On January 1, 1994, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, EZLN) staged a violent rebellion that rocked Chiapas, Mexico’s southernmost and poorest state. The EZLN mobilized some 2,000 armed peasants to occupy a chain of mountain towns in Chiapas and confront local and federal authorities, only retreating when then-President Carlos Salinas ordered 70,000 troops to the region. Tensions still simmer in Chiapas today. Since 1994, the ongoing conflict has been characterized by battles between Zapatistas and the Mexican government for political control over the state’s lands and communities. The Zapatistas fight on behalf of poor and indigenous Mexicans, who, they claim, face social ostracism and exploitation under the heel of wealthy capitalists. The government, in turn, retaliates in the name of law and order. Present-day Chiapas is an unstable and violent region that Mexican officials refer to as a “tinderbox.” It seems that there can be no hope for peace so long as the Zapatistas’ grievances remain unaddressed.

The 1994 uprising was staged in response to the enactment of NAFTA, which broke down trade barriers between Mexico, the United States, and Canada. The EZLN protested NAFTA on the grounds that free trade would cause a huge drop in the prices of Mexican exports such as coffee and corn, advancing the interests of landowners and capitalists at the expense of the peasants in the fields. The Zapatistas feel that NAFTA has widened the rich-poor gap in Mexico, fueling their fiercely anti-globalization, anti-capitalist stance.

The EZLN declared the rebellion a success because it had raised international awareness of the class conflict in Chiapas and of NAFTA’s negative repercussions. Post-rebellion, the Mexican government promised to enact land redistribution and public works programs as well as a non-discrimination policy toward indigenous peoples. But the government has made little progress in combating poverty and discrimination in the poor regions of Chiapas. Indigenous peoples earn 32 percent as much as their non-indigenous counterparts, and they also face a language barrier because of Mexico’s insistence on Spanish education. More importantly, indigenous populations suffer from a decades-old trend of land dispossession, having been driven from fertile lands along the Pacific coast toward the central highlands and eastern rainforests that are less suited for agriculture.

On-and-off dialogue between the Zapatistas and the Mexican government has made little headway toward reducing the equality gap between the indigenous and non-indigenous. The two parties agreed to the San Andrés Accords in 1996, which were supposed to guarantee indigenous peoples’ autonomy and acknowledge their claim to the territories they used and occupied. But adherence to the Accords has been poor, and indigenous Mexicans still complain of unequal treatment. President Vicente Fox famously promised in 2000 that he would solve the conflict “in 15 minutes,” but his solution stalled in negotiations, and new President Felipe Calderón has demonstrated little commitment to resolving the issue.

Under spokesman Subcomandante Marcos, the Zapatistas have toned down the use of violence to achieve their aims, relying more heavily on propaganda and political demonstrations. Of its two weapons—“El Fuego” (The Fire) and “La Palabra” (The Word)—the latter clearly predominates. The EZLN has spread its message through the promulgation of the Six Declarations of the Lacandon Jungle, which include a declaration of war on the Mexican government and a call for mobilization of citizens. The Sixth Declaration inaugurated the “Other Campaign,” a cross-country tour that involves Marcos speaking out at peaceful rallies against capitalism, globalization, and the Mexican state.

Meanwhile, both sides continue to wage a low-intensity conflict in the violent, mob-ridden territories of Chiapas. The Mexican government, unwilling to wage an all-out war that could attract an international backlash, maintains an official policy of low-intensity warfare toward the EZLN. This primarily involves random acts of violence—including death threats, abductions, and torture—against pro-Zapatistas. The government has also supported the formation of paramilitary groups, one of which killed 45 civilians in Acteal in 1997. In contrast, the EZLN maintains all the trappings of a terrorist group, with its arms, ski masks, and threatening rhetoric, but there have been relatively few reports of EZLN-orchestrated kidnappings or murders since the early 1990s.

From the Mexican government’s point of view, the Zapatistas are a group of rebels who undermine government authority, and the government troops in Chiapas are a peace-keeping force meant to guarantee civilians’ security and curb drug trafficking. But the poor human rights record of the Mexican counterinsurgency campaign, combined with the continued existence of mobs and paramilitary groups with shadowy connections to the government, only contribute negatively to the peaceful resolution of the Chiapas conflict. The state’s antagonism only reinforces the Zapatistas’ appeal, which relies heavily upon feelings of victimization. Moreover, the government’s current approach neglects the legitimate concerns of the people of Chiapas and fails to deal with the political activism represented by the Other Campaign. The government has little choice but to renegotiate a settlement with the Zapatistas that provides security and rule of law, while committing to meaningful economic reform and recognizing the needs of the indigenous people. Failure to come to terms with the reality of the Zapatista rebellion will only prevent Chiapas from achieving a much-needed peace.