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The ANZUS Treaty, signed in 1951 between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, was one of a number of mutual defense treaties the United States signed with Asia-Pacific countries in the aftermath of the Second World War in an effort to contain Soviet and communist Chinese expansion in the region.
For Australia and New Zealand, the principle objective of the ANZUS Treaty was to ensure that there would be no post-war resurgence of Japanese militarism. The treaty was their quid pro quo for acceptance of the peace terms the United States sought with Japan. Fears of Japan had passed in Australia by the 1960s; however, as former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans has remarked, there has existed in Australia, throughout its history, a “persistent anxiety about a threat from Asia: sometimes vague and undifferentiated, sometimes specific, but always there.” Australian governments have, therefore, continued to attach central importance to the treaty.
In essence, each ANZUS Treaty party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on any party is “dangerous to its own peace and safety.” The parties are to consult together whenever such an attack is threatened and to act to “meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.” The treaty also requires that the parties “separately and jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid … maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.” This has led to a broader defense relationship through which Australia has obtained intelligence and military technology from the United States. Gareth Evans has noted that “without the exchange of intelligence [with the United States], and the technology, re-supply, and training support that it [the alliance] involves, Australia would find it difficult to sustain a basic defense posture quite as self-reliant as we would like it to be.”
The ANZUS alliance has also led to joint US-Australian ground defense, communications, and intelligence installations in Australia. They provide intelligence on adherence to arms control and disarmament agreements and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, as well as communications between Australia and US command centers and their respective fleets in the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific.
Liberal-National Party governments in Australia have been unwavering, even eager, supporters of the alliance which has led to Australian contributions to US-led global military actions in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. When the United States announced in April 1965 that it would introduce ground forces into the conflict in South Vietnam, the then Liberal-National Party government provided a battalion of troops to support US forces. Immediately following the events of September 11th, 2001, the Liberal-National Party government invoked Article IV of the ANZUS Treaty for the first time in its fifty year history, announcing its willingness to support the United States militarily “to the limit of our capability.” In 2003, Australia provided forces in Afghanistan (and is still doing so) and Iraq as a member of the “coalition of the willing.”
Support for the alliance has generally been bipartisan. However, there has been a degree of ambivalence in the Labor Party towards military actions taken in the name of the alliance. Initially supportive of the war in Vietnam, it later campaigned for withdrawal of Australian forces. On the announcement by the Liberal-National Party government that it would commit troops to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, then Labor Party Leader Simon Crean described the moment as a “black day for Australia.” The recently elected Labor Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has committed his government to the alliance, recently remarking, “the ANZUS Treaty … is destined to endure into the future whoever might form the next government in Canberra or in Washington.” However, Labor campaigned during the election campaign for an early Australian force withdrawal from Iraq and is currently negotiating with the US and Iraqi governments to that end.
Public attitudes in Australia show a similar ambivalence towards the alliance. Recent polling revealed that 84 percent of Australians thought the alliance is either “very important” or “fairly important.” But, in a separate poll, 68 percent said that Australia takes too much notice of the United States in determining its foreign policy. This reflects the low levels of public support for Australian participation in the wars in Vietnam and Iraq. Public support for Australian involvement in the war in Vietnam initially ran as high as 63 percent, but by August 1969, more than half of the public wanted Australian forces withdrawn. In early 2003, in the lead up to the second Iraq war, a majority of Australians opposed Australian force involvement without UN endorsement. In February 2003, more than 500,000 people across Australia demonstrated against the war. Asked in a mid-December 2006 poll, 73 percent of Australians said the Iraq war was not worth fighting; 71 percent said that Australia’s involvement in the war had made a terrorist attack on Australia more likely. In a defiant response to criticism of the war, then Prime Minister Howard commented, "people are critical of America, but in the end, our futures are linked and the strength and power of America is important to us, especially in this part of the world.”
What guarantees does the alliance offer Australia?
A recent poll revealed that 73 percent of Australians had either a “great deal” or a “fair amount” of trust that the United States would come to Australia’s defense if it were attacked. But is this trust well placed? In an important way, the ANZUS Treaty is unlike the NATO Treaty, which makes automatic responses mandatory. The ANZUS Treaty, as mentioned above, requires only that the parties “consult” in the event of a military threat and act “in accordance with [their] constitutional processes.” This choice of words was deliberate on the US side. In March 1951, following the negotiation of the treaty, President Truman’s Special Envoy to the Far East, John Foster Dulles, wrote to General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, that “the United States can discharge its obligations [under the ANZUS Treaty] … by action against the common enemy in any way and in any area that it sees fit.”
