Not so many years ago, the international community approached the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as an issue exclusively connected with the activities of states. Non-state actors seemed to have little interest in acquiring or using nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. Their capacities to acquire such weapons also appeared to be lacking, if not nonexistent. However, the appearance of well-organized, well-financed, and well-equipped terrorist groups, especially hybrid networks like Al Qaeda, began challenging that perception in the mid-1990s. The troubling revelation of Abdul Qadeer Khan’s nuclear black market in 2004 was one event that put an end to such innocent outlooks. These revelations demonstrate that non-state actors, including terrorist organizations, have easy access to even the most sensitive WMD expertise and hardware. The likely expansion of civilian nuclear programs also provides an opportunity for criminals and terrorists to access fissile and radioactive materials, which they may use to create nuclear weapons or dirty bombs.

The threat of terrorists using weapons of mass destruction is real and growing. The terrorist attacks of the past decade—ranging from massive embassy bombings in East Africa, the indiscriminate bombings of commuter systems in Europe and Asia, the massive terrorist attacks of 9/11, and most recently the use of chlorine gas in attacks in Iraq—all clearly indicate that terrorists will not hesitate to use even the deadliest weapons if they acquire them. Considering the unprecedented growth of terrorist movements, the international community of nations should be aware that it currently finds itself in a race against time. Without further action, the current threat of nuclear proliferation among non-state actors might become a much crueler reality.

Under these circumstances, it is crucial to recognize the importance of the UN Security Council’s adoption of Resolution 1540 in 2004, which affirms that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery—as well as illicit trafficking of related materials—constitute a threat to international peace and security. Nations must work toward conquering the many challenges that currently impede full implementation of this resolution through regional, national, and global cooperation.

The adoption of Resolution 1540 was a necessary step toward building a comprehensive global system of prevention and protection against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The resolution establishes binding obligations for all states regarding non-proliferation and creates a subsidiary body of the Security Council—the 1540 Committee—to review relevant measures taken by states to meet these obligations.

Since the adoption of Resolution 1540, there has been significant progress in the implementation of its provisions in various regions. At the same time, there is no room for complacency. More needs to be done, including the development of tools that states may create for themselves, in order to successfully implement all aspects of the resolution. In April 2007, the 1540 Committee submitted a comprehensive report to the Security Council on the work of its first biennium. Among other observations and conclusions, the report identified several important gaps in the implementation of Resolution 1540 in the areas of accountability, physical protection, border controls, law enforcement efforts, and national export and trans-shipment controls. Given these gaps, the report also notes that the internal administrative and technical capacities of many states must be strengthened in order to effectively address the threat of proliferation.

Even those states that have made significant progress in the implementation of Resolution 1540 need to regularly enhance national systems to license export items and control relevant activities, including transit, trans-shipment, or re-export. Posing as businessmen, undercover investigators from the US Congressional Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently reported that they were able to obtain a license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission without major difficulties. This gave them the access to buy enough radioactive material from US entities to build several “dirty bombs.” The obvious threat is that terrorists will also identify such weak spots in the regulation of nuclear materials if those systems are not continually strengthened and upgraded.

Another reason for concern is the existence of unprotected, lost, or unaccounted for radioactive sources around the world. As apparent in the recent terrorist network attempts to build dirty bombs, this material is becoming an attractive article for sale or smuggling. Finally, the involvement of a group of medical doctors in planning terrorist activities in the United Kingdom is an ominous phenomenon because it indicates the potential for terrorists to harness relevant medical knowledge and supplies in launching biological attacks on civilians.

In light of the increasing threat of terrorism, it is clear that only a comprehensive approach to the implementation of Resolution 1540 can provide for an adequate system of protection and prevention. The whole system is truly only as strong as its weakest link—as evidenced by the A.Q. Khan network’s use of transshipment hubs in trafficking nuclear items. No single state or institution can cope with the threat of WMD proliferation alone. The challenges and complexities of implementation can only be addressed through the broadest degree of international cooperation and interaction. Hence, cooperation with and coordination of some activities among various international, regional, and sub-regional bodies should be put into practice by states. For example, regional bodies such as the Organization of American States (OAS) can further enhance the implementation of Resolution 1540 among its members through increased cooperation with the existing or new programs within the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Organization of Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), or the World Health Organization (WHO).

The outreach activities conducted by the UN Security Council’s 1540 Committee during 2005 and 2006 demonstrated the need for more assistance and closer regional cooperation as ways to address difficulties of implementation. These difficulties stem from a lack of administrative, technical, and expert capacities, as well as a lack of financial and human resources. The Committee has accorded high priority to this area and is developing its role as a clearinghouse for assistance. In July 2007, following a thematic debate on strategy, the Committee met with countries and IGOs that already provide such assistance, as well as with a sample of non-governmental institutions that had experience in implementing assistance related to non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. To this end, the increased support of donor countries will be a crucial component to future success.