More than 15 years after the fall of the USSR, Russia is on a steady slide away from genuine democracy and toward authoritarianism. Even more troubling is the Russian government’s effort to inculcate its new generation with values that justify this regression. By propagandizing its youth with nationalistic fervor and political orthodoxy, Russia is setting itself up for a future of repression and international confrontation.
Under President Vladimir Putin, the Kremlin has started to organize and fund a variety of youth organizations, such as the Youth Guard, United Russia, and the Locals. Perhaps the most popular of these is Nashi (meaning “ours”), an organization for citizens 17 to 25 that claims 10,000 members and draws over 200,000 participants to its events, rallies, and summer camps. The Nashi agenda is characterized by a cult-like respect for President Putin, vehement hostility toward any opposition parties, a romanticized view of Soviet history, and the belief that the West is bent on denying Russia its rightful place in the world. Nashi owes part of its success to its strategy of putting opponents on the defensive—it criticizes opposition parties as fascists and has helped create a “museum of double standards” which highlights supposed Western hypocrisy and imperialism by drawing attention to rights violations occurring in Western countries. This strategy not only discredits opponents but also diverts attention from Nashi’s own alarming tendencies.
Nashi is a product of both recent events and Soviet history. It is not a coincidence that the organization was started in the spring of 2005. Russia witnessed the Rose Revolution of 2003 in Georgia and the Orange Revolution of 2004 in Ukraine—in both cases, youth formed the backbone of the mass protests that toppled corrupt regimes. The Kremlin decided that instead of leaving youth to agitate for change, their energy could be channeled into pro-regime activity. Nashi also borrows a chapter from history almost a century old. It takes its colors and motifs from Soviet organizations such as the Young Pioneers and Komsomol, the youth branch of the Communist Party. Knowledge of these historical antecedents makes it easier to see Nashi as instruments of political control.
The distinction between Nashi and other ideologically driven youth organizations in Europe and the United States is that the former acts as a de facto tool of executive power. Nashi members—who must pass an “ideological fitness” interview by parroting back the government’s official stances on issues ranging from the war in Chechnya to Putin’s success as a leader—receive preference for jobs in state-run companies and government agencies. After the Estonian government removed a Soviet war memorial, Nashi members vandalized the Estonian embassy in Moscow while the police did nothing to stop them.
The rise of Nashi must be a cause for concern. Encouraging a narrow set of political views and demonizing independent thought cannot serve Russia’s interests in the long term. Moreover, Nashi members have sent a slew of letters to the American Enterprise Institute, demanding that the United States stop funding NGOs in Russia. Continued US support, the letters claim, “means that confrontation is irreversible. It also means the return to the times of the Cold War.” A generation of Russian youth brought up on anti-Americanism and hostility toward the West will only exacerbate the brash and confrontational tendencies already visible in Russian foreign policy. Perhaps the most poignant cause for concern is the historical record on nationalistic, government-sponsored youth organizations. Cathy Young explains, “Some Russian liberals refer to Nashi as Putinjugend. The movement’s brownshirt tactics certainly evoke shades of Hitler Youth, as does the emphasis on physical fitness, clean living, and procreation for the Motherland.” Organizations such as Nashi are not only alarming on their own, but also speak volumes about the ambitions and strategies of the government that supports them.
The West can do little to change how Russia engages and educates its youth. After all, any Western attempts to directly discredit Nashi only bolster the organization’s argument that the West is trying to interfere in Russia’s sovereign affairs. The irony is that Russian antipathy for the West comes at a time when interaction between the two—on trade, energy sales, and international treaties—is increasing. These interactions provide ample opportunity for the West to demand that Russia provide a safe space for opposition and dissent. Showing even symbolic solidarity with those who do not conform to Russia’s state-sponsored vision of the country’s past, present, and future will help chip away at the power and allure of Nashi and its allies. 




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