Problems of Enforcement
Iran, North Korea, and the NPT
by Julia Choe
From Academy and Policy, Vol. 28 (2) - Summer 2006
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Lessons for the Future

Given the difficulty of instituting the ideals of non-proliferation, the failures of the NPT in addressing non-compliance and withdrawal make it apparent that the treaty warrants revision. In the future, more explicit guidelines and a more direct plan of action would help prevent the uncoordinated and sluggish response that allowed Iran’s nuclear program to begin and allowed North Korea’s to possibly reach fruition. Acknowledging the Security Council’s lack of internal consensus, the NPT could skip the problems of global politics by offering a set strategy not dependent on the unanimity of enforcing states. Though these reforms would perhaps make nations more hesitant to accept the treaty, it is significant to note that the NPT has near-universal participation. There is currently little consensus on how best to enforce the ideal of non-proliferation, but such acceptance of the NPT implies that there is a widespread commitment to codifying nuclear compliance. As a result, though the NPT’s enforcement has proved insufficient against defiant states such as North Korea and Iran, stronger enforcement mechanisms may one day help attain the ever-elusive goal of nuclear non-proliferation. 

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