In this compelling selection of 22 essays, Dr. Courtney Blackman, the founding governor of the Central Bank of Barbados, lays out a clear and concise description of economic issues affecting the Caribbean within a broader political context. The essays are sharply critical and insightful as they analyze economic policies set within the context of small developing Caribbean economies and their unique colonial histories and cultures. The lessons drawn, however, are not limited to the Caribbean region; all have larger global significance of their own.

Interestingly, although he is a trained economist, Blackman approaches his essays from a more holistic and managerial point of view. The book encompasses other disciplines such as sociology and history, rather than focusing on world prices, exchange rate regimes, and more traditional economic fare. Blackman stresses the importance of mitigating the impact of economic policies on people, and in doing so, sometimes appears to be at odds with the more traditional prescriptive approaches to economic policymaking. In taking on economic issues within the Caribbean region, Blackman argues rather forcefully that the underperformance of these economies largely reflects weak economic management. To address these issues, he advances a selection of essays that are heavily prescriptive and laden with a host of suggestive policies and strategies.

Blackman is able to explain otherwise complex economic issues with a level of clarity and simplicity that can be understood even by the casual reader. His emphasis on sound economic management practices and a culture of management is insightful. In his view, the returns to small countries of sound economic management are far more pronounced than those received bys large countries. As a result, decision makers in small developing economies should not unquestionably accept foreign ideologies and theories. Rather, they should develop the art of critical thinking and strategies rooted in their own national interests.

Dr. Blackman writes from a historical perspective to comment on what he perceives as the failings of the Marxian and New World Radical Views of the 1970s and early 1980s. Within “Development and Management: Contending with the Left,” he laments the failure of states like Guyana, Grenada, and Jamaica that “zealously pursued the statist policies promoted by the ‘New World’ and Marxist-Leninist paradigms.” He notes that these countries suffered grievous economic and social setbacks from those policies. On the contrary, other Caribbean states that pursued pragmatic and conservative economic strategies all made significant economic progress during the same period.

Dr. Blackman is as critical of the “doctrines of the right” in the 1990s as he is of those of the left in the 1970s and 1980s. He challenges the economic prescriptions that multilateral institutions promote for developing economies. His case

against IMF/World Bank economists is that “their prescriptions hardly distinguish between industrialized economies with highly developed goods and capital markets and lesser developed economies (LDCs) with poorly developed or collapsed markets.” Dr. Blackman goes on to comment on the unrealistic short time horizons for these institutions’ structural adjustment programs.

In pressing the issue of misplaced economic advice from multilateral institutions, Blackman points to the international financial crisis of the late 1990s. In Section Three, “The Washington Consensus: Contending with the Right,” he observes that developing countries that had opened their financial markets to unrestricted capital flows all suffered economic decline. In particular, Guyana and Jamaica, which in his view were “pressured” into making such decisions, sustained severe punishment. Indeed, Blackman argues that these capital inflows dramatically increased countries’ debt burdens, thus effectively stifling their growth.

Blackman’s critical views should not be taken lightly or dismissed. He espoused these same views during his 15 years as Governor of the Central Bank of Barbados when he was able to fine-tune many of his policy prescriptions. His major source of departure from the IMF-World Bank economic doctrine is over the concept of stable equilibrium and the efficacy of the free market. To underline his case, he dramatically highlights Barbados’ revaluation of its currency by upwards of 10 percent after it realigned from the pound sterling to the US dollar in July of 1975. Blackman notes that the country “went on to enjoy five of the most prosperous years in our economic history” and has “maintained that parity ever since.” During the high inflation years of 1973-74, his country rejected the prescription of positive real interest rates and saw a dramatic fall in inflation just two years later. Rather than opting for approved global credit controls, his country applied selective credit controls with great results. The one caveat is that it may not be possible to apply these lessons to other countries, since Blackman did not elaborate on the other key underlying factors which would have contributed to the success of his policies.

Blackman does demonstrate an understanding of the diverse issues confronting the Caribbean. These range from political and economic integration to national productivity, income policies, and the Caribbean business environment. An interesting inclusion is his attempt to trace the roots of regional underdevelopment, which he views as being essentially an issue of economic under-management. He laments the Caribbean’s predominantly political culture in which positions are filled and decisions taken at the expense of economic progress. In response, he calls for government investment in a sound management culture that focuses on developing a vibrant private sector, stimulating entrepreneurship, developing a cadre of professional managers, and insistence on accountability of top management.

In a departure from the earlier sections, the final chapters in Section Five on “The Barbados Experiment” highlight the success of the Barbadian economy dating back to colonial times. Blackman skillfully outlines the development of the economy during pre-colonial times, the immediate post-WWII period, and the decades since then. In particular, the early years of the 1990s appears to be the most difficult for the country, since it “labored under the stern IMF conditionalities, which involved higher taxes, reduced government expenditure and savage cuts in government personnel.”

While the book is heavy on economic prescriptions, its main problem is its lack of emphasis on analyzing some of the problems in the first place. Part of this shortcoming has to do with Blackman’s almost complete dismissal of mainstream economic thought in defining the problems of small developing economies. The fact that Blackman blames a number of economic failings almost exclusively on weak economic management may also be viewed as a bit simplistic. Indeed, questions of human and technical capacity, cultural norms, and a country’s history (particularly that of its colonial past) all play a role in determining its economic outcome. Despite these weaknesses, though, the book is a still useful guide in understanding the dynamics of policy making in the Caribbean in general—particularly in Barbados, which can be considered as one of the world’s true economic success stories.