As a result of the West’s continued presence in the Middle East, al Qaeda has turned its focus to the occupation of a new front in its global jihad: Africa. With their presence threatened in what was once a safe haven, al Qaeda leaders, cells, and attacks are moving to northern and eastern Africa. Once there, they can capitalize on social instability and latent extremism. This geographic shift is a threat not only to the security of African nations, but also to the West, which remains a target for al Qaeda.

In Somalia, the fundamentalist Council of Islamic Courts, which the United States alleges has ties to al Qaeda, has been actively fostering violence. Militants and terrorists sympathetic to the Courts are preventing the establishment of peace and continue to fuel violence against the extremely weak Western-backed Transitional National Government. Neighboring Eritrea is a key component in this conflict. As a result of the Eritrean government’s funding and equipping of Islamic insurgents in the battle for control in Somalia, the US State Department has seriously contemplated adding Eritrea to its list of state sponsors of terror. Eritrea has provided safe harbor to the leader of the Council of Islamic Courts, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys. The US State Department has since named him an al Qaeda collaborator.

Al Qaeda is gaining ground and winning followers even beyond the Horn of Africa. In early January 2007, the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (SGPC) became part of the larger al Qaeda organization under the name “al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb” (AQIM). Since then, AQIM has focused its efforts on increasing recruitment and improving its public image by highlighting government corruption and foreign involvement in Algerian affairs. Developing a sophisticated training program and recruiting combatants from within and outside Algeria, AQIM has carried out a number of high-profile urban bombings, such as the December 2007 bombing of United Nations and government buildings in Algiers. AQIM’s targets reportedly include nearby Morocco and Tunisia, as well as Spain, Italy, and France.

Officials in Nigeria often downplay the presence of al Qaeda, but they did arrest three suspects in November 2007 who had allegedly trained with SGPC in Algeria two years prior. Western diplomats are now worried about the possibility that religious tensions in Nigeria, a nation equally split between Muslims and Christians, may lead to violence. As further indication of these concerns, the US Embassy in the country has warned of the increased likelihood of attacks. Libya is yet another a concern. In late 2007, al Qaeda deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri announced that a group in the country had been added to the growing al Qaeda network. At the same time, al-Zawahiri called on North African mujahedin to target the governments of Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia.

Officials in countries like Nigeria and Algeria are at least attempting to crack down on suspected terrorist activity, but as al Qaeda continues to gain support, officials may be less likely to continue such efforts. Actions elsewhere, meanwhile, are futile or non-existent. The weak Somali government has no power to target terrorism, and the Eritrean government, though publicly denouncing terrorism, has done nothing to deter al Qaeda operations. Moreover, with law enforcement weak in Somalia, terrorists are using the country as a gateway to the African continent from the Middle East. Should the Transitional National Government fail—a likely possibility—Somalia will again devolve into lawlessness and the Council of Islamic Courts could easily fill the power vacuum. If ruled by a pro-al Qaeda, anti-Western regime, Somalia would join Eritrea as a prime breeding and training ground for terrorist activity.

Al Qaeda’s penetration into Africa affects not only those countries in which it has already gained a strong foothold, but also those countries marked by instability and inadequate law enforcement. These characteristics make such countries ripe targets for Al Qaeda. In 2007 there were 12 international peacekeeping operations on the African continent. All were a response to the violence and humanitarian strife caused by ethnic conflict and incapable governments. Already unable to control these forms of conflict, African authorities cannot be expected to counteract the spread of terrorism in these areas as well. Moreover, many of the peacekeeping operations are concentrated in eastern and central Africa, where a small al Qaeda presence already exists and now will likely continue to grow unnoticed because of the lack of social or political stability.

The governments of these African nations have been hardly convinced by the US’ talk of the “War on Terror,” making it even more difficult for collaboration to prevent terror’s spread. Now encumbered by the complexities of Iraq, the United States has little time and few resources to address the issue of African terrorism. The chances of cooperation fall even further because many foreign governments are unwilling to work with what they see as an interventionist superpower. As a final complication, the need to address a spreading terrorist network in Africa must attract attention ahead of other more prevalent crises such as AIDS, hunger, and poverty.

Africa comprises a large and complex new front in the struggle against terrorism. Al Qaeda’s presence in failed or failing states allows it to both operate with ease and influence increasingly unstable political environments. The group can play on existing societal tensions to challenge those in power, while using its African bases to launch attacks on Western interests within and beyond Africa’s borders. Unable or unwilling to respond to this threat, African governments will likely accomplish little in fighting al Qaeda’s efforts. Until the United States and Western nations find a viable solution to halt the continent’s growing al Qaeda movement, terrorism in Africa may grow into a larger, eventually uncontainable threat.