US-Cuban Relations

Free elections are a totemic issue for any US administration and this will not change. Yet, the Cuban leadership is well placed to confront the next US president whoever he or she is. US policy towards Cuba is so riddled with inconsistencies that it will take a long time to establish greater coherence. A trade embargo is in place and yet the United States is now the fourth most important exporter of goods to Cuba as a result of the presidential decree permitting the sale of farm goods and medicines. A travel ban is in place and restrictions are placed on visits by academics and religious organizations while thousands of young Americans travel illegally every year to Cuba through third countries. The administration condemns those linked to terrorism around the world but refuses to hand over Luis Posada Carriles, accused of blowing up a plane full of Cuban civilians in 1976 and allegedly responsible for a series of terrorist acts in Cuba in the 1990s. The “wet-foot dry-foot” policy, under which Cubans reaching land in the United States almost automatically secure entry while those apprehended at sea do not, is indefensible.

There has also been a weakening of the Cuban-American lobby. This may not be immediately obvious given the considerable influence of a few politicians in Washington, DC of Cuban origin. But, at the grassroots interests are diverging, as more recent economic migrants replace the aging political migrants from the 1960s. These divisions mean that the Cuban-American National Foundation, once mentioned in the same breath as AIPAC, is no longer so powerful. Additionally, the politics of Washington, DC are likely to look different if the Democrats can build a sizeable majority in Congress yet alone capture the presidency. An easing of the travel ban and trade restrictions would then be more likely.

It is not inevitable, but Raúl Castro is widely expected–inside and outside the island—to become Cuba’s president this year. He will repeat his offer of dialogue with the next US administration on all issues. Whether the offer is taken up will depend on who wins the US election. Even if it is taken up, it is unlikely to lead to a quick breakthrough. To a US audience, the transition from Fidel to Raúl does not mark a break with the past, and the Helms-Burton legislation—still in force, it should not be forgotten—rules out a complete rapprochement while either brother is in power. The true test–for Cuba and the United States–may therefore not come until Raúl Castro is himself replaced. If this coincided with the end of President Chávez’s administration in 2013, it would be the toughest test for Cuba since the fall of the Soviet Union.