The events of the past three years in Iran demonstrate the difficulty of implementing the NPT’s doctrines and reflect the sluggish and inadequate pace of treaty enforcement in a system reliant on states’ self-initiative. They have also shown that there is no consensus on what NPT doctrine should be, leading to divisions that a nation like Iran can exploit. Under the NPT there is no concrete, automatic response to a state’s nuclear pursuits, and enforcement is hindered by unrelated political events. As a result of the NPT’s lack of action, Iran has been able to disregard calls for a reduction of its nuclear program for several months, as it continues with its nuclear program. These actions underscore the weakness of the NPT in defining and handling non-compliance before a nation begins to make nuclear arms.

Increasing Defiance

The NPT’s shortcomings are made more apparent as states such as North Korea decide to withdraw from the treaty. States are allowed to withdraw from the NPT with no adverse consequences if they feel that “extraordinary events” jeopardize their national security and if they give three months’ notice. North Korea signed the NPT in 1985 but did not allow safeguards for another five years. Subsequent discrepancies led the IAEA to demand special inspections at the Yongbyon nuclear facility. In response, North Korea declared that it would withdraw from the NPT. Eventually, direct negotiations between the United States and North Korea led to the Agreed Framework, which stipulated that North Korea would halt production of nuclear-weapons-grade material and remain party to the NPT. In return, the United States would supply fuel oil shipments, construct two light-water nuclear power reactors in North Korea, and normalize relations.

By October 2002, however, this agreement began to unravel. The US State Department declared that North Korea had continued its nuclear weapons activities, and in retaliation the United States suspended monthly shipments of oil. North Korea reactivated its Yongbyon reactor. In January 2003, it announced its second withdrawal from the NPT. Since then, the Six-Party Talks (comprised of the two Koreas, the United States, China, Japan, and Russia) have taken the place of the NPT, but they have had little progress. A fifth round of talks ended in November 2005 with merely a commitment to implement a preliminary agreement created in September 2005. This agreement, which seemed to be a breakthrough, was delayed when North Korea requested a light-water nuclear reactor. Because the NPT is clearly no longer applicable, and perhaps because North Korea had allegedly already built a nuclear weapon while it was still a member, the Six-Party Talks now seem to be the most effective way to curtail North Korea’s nuclear ambitions.

Theoretically, the NPT should have been able to resolve the North Korean situation. North Korea’s initial lack of cooperation ought to have caused the IAEA to declare it non-compliant and forward the case to the Security Council. While it is unclear how the Security Council would have acted, the NPT parties, at the very least, should have immediately referred North Korea to the Security Council to begin some form of consultation and prevent its withdrawal from the NPT. Now, however, the mechanisms for managing the North Korean standoff are even more unclear than in the Iran situation, since North Korea has left the NPT, and the treaty’s framework can no longer be used. The IAEA Board of Governors did report North Korea to the Security Council in February 2003, but no condemnation was issued. The problem of finding consensus still exists, with China acting more as a mediator than as a punisher. The United States refuses to have bilateral talks with North Korea, preferring instead to go through the Six-Party Talks in a demonstration of a tougher policy against the country. Whether North Korea will temper its stance has yet to be determined. At the very least, the case of North Korea has made it clear that the NPT has been glaringly insufficient in resolving the issues of nuclear proliferation, particularly when a proliferator that has been caught withdraws from the system.

Mending the Framework

Iran’s non-compliance and North Korea’s withdrawal raise the question of the NPT’s relevance and effectiveness in the current world order. NPT members are aware of a need to modify the treaty to suit today’s world. Every five years, NPT parties hold a Review Conference that addresses treaty implementation. The 2000 NPT Review Conference established the “13 Practical Steps” toward disarmament, which includes the negotiation, verification, and signing of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). However, the United States has since withdrawn its support of the CTBT, claiming that it is not effective in promoting non-proliferation. The May 2005 Review Conference in New York addressed issues such as the tightening of safeguards, restrictions on enrichment, and reprocessing activities for non-weapon-holding states. At the conference, the US delegation proposed a ban on the development of fuel-cycle facilities on countries that do not have them, but non-weapon states blocked the proposal as violating the rights of all countries to use nuclear energy peacefully. The United States also attempted to tighten the provisions for withdrawal from the NPT in response to North Korea’s actions, but criticism of the US rejection of the CTBT prevented consensus on the issue. Thus, the conference failed to reach a final resolution and many issues were left unresolved. For another five years, reform will have to be tabled, leaving current nuclear questions of the NPT unanswered.

Looking Ahead

In the future, there must be a clear and objective method for determining non-compliance, coupled with a plan of action for cases where a state rejects NPT provisions. Yet it is too easy to link the NPT’s failures simply to the treaty’s wording. In the case of Iran, lack of consensus in the Security Council and in the IAEA Board rendered immediate action impossible. But consensus, which is crucial for multilateral treaties such as the NPT to succeed, is necessary for any multilateral diplomatic effort. Even within the UN Security Council, which the United States has advocated as a mechanism for taking action against Iran, the veto-holding power of nations such as China and Russia ensure that collective action will always present problems of agreement. Another endemic problem is the difficulty of identifying peaceful uses of nuclear energy. While the NPT does not have clear provisions regarding the distinction between peaceful and weapons-grade nuclear material, it is difficult to reconcile the claims of states like Iran that argue that they are only using peaceful nuclear energy, with those of US President George W. Bush, who has stated that the United States “will not tolerate” an Iranian nuclear program. These troubles offer the disheartening implication that simply changing the terms of a treaty may not be sufficient for effective peace in the future, given the global politics that affect any action against nuclear proliferation.