There was an additional failure that concerned the United Nations. The US National Security Strategy of 2002 declared that the United States would not feel inhibited by Article 51 of the UN Charter, which only allows member states to use armed force in self-defense against an armed attack. The strategy declared that this was too narrow a basis and thereby refuted a vital restriction in the UN Charter. There were even complaints about the Security Council not supporting the United States at the time. Actually, the Security Council did the right thing by not authorizing a war that should not have been waged. In my view, one should applaud the Security Council for not having given that authorization. However, we are where we are, and the United Nations has acted upon the reality that has resulted.

We want to finish the war. I see that public opinion in the United States favors a withdrawal, but preferably without a civil war occurring as a result of the conflicts inside Iraq. Personally, I think it would be wise to set final dates for a withdrawal; a deadline would empower the Iraqis themselves to reach an agreement internally. So long as they have an occupying power in the country—over 100,000 soldiers—I think they will not feel that the problems are firmly in their own lap. Knowing that the United States will withdraw within a particular time would strengthen that feeling. However, I understand the US’ hesitation since the risk of sectarian violence remains.

How has the Bush Administration evolved through the turbulent experiences of the last several years? Has the United States adapted its policies effectively?

I believe the Bush Administration has learned from the case of Iraq and also from the experience in Lebanon that there are limits to what can be achieved with military means. As the Bush Administration has recently stated, it is now time for diplomacy. This could have been discovered earlier.

I do see minor adjustments in various areas. In the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, we learned that the United States was willing to discuss a cutoff agreement —albeit one without any verification. Lately we have heard that the United States might accept a work program for the CD, including discussions of nuclear disarmament and outer space. This does demonstrate a more flexible attitude. Similarly, recent talks in the preparatory committee for the NPT review gave me the impression that it was not so much the United States as Iran that was the stumbling block.

But at the same time, in the case of Iran, it seems that the United States rigidly clings to preconditions. While the United States has joined with the Europeans in offering some carrots such as support for Iranian membership in the World Trade Organization, it primarily maintains a stick policy—including three aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf. I am skeptical about such military threats, but I acknowledge that economic pressures may be meaningful.

In the past, you have said that Iran has a right to nuclear development as a signatory to the NPT. In terms of seeking cooperation, you have also been a vocal proponent of diplomatic negotiations, and you have suggested increased incentives, such as economic incentives, for the suspension of uranium enrichment. Are these the crucial concessions needed in the negotiations with Iran and North Korea?

It is, in fact, very instructive to compare the two negotiations. In both cases one wants to ensure that the state does not pursue a nuclear weapons program. North Korea, however, has already done so. I think the approach that the United States has been taking together with others in negotiations with North Korea in Beijing has been good. It has been an approach that relies much more on the use of carrots than sticks. If we want to prevent a country from developing nuclear weapons, we must ask why they are wanted. We must then seek to remove these reasons. In most cases we find that perceived security interests and recognition are guiding forces. The North Koreans themselves consistently referred to what they termed “US hostility to North Korea” as the reason why they have been moving in the direction of nuclear weapons. Now, this has been countered by the United States’ offer to North Korea of a guarantee—albeit admittedly a paper guarantee—of security.

Secondly, on the recognition side, North Korea has been ostracized and isolated for various reasons. It has not abided by the rules in its international intercourse. Nevertheless, I believe that the United States is correct in offering the North Koreans a normalization of relations in exchange for an agreement on a nuclear settlement. North Korea, moreover, voiced a number of other concerns, among them oil and economic development. Once again, the United States and other parties in Beijing made it clear that they were not pursuing a regime change. Rather, they would help the country progress and become a modern society. I think that might be a more productive approach than military threats.

In the case of Iran, we find neither of these two important elements. First, to my knowledge, no guarantee has been offered to Iran—in return for suspending enrichment —that it will not risk an attack or subversion from the outside. Second, while all the European countries have diplomatic relations with Iran, the United States does not, and has not, since the occupation of the US embassy in 1979. And I have not heard it said that the United States would, at any moment, offer any kind of normalization of relations with Iran. So here are two important inducements—security and recognition—that are used in the case of North Korea but are not used in the case of Iran. Rather, in Iran, the main focus is on stiffer sanctions.

One further crucial difference is that in the case of Iran, the United States and the Security Council require that Iran suspend its enrichment program prior to negotiations. In the case of North Korea there is no such precondition. North Koreans have been able to continue reprocessing and producing more plutonium every day. This has not stopped discussions with them. The case of Iran is reminiscent of a situation in which strikers are asked to first stop striking before employers are willing to sit down and discuss the grievances. It is unlikely that Iran will comply with such a precondition. Some diplomatic dance will need to be developed to allow the negotiation about the suspension of enrichment without making it a precondition for talks.