The 1998 bombings of American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya alerted the United States that Africa had become an active center of Al-Qaeda operations. In particular, the United States focused attention on the group of states known as the Horn of Africa – Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Kenya – where war and lawlessness offered ideal breeding grounds for terrorist cells. A significant component of the US response to the situation in the Horn has been the creation of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). As members of the Task Force, soldiers undertake public works projects in remote areas of Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya in an effort to build goodwill toward America and keep the areas under surveillance.

Those who deliver military-sponsored humanitarian aid, sometimes labeled “hearts and minds” operations, believe that those efforts increase stability, win local allies, and bolster international legitimacy. If not carefully executed, however, hearts and minds operations can actually undermine American interests, or at least, fail to achieve any positive effects. Military planners can avoid such negative outcomes by relying on the humanitarian “do no harm” principle. In the context of the CJTF-HOA, and other similar missions, the do no harm principle suggests the following four guidelines. First, military projects should complement the work of civilian organizations, rather than duplicating or ignoring it. Second, focusing on the long-term sustainability of projects will ensure that any goodwill generated does not quickly evaporate. Third, military forces should also target their efforts to areas in which they hold a comparative advantage, such as disaster relief, logistics, and operating in insecure environments. Fourth and finally, hearts and minds operations should attempt to project an appearance of relative neutrality and humanitarian services separate from overt counterinsurgency activity. This article focuses on the military’s strategy to win hearts and minds in the Horn of Africa through the CJTF-HOA.

The US Army’s recently revised field manual on counterinsurgency explains that "the integration of civilian and military efforts is crucial to successful COIN [counterinsurgency] operations... Political, social, and economic programs are usually more valuable than conventional military operations in addressing the root causes of conflict and undermining an insurgency." In the case of the Horn of Africa, the United States hopes that humanitarian programs will prevent the need for more robust military intervention or counterinsurgency warfare. As Marine Major General Timothy Ghormley, former commander of the CJTF-HOA, explained, “We are setting the conditions for victory…We’re avoiding another Iraq or Afghanistan.”

In 2006, State Department official Eunice Reddick described the goals of US policy in the Horn of Africa as “addressing the threat of terrorism, supporting the establishment of effective governance and political stability and responding to the humanitarian needs of the Somalian people and promoting regional security.” The United States has allegedly offered covert support to the Somali militants fighting the Islamists. American policy also cultivates a strong diplomatic relationship with neighboring Ethiopia and Djibouti. The main mechanisms for achieving those goals, however, include the actions of the CJTF-HOA, the provision of humanitarian assistance by the Department of State and the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and funding for international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Established in October 2002, the CJTF-HOA consists of around 1,500 members, representing each branch of the US military, civilians, coalition forces, and partner nations. The CJTF-HOA concentrates its activities in Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia, especially in the areas alongside the Somalia border. It is headquartered at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti. The Task Force relies on Civil Affairs teams to help select and undertake civil-military operations in local communities. Types of operations include: short-range humanitarian programs, immediate impact military civic action projects, emergency services, and support to civil administration. Task Force members team up with local villagers to build schools, dig wells, and construct clinics. For many of these projects CJTF-HOA provides funding and then contracts with local residents to complete the construction. As of 2006 the Task Force had completed 85 projects, including schools, health clinics, and wells.

Other aspects of the Task Force activity include Medical Civic Action Programs (MEDCAP) and Veterinary Civic Action Programs (VETCAP). For these missions, a small team travels to remote locations to provide medical care to the residents (and livestock) by setting up a temporary clinic. Over the course of a few days, the programs treat a few thousand residents. For example, one MEDCAP mission in Djibouti provided primary healthcare to 2,000 people over a period of two weeks. Specialist Jason Crohan, a medic, commented, “We did something in each village to bring hope, and all of us could feel the immediate impact with what we were doing.”

A Partial and Political Mission

The motivating assumption underlying the CJTF-HOA is that its projects will generate goodwill toward America and reduce local support for terrorists and Islamist factions. United States Senator Barack Obama confirmed this strategy during a September 2006 visit to Camp Lemonier: “The enthusiasm and appreciation of people shown in Ethiopia is indicative of the good will generated when we participate in these kinds of activities.”

Many NGOs, however, express skepticism that missions such as the Horn of Africa Task Force can be compatible with traditional humanitarian activity. NGOs typically stress three guiding principles in their work: neutrality, impartiality, and independence. Neutrality requires an organization to refrain from taking sides in a conflict. Impartiality means basing the provision of aid solely upon the need of the recipients. Independence ensures that governments do not influence the decision-making and actions of the NGO. These three principles are viewed as both core values and as practical protection measures. David Curtis, head of mission for Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) in Somalia, explains: “When military and humanitarian groups are doing similar work it is hard for people… to differentiate between them. Yet the objectives of the two are utterly dissimilar; humanitarian agencies aid the population without taking sides and based on need, while the US military serve their own political and military objectives alone. The two are incompatible.”

In contrast to the humanitarian ethos, the CJTF-HOA does not provide assistance based solely on need and does not claim to function independently of political considerations. The Army’s new field manual on counterinsurgency recognizes that many NGOs “do not want to be too closely associated with military forces because they need to preserve their perceived neutrality.” The guidelines go on to assert that “there is no such thing as impartial humanitarian assistance" in counterinsurgency operations. As Rear Admiral Richard W. Hunt, current commander of CJTF-HOA, speaking to a group of thirty NGO representatives in June 2006, explained, “The civil affairs and humanitarian projects are prioritized based on their potential to counter terrorist ideology in the region.”