As yet another example, we could point to the 1918 Revolution in Germany, which overthrew a centuries-old aristocratic/imperial regime of the Hohenzollern rulers and their Junker military and civil officers, and replaced it with a constitutional republic. Yet the revolutionary nature of these events too was clouded by accidents of history – the Hohenzollern regime had already begun to compromise with popular claims to citizenship after the Revolution of 1848, while the unsuccessful attempts of German socialists to use the revolution to create a socialist state imbued the 1918 revolution with an air of failure. Moreover, the Weimar republic that emerged was overshadowed by its collapse and the Nazi regime that followed.

Another reason that the classic revolutions are iconic is that, as global or regional ‘firsts,’ they served as models for later imitators. The American and French revolutions were the most influential models for constitutional revolutions throughout the Americas and Europe; China’s break with imperial authority paved the way for challenges to similar authorities in Korea and Vietnam; Russia’s revolution became the model for communist party-led revolutions across the globe. Still, other modern events also have claims to being global ‘firsts.’ The Nasser Revolution in Egypt can claim to be the first nationalist revolution to replace monarchist rule among Arab states, leading to similar revolutions in Iraq and Syria; and the Iranian revolution of 1979 can justifiably present itself as the first revolution to blend modern and Mahdist principles to create a regime designed as an Islamic republic. Perhaps most important, the Chinese Communist and Cuban Revolutions, as the first guerrilla-led revolutions in their regions, spawned further guerrilla-led efforts at communist revolution in their areas, including successes in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Nicaragua.

Different Models in Modern Revolutions

But how should we classify the dozens of other events that have claimed the mantle of revolution, without manifesting either stunning social change or ideological originality? Among these are many popular revolts against dictatorial or colonial regimes, such as those in Mexico, Bolivia, Algeria, Cuba (1898), Indonesia, Vietnam, Congo, Guatemala, East Timor, Portugal, Serbia, Romania, Zanzibar (later Tanzania), and Nepal. These events are indeed revolutions in the formal sense of being popularly-assisted changes of political power achieved by non-institutionalized means, resulting in a new regime with a different structure and justification of authority. They were often important, even crucial, events in the history of the countries in which they occurred. Many of them also drew on the romance of heroes of the people – Zapata and Pancho Villa in Mexico, José Martí in Cuba, Julius Nyerere in Tanzania – to enhance their affinity to the classic revolutions of the past. Yet these were not events that created new or widely imitated frameworks for political development, or marked turning points in the history of their regions or the globe. Thus they should perhaps be called ‘national revolutions,’ but not numbered among the ‘great’ revolutions of world history.

Yet there are exceptions. One can make a case for at least two other sets of recent revolutions that they did create new frameworks for political development and do mark such turning points. First, the Polish Solidarity revolution and the USSR anti-communist revolution led by Boris Yeltsin (which were inextricably intertwined) were the first successful popular revolts against the authority of communist parties. The Polish Solidarity revolt was the first movement led by intellectuals and workers to wrest power from a communist government; it thus led the way for anti-communist revolutions throughout Eastern Europe. The anti-communist revolution in the USSR, which began with Gorbachev’s reforms and elections intended to modernize and strengthen the communist party, but which resulted in its collapse, marked a turning point in world history – both the end of Communism as an ideological and political system with the power to challenge the West, and the end of Russia’s imperial control of Eastern Europe, the Baltic, central Asia, and the Caucasus, with the formation of new and independent states in the latter regions.

The second set of recent revolutions that marked such a change was the ‘Yellow Revolution’ in the Philippines in 1986 and the ‘Velvet Revolution’ in Czechoslovakia in 1989. Together, they created a new template for revolutionary change, based on non-violent but massive displays of political mobilization and popular will, and emblematic symbols of unity and opposition. In both cases, authoritarian regimes were brought down not by rural revolts, guerrilla struggles, vanguard party-mobilization, or civil war, but chiefly by peaceful urban demonstrations manifesting popular unity and opposition to the regime. In the Philippines, the supporters of the opposition to President Ferdinand Marcos adorned themselves with yellow badges and ribbons, and their sustained demonstrations in Manila led to splits in the army. The ensuing confrontation forced Marcos to flee, and the struggle became known as the Yellow Revolution or the People Power Revolution, to honor the colors worn by the opposition and the pivotal role played by urban protesters. In Czechoslovakia, the peaceful yet sudden recapitulation of communist party leaders in the face of mounting popular demonstrations in Prague left people grasping for words to describe events; the term ‘velvet revolution’ was coined to describe a revolution exceptionally free of armed strife or indeed any kinds of widespread violence.

Ironically (and sadly) these ‘new model’ revolutions were marked by weakness and failures of the new regimes. Czechoslovakia was soon riven by new nationalisms, and split into the separate countries of Slovokia and the Czech Republic. The Philippines were marked by continued instability, with repeated attempted coups and rampant corruption shaking the government, which was unable or unwilling to undertaken major social and economic reforms. It appears that the price to be paid for a relatively peaceful revolutionary process was that a ‘hardened’ new regime did not emerge; instead varied factions survived and continued to challenge the new rulers over the direction and control of the new government.

Nonetheless, the new model of ‘color revolutions’ or ‘electoral revolutions’ spread, influencing events in Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, and – as I write this – in Kenya. In all these cases, revolts against unpopular regimes shaped themselves mainly as urban popular mobilization against authoritarian regimes, often in the wake of the latter’s efforts to falsify election results. As with the originals, events in these latter ‘color revolutions’ have led to weak governments that continued to be riven by conflicts, rather than powerful new regimes. Nonetheless, they have managed (as the originals) to hang on to democratic governance, however troubled, rather than (with the possible exception of Kyrgyzstan) reverting to their pre-Revolutionary ways.