Western media outlets initially hailed the presidential election of moderate reformer Viktor Yushchenko as an important step toward functional Ukrainian democracy. His Orange Revolution, a vast outpouring of public support and anger at government and business corruption, promised a much-needed political revival for the country. Much of this idealism and energy, however, has since disintegrated into political bickering. Following a split over basic policy between Yushchenko and his former prime minister and political ally Yulia Tymoshenko, the president dismissed his entire cabinet. This move and Tymoshenko’s subsequent statement that she and Yushchenko are now on “two different teams” have plunged the new government into uncertainty.

Beyond the immediate issue of rebuilding the government lies a more fundamental concern: have the original values of the revolution been betrayed, or do they still run strong in Yushchenko’s government? The answer to this question will largely determine Ukraine’s place in Europe’s future. But despite the fears of many Ukrainians and observers, it seems that the principles of the Orange Revolution are still alive and well, even if not in their original form.

The color orange, ubiquitous around the time of Yushchenko’s election, embodied the democratic values absent in recent regimes as Yushchenko rallied crowds with his promises of eliminating corruption, shaping Ukraine’s identity in Europe, and liberalizing the economy. When voters braved sub-zero temperatures to protest the fraudulent elections, they were supporting these democratic principles. Lubomyr Hajda of the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute told the HIR that these voters were striking out against being “treated like dirt” under previous governments. They voted for the principles symbolized by Yushchenko and the Revolution, he said, not for Yushchenko himself.

After Yushchenko’s dramatic victory, public opinion polls showed that trust in the government spiked to all-time highs. While these numbers have since dropped, Oxana Shevel of Harvard’s Davis Center explained in an interview with the HIR that still “the people see Yushchenko as an improvement over [Leonid] Kuchma,” Ukraine’s last president.

The people have a right to be optimistic, as the Revolution has already brought measures of democratization. Constitutional reform will convert Ukraine’s presidential democracy into a parliamentary democracy on January 1, 2006, thereby limiting the ability of the president to wield authoritarian power. Yushchenko has also eliminated visa requirements for citizens of Western European nations and the United States, drawing Ukraine closer to the western democracies.

The rift between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko seems to jeopardize this progress, raising the issue of whether the original principles of the Revolution are still intact. Amid a slew of scandals, Tymoshenko accused the president of abandoning his promises to reduce corruption and of betraying his campaign slogan, “the bandits will be in jail,” by conducting deals with business oligarchs. In response, Yushchenko argued that participation of the wealthy elite is necessary to achieve regional economic integration for Ukraine to ensure more profitable trade. Such a basic policy disagreement between the two leaders of the Revolution indicates a troubling weakness. As it stands, the schism between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko threatens to divide voters in the country’s consistently liberal western region, offering the old guard a potential return to power.

However, Shevel believes that Yushchenko and Tymoshenko have the common goal of democratizing Ukraine but just “disagree on the most appropriate methods.” Perhaps the most divisive policy difference concerns the economy. Yushchenko is more of a free-market economist whereas Tymoshenko favors more state control over the economy. But because the two leaders share the same ultimate goal, Shevel says she would not be surprised if the spring elections forced reconciliation and reunification.

In fact, the crisis in the revolution might even bring positive results. Instead of simply silencing his opponents, as previous leaders have done, Yushchenko used democratic means. The Ukrainian democracy now seems strong enough to withstand a drastic change, and with the upcoming transformation to a parliamentary democracy, the nation can move only further away from its authoritarian past.

While some remain disenchanted with the government, Hajda believes “the country is largely better off” since Yushchenko’s election. Shevel asserts that there exists a paradoxical phenomenon in Eastern Europe that, “the more unstable a nation in the area is, the more democratic it becomes.” That seems to be the case in Ukraine: even in crisis, democracy marches on and the values of the Orange Revolution remain intact. With the media spotlight on Ukraine, Yushchenko has the opportunity to impress the rest of the world and continue the painstaking process of transforming Ukraine into a democracy.