Southeast Asia—home to more than 250 million Muslims and to the largest Islamic country in the world—has experienced a perceptible intensification of Islamic militancy after September 11, 2001. The futility of the US-led war in Iraq and the failure of the “coalition of the willing” to secure UN approval to attack Iraq have heightened Islamic animosity in the region and across the Muslim world.

Radical Islam will continue to grow if Muslims, despite being the world’s second largest religious community, continue to be treated like pariahs of the international community. Never in recent history have Muslims been subjected to such intense scrutiny, marginalization, and siege on a global scale. This state of utter bewilderment, disorientation, panic, and rage has the potential to intensify in the future, even in Southeast Asia, a region long known for peace and prosperity.

If Southeast Asian nations resort to undemocratic means of dealing with political Islam—which is characterized by the sustained, albeit peaceful pressure that Muslim political parties, organizations, and intellectuals exert upon the state to fulfill their aspirations—this discord will spread to their borders. The central tenets of political Islam are the inseparability of religion and politics and the legitimate right of Muslims to practice the shari’a, even in secular states. The re-awakening of political Islam within the democratic framework, if properly understood, should not endanger the stability of countries in this region and beyond.

Misperceptions

Misperceptions abound concerning radical Islam in Southeast Asia. Political Islam in this region is neither new nor necessarily related to terrorism. Islamists were at the forefront of the independence struggle in both Indonesia and Malaysia, and terrorism is not unique to extremists of the Muslim faith. Not only is militant Islam in Southeast Asia scattered, but it is also confined to small and marginalized groups. These groups include Jemaah Islamiah (JI) in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia; the Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia and al-Maunah in Malaysia; the Abu Sayaff in the southern Philippines; Pattani United Liberation Organization in southern Thailand; and Laskar Jihad, Majlis Mujahideen, and Islamic Defenders’ Front in Indonesia.

The rise in radical Islam has nothing to do with Western claims that Islam is inherently anti-democratic or that the Qur’an promises jihadis heavenly rewards in the form of unlimited luxuries and women of unparalleled beauty. Such claims trivialize radical Islam and its motivations.

The hypocritical US policies in the Middle East generally—and in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine specifically—have caused deep-seated resentment of the West among Muslims. The distorted translation of jihad as “holy war” and misguided ambition to re-establish a Pax Islamica caliphate further exacerbate that resentment. The long history of state oppression and other discriminatory policies aimed at denying the expression of Muslim identity also explicate the issue. Against such a background, the Danish caricatures that depicted Prophet Muhammad as a terrorist in September 2005 could not have been published at a worse time.

The binary distinctions often used by scholars to distinguish different types of Muslims—“moderate” versus “extremist,” “modern” versus “traditionalist”—cause further misperceptions. These are political statements, not analytical ones. These explanations fail to grasp the multi-layered nature of the Muslim identity.

Misunderstanding of the above factors has led to a misinterpretation, if not misrepresentation, of political Islam in many parts of the globe. For example, many governments claim that the JI cells in Southeast Asia have been around for more than 10 years in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia. True, some of these militant groups were inspired by the legacy of the anti-colonial Darul Islam movement in Indonesia, but the term “Jemaah Islamiah” has long been used in this region to describe the general and peaceful existence of Muslim communes and organizations. The militant brand of JI and its links with Al Qaeda are recent phenomena associated with radical leaders and jihadi fighters newly returned from Afghanistan and Mindanao.

Government Response

Islamic radicalism has begun to preoccupy the energies and resources of states in this region because of its ramifications for issues of social cohesion, national integration, and general stability and prosperity. Although “crisis amplification” tactics have been dominant features in Southeast Asia’s political discourse, state policies toward militant Islam vary. Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand seem to be the most firm; Indonesia, in its democratic transition and the abrupt decline of central authority, has remained ambivalent; and Malaysia, faced with outbidding politics between the PAS (Islamic Party) and the UNMO (Nationalist-Islamic Party), lies in the middle of this continuum. Most governments in the region either repress or co-opt political Islam. While the Philippines and Thailand have resorted to violence in dealing with Muslim militancy, the rest of Southeast Asia prefers the softer approach of arresting such militants and “rehabilitating” them.

The United States and Political Islam

The US “war on terror” and US President George W. Bush’s stipulation that “you are with us or against us” have added a new dimension to the responses of states in this region. On the surface, it seems that most countries have supported the United States. An Association of Southeast Asian Nations Anti-Terrorism Act has been signed. However, only Singapore and the Philippines have shown unequivocal support for the US position. Beset by the problems of a recent marriage between a presidential system and a parliament divided among 17 parties, Indonesia has been the least decisive. A huge archipelagic topography and the memories of extremist acts since 2002—Bali in 2002, the Mariott Hotel in 2003, the Australian embassy in 2004, anti-US skirmishes in 2005, and the burning of Danish flags in 2006—explain Indonesia’s caution in taking action against the perpetrators. Malaysia has taken a dialectical approach, arresting radical Muslim figures under the Internal Security Act, which circumvents a court trial, and establishing an anti-terrorism regional training center in Kuala Lumpur but wasting no time in criticizing the US position on Iraq and Palestine.

Bush’s declaration of Southeast Asia as the “second hotbed of terrorism” forced states in this region to re-evaluate their nation-building priorities—and prioritize the anti-terrorist security agenda. However, in pursuing this new priority, states change their governing cultures. Under the pretext of the “war on terror,” some have resorted to brutal force and arbitrary arrests in response to legitimate Muslim grievances. The US tendency to disregard violations of human rights committed by its partners has the unintended effect of encouraging such violations.