But the outcomes were not all positive. In addition to the striking absence of any kind of continued democratic reform or consolidation from the government’s initial set of goals and accomplishment, the government pursued its ambitious reform agenda with little concern for democratic processes including contestation, deliberation, and citizen input. Strengthening of the State took a clear priority over strengthening of democracy, and this was pursued without any effort to hide the concurrent deemphasizing of democratic reform.

The supposed incompatibility of the dual pursuits of a stronger state and stronger democracy is, for the most part, a creation of the Georgian government. The notion that these two ideas are somehow in conflict with each other in Georgia, and that these goals cannot be pursued simultaneously is very convenient for the government, but there is little reason to believe it is actually true. In fact, in Georgia these two goals would have been mutually reinforcing. By seeking to strengthen the state without paying sufficient attention to the need to continue democratic reforms, the government failed to ensure that the public at large understood and had a chance to weigh in on the goals it was attempting to pursue. By rapidly pushing through ultra-liberal reforms without any real discussions or debates within the legislature or between the government and the people, it made it difficult for many Georgians to understand the importance of the reforms or their potential impact. This problem was further exacerbated by the government’s tendency to raise expectations and oversell its accomplishments.

Additionally, when discontent increased in Georgian society, the democratic avenues for expressing such discontent were not sufficiently developed. The legislature was weakened early in Saakashvili’s term through constitutional reforms which made it difficult for legislators to act as a check on executive power. Similarly, press freedoms and independent civil society organizations were not as strong as they once were. As a result, after the revolution, they were significantly less cable to channel citizens’ concerns or to hold the government accountable for its policies.

Thus, public discontent built and went unaddressed until it spilled into the streets with new demonstrations featuring radical, if unrealistic demands. The government was thus faced with a significant problem in November 2007; a problem it decided to address by using violence to disperse the demonstrations, even though they were already dwindling on their own accord. What was more disturbing was, however, the fact that the government somehow thought this approach was a wise and justified decision.

Conclusions

Despite the demonstrations in November and the events which followed, for the Georgian government, the Rose Revolution has been a success. After all, the state is stronger than it had been at any time in decades, and probably centuries. However, the government has had less success resolving the issues of territorial integrity which still dog the country. Additionally, indications of a stronger and more independent Georgia have only made relations with Russia more tense. Russia’s desire for a weak and malleable southern neighbor, meanwhile, continues to create problems for Georgia. The fault here, however, probably lies more with Russia, which has maintained a policy of harassment, economic boycotts, and intervention with Georgia, more so than with any actions taken by Georgia.

Democracy in Georgia, however, is in crisis. In the long run, we may see a turnaround in this area, but at this time Georgia seems to be moving towards consolidating a strong, but not particularly democratic, regime. To deem the Rose Revolution a failure because of this, however, misses the larger point. The real failure here is one of Western expectations rather than the policies of the Georgia government. Until recently, it remained possible for Western governments to overlook the democratic shortcomings and to view the Rose Revolution as successful, according to both Western and Georgian criteria. That illusion was shattered with the first rounds of rubber bullets and tear gas canisters used by the government on November 7, 2007, and cannot yet be fully restored even after the relatively smooth election of January 5, during which Saakashvili was reelected. Now Western countries and organizations find themselves increasingly unable to ignore the differences between their goals and expectations of the Rose Revolution and those of the Georgian government. Recognizing this difference is the first step towards crafting policies regarding Georgia that is grounded in appropriate expectations and a clear understanding of political realities in Georgia.