My commission developed an approach to Iran that mirrors an element in the Korean affair. In a Denuclearization Declaration of 1992, North Korea and South Korea agreed that neither would have enrichment or reprocessing. Something similar could be considered for the Middle East. Perhaps the Security Council could ask all states in the area, including Iran and Israel, to refrain from both enrichment and reprocessing. The area is very sensitive, and a multilateral commitment might be easier than an order to just one country. The creation of a nuclear weapon-free zone in the region is an ultimate objective. Commitment by all in the region—including Israel and Iran—not to enrich or reprocess might be a possible step in this direction.

You have been a tremendous supporter of disarmament and of the idea that we can achieve a nuclear weapon-free world. Your critics maintain that this idea is simply unfeasible. They claim that this technology has been invented and learned, and cannot be erased from human consciousness. Do you believe—aside from being extremely desirable—that a world free of nuclear weapons is achievable, perhaps within our lifetimes?

Within the near future, I think no. If you look at our report from the Commission of Weapons of Mass Destruction, we say that this is the aim and that it should be doable. But we are placing more emphasis on short-term and medium-term targets, like the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). We do emphasize that such a treaty is the single most important thing that could now be done in the arms control area.

The second most important thing that we push for is a cutoff agreement, which would be verified and would prohibit the production of enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons purposes. I fail to understand why international verification is not currently acceptable to the United States. If a treaty were made without verification, certain state parties such as India, Pakistan and China, for instance, would not trust each other. The United States said in Geneva that there would be verification, but national verification. Yet how many states have the capability to have effective and credible national verification? Does Washington, after the case of Iraq, claim to have credible verification of its own? In Iraq, after all, international verification came closer to the truth than did national verification by the United States or the United Kingdom.

Another proposal that the Commission advances is a mutual withdrawal of nuclear weapons in Europe. On the Russian side, weapons should be withdrawn to stores further into the Soviet Union. US nuclear weapons in NATO should be withdrawn to the United States. This would have broad support in European public opinion and would help to lower tension in Europe

Now, am I naïve enough to think that we can have a world free of nuclear weapons? In the long term, yes. We have a long way to go to. We have time to consider what problems will arise in the final stretch.