A similar phenomenon exists in the Jordan River basin. Israel by far has a larger and stronger army when compared to that of Jordan. Israel’s army greatly outnumbers Jordan’s because Israel holds both genders liable for military service. Furthermore, although Israel and Jordan spend a comparable percentage of their GDPs on maintaining their military strength, Israel’s GDP is almost six times greater than that of Jordan. With these obvious advantages, coupled with the support of the American military, Israel, like Turkey, also enjoys more input regarding matters of water.

As a final note, military imbalances cause fear in the inferior nations, thereby empowering the superior nation even further. Disparities in military capacity can thus hinder peaceful cooperation and can increase the potential for conflict. In a negotiation setting, such differences can easily lead to the inferior country perceiving the superior as a threat to its security. The implications for future agreement, as a result, are less than heartening.

Working through the Differences

All four categories of inequality—geographic location, water resources, economy, and military—render cooperation unlikely by creating an imbalance of power between the superior state and the inferior states. The superior countries controlling the headwaters of the rivers have more access to water, and thus, more options and opportunities for economic development. With all of their obvious advantages over their downstream neighbors, the superior riparian states do not have much incentive to cooperate. Furthermore, the riparian states of both the Tigris-Euphrates and Jordan basins have unpleasant histories of wars and occupations. In the Tigris-Euphrates region, the memories of Ottoman oppression are still fresh in the collective memories of Syrian and Iraqi residents. In the Jordan basin, the Arab countries still hold hostile feelings regarding the disastrous endings of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. When the war ended with the West Bank and Jerusalem under Israeli occupation, the chances for regional cooperation decreased significantly in the Arab countries; they felt that it was impossible to maintain their self-respect while also cooperating with Israel. These unfriendly feelings are still present in the Jordan watershed area, hindering effective cooperation. In both of these regions, historical conflicts make cooperation, an already difficult process, even more so.

Water will always remain an issue in the arid Middle East. Therefore, a plan for cooperation and fair division of the limited supply of water is crucial. It is important to note that the disputing riparian states are members of international organizations like the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. As some scholars argue, these organizations can encourage cooperation by pressuring or offering incentives to speed up the much-needed process. One possible approach the international community can take is setting up a nonpartisan regional organization specifically for water politics. As an international entity, it could look beyond the immediate circumstances of individual countries and the inequalities created, and instead dedicate its efforts solely to water-sharing. Arun Elhance, a geopolitical specialist, predicts: “In the end, even the strongest riparian states sharing international basins are compelled to seek some form of cooperation with their weakest neighbors… because when water is scarce, the costs of non-cooperation are felt on many levels.” The only question that remains to be seen is when this end will come.