending fences with its neighbors, damaged by the reputation it has earned in some quarters of Asia of having become the United States’ “deputy sheriff” in the Asia-Pacific region.