President Saakashvili claims the demonstrations were a plot inspired by external forces to destabilize the government. This event and the continuing disruption of the capital city’s main street, he argued, justified the use of the riot police and the closure of TV stations agitating on the demonstrators’ behalf. The use of non-lethal force to prevent the blockage of a vital thoroughfare or prevent civil disturbances is a commonly practiced solution in democratic states too. But the decision to strike when the rally was dispersing, and the use of national security threats and conspiracies to justify the brutal police action underlines features of the Rose Revolution that suggest it was more than mere frustration over prolonged disruptions of Tbilisi city life. It was the action of a government which wished to demonstrate the coercive capabilities of the new state, the weakness of the opposition, and the importance of social discipline.

Three statements by President Saakashvili in November – while not necessarily representative of a complex figure who is prone to exaggerated rhetoric and emotional outbursts – provide some evidence of the Rose Revolutionaries’ thinking on state power, thinking that led naturally to the government action of November 7. In an address to Georgia’s leading businessmen on November 10, Saakashvili defended the fierce crackdown: “We have passed the test on whether we are Bantustan or a real state, whether we are a failed state, or whether we have a real government […].” Throughout November, he consistently emphasized the importance of a strong state capable of resisting opposition threats to its very foundation. On November 25, at the National Movement’s party congress celebrating the fourth anniversary of the Rose Revolution, Saakashvili declared: “We are a young revolutionary government … We are idealist and maximalists – this is our party’s major strength and advantage.” Although this was an address directed at a more ideologically oriented audience, it was an appeal to the radical roots of the Rose Revolution. Revolutionary government can mean many things – and not all of it is necessarily bleak for democracy – but it has two features that undermine democratic government: first, revolutionaries know what is best for the people, and second, the goal of a better life for all is not obstructed. Finally, on November 5, in a TV broadcast not two days before his decision to disperse the rapidly diminishing demonstration, Saakashvili declared: “Keeping focus means that everything we do should be done faster.” Speed was the essence. Saakashvili was in a hurry. Movement was more important than accommodating procedural delays or obstacles presented by the opposition.

Keeping in mind that Saakashvili also articulates pragmatic and sensible views about democracy-building, these three statements taken together suggest an emphasis on the state’s despotic power, especially at times of crisis, a dedication to irreversible change, and the need to accelerate reforms. None of these features, in themselves, are anti-democratic, but they suggest a style that neglects, rather than promotes, compromise and cooperation with the opposition, or what Mann calls infrastructural power. This may change in Saakashvili’s second presidential term. His significantly diminished support at the January 5 elections is one reason to expect a much more cooperative president. His election program, which called for “Georgia without poverty,” acknowledged a government disconnect with society that had to be repaired. However, after four years, the Rose Revolution still has three major promises to fulfill: prosperity, territorial unity, and inclusion. But Georgia’s poverty, its hostile international environment, and internal territorial threats will make them hard to achieve. The first and second will be hard to accomplish in the next five years of President Saakashvili’s second term, but the third is feasible. On appointing Lado Gurgenidze as Prime Minister on November 16, Saakashvili declared: “We should be very concrete and open with the people and there should be no distance at all between the government and the people.” If he follows through on this policy of infrastructural power, then he has a chance of creating the strong state he wants and Georgia needs.