Of course, there remains the possibility of an external defect to this analysis, namely that Al Qaeda will pursue a medium-target phase as opposed to a purely small-target phase. That is, pursuant to the goal of “maximum efficiency” in a terrorist operation identified above, Al Qaeda may choose as a locus for an attack somewhere that a large number of people gather at the same time, which thereby distinguishes it from a so-called “small target,” and is large enough that complete security is impossible, either practically or fiscally. Obvious examples include major league sports events, music concerts, or even holiday celebrations in metropolitan areas. What all of this amounts to is that defensive measures are simply insufficient for protecting against another Al Qaeda terrorist attack.

The End Game

Al Qaeda’s strategy has entered into a new phase. The small-target phase that was deduced as the next stage of Al Qaeda terrorist attacks is logically supported by the evidence at hand. The problem, though, is that the analysis seemingly offers nothing of a counter strategy, in fact the greatest deficiency in the argument is its failure to provide anything in the way of a precaution to the forecasted danger. Furthermore, the most obvious precautions are now the most obsolete. The first is to find, track down, “smoke ’em out,” or do whatever is necessary to arrest the high ranking members of Al Qaeda, chiefly and specifically Osama bin Laden. Without a centralized leadership, the organization of Al Qaeda will falter and weaken. Organizations are not like hydras; they will not sprout two more heads where you cut off one. Instead, they will run like the proverbially decapitated chicken. The second precaution is like the first: isolate and capture the remaining splinter cells of Al Qaeda until it ceases to operate. These steps are both proactive, and they are not defensive per se, except insofar as the best defense is a good offense.

Although these actions are simple in conception that is not why they are obsolete. Rather, they have been rendered obsolete by the current state of world affairs. Since this piece is dealing with Al Qaeda and its intention of terrorizing the United States, it is not improper to say that it is the responsibility of the United States to deal with this threat. However, the United States engaged itself with an unnecessary war in Iraq, so that now steps one and two above are obsolete.

The vast bulk of US military forces instead of being employed in tracking down and capturing the top leaders of Al Qaeda are currently rebuilding the country of Iraq. With an armed force occupied with reconstructing a nation, the United States does not have the critical mass of manpower needed to comb the wilderness between Afghanistan and Pakistan that Al Qaeda currently operates out of and capture its leaders. And so, since step two is causally dependent on step one, if step one is impossible, step two is likewise impossible. Consequently, military decisions by the United States have rendered its people more susceptible to the most immediate threat of Al Qaeda.

The conclusion of this paper is, unfortunately, an unacceptable one—that Al Qaeda is entering a new phase of small-target terrorism within the United States and that the United States has made itself more vulnerable to this strategy by its actions in the War on Terror to the extent that it now seems impossible to offer a viable solution to the threat of Al Qaeda without simultaneously offering a solution to the situation in Iraq. And such an analysis and solution is surely wanting not only by the author, but also by the world.