Every major election in Ukraine has seen profound regional variations in voting, a phenomenon that has been widely analyzed. Ukraine’s regions were joined to the Russian Empire/Soviet Union at different times and under vastly different circumstances. As a result, there are different regional identities with different historical memories concerning Russia, Europe, and democracy. Many have wondered whether the absence of a clear national identity in Ukraine, or a “political community,” impedes construction of a liberal democratic system.

Less appreciated has been the contribution that Ukraine’s regional divisions make to maintaining a balance of power in Ukrainian politics. The events since 2004 can easily be recast in regional, rather than democratic/authoritarian terms. For those in central and western Ukraine, the bid by Kuchma and Yanukovych to steal the 2004 election was a bid by the pro-Russian Donetsk clan to rule the entire country and steer it toward Russia. Many in the east and south supported this bid, and saw the Orange Revolution as a “coup” designed to subjugate their regions of Ukraine. The 2006 and 2007 parliamentary elections replayed these voting patterns quite closely.

In sum, Ukraine has had pluralist politics – and a fractured array of “democratic” forces – since 1991. Leonid Kuchma tried to overturn pluralism, and make Ukraine a hegemonic system, as is the norm in the region. In this context, the rigging of the election was an attempt at a change in the system, and the protests that ensued constituted a restoration of the existing system. Similarly, the unity of opposition forces in 2004 was not the norm, but an exception born of the imminent danger to opposition groups of all kinds. Since 2004, various forces have continued to foil attempts by one actor either to become dominant or to eliminate another key actor from the process. At the same time, no change that would mark 2004 as a year of democratic revolution has taken place.

To say that Ukraine has political pluralism is not to say that this pluralism is stable, secure, or consolidated. There have been periods (especially 1999 to 2004) when power has been consolidated dangerously. So while pluralism has persisted, it is not guaranteed. Had they chosen a less odious candidate than Viktor Yanukovych, Kuchma and the Party of Regions would likely have succeeded in overthrowing pluralism in 2004. Yanukovych nearly succeeded again in 2007, when he was able to get a new Law on the Cabinet of Ministers passed, and was able to ignore the imperative mandate. Attempts will continue, and sooner or later, one could succeed. Three essential questions remain:

First, will pluralism become an important constraining norm in Ukrainian politics, or will it continue to be only a practical necessity? In other words, will important actors in Ukraine believe that a balance of power is itself good, such that they will switch sides in order to preserve it, and will support institutions designed to preserve it? Signs point in both directions. Yushchenko and a pivotal bloc of voters seem to support pluralism, and Yushchenko has played the role of “balancer” (and has been excoriated for doing so). Yanukovych and Tymoshenko seem more inclined to fight it out for supremacy. Stronger normative support for the principals of compromise, rule of law, and constraint of power will need to emerge if democracy will be consolidated in Ukraine.

Second, will balance of power lead to a strengthening of institutions and rule of law? Put differently, can the balance of power be maintained by itself, or are strong institutions needed to prevent what the American Federalists called the "tyranny of the majority?" One interpretation of the rise of liberalism in the West is that powerful actors found it in their interest to create institutions that constrained their behavior, in order to produce greater stability and survivability. Might that happen in Ukraine? So far, such efforts have failed. In 2004, the deal that ended the standoff in Kiev included measures intended to support pluralism more effectively. But some of those measures were quickly ignored. While a balance of power helps institutions remain in force, strong institutions help keep power balanced, and Ukraine currently lacks them. Three institutions need strengthening: political parties, civil service, and the courts.

Third, what are the political and economic limits of a system in which competition is only loosely limited by rules of engagement? Ukraine, like many polities in transition, contains within it powerful forces promoting the concentration of political power. These include heavy state involvement in the economy, politicization of law enforcement and regulation, patronage unhindered by civil service rules, and lack of judicial independence. Unlike many others, Ukraine has centripetal forces that hinder concentration of power. Foremost among these is the regional divisions, which makes a nationwide “majority faction” nearly impossible to assemble. Equally important is a plurality of economic oligarchs, who seek to keep each other in check.

The “Orange Restoration” of 2004 helped maintain a plurality of political and economic powers in Ukraine. Unlike in Russia and other states in the region, no single force has consolidated power in Ukraine. But this does not necessarily mean that Ukraine is not a “winner take all” system. Rather, it may simply be that no one has won yet. Is Ukraine always one election, one clever would-be authoritarian, one blunder by liberals, or one economic crisis away from authoritarianism? Only by developing the normative and institutional bases for pluralist politics can it achieve stability without authoritarianism.