An important prerequisite for a breakthrough in the Iranian nuclear standoff is Washington's explicit self-distancing from demonizing Iran as a part of the "axis of evil." In turn, this calls for a serious and objective scrutiny of Iran's foreign policy actions and priorities, which are a far cry from the actions and priorities of a state sponsoring terrorism. Rather, Iran’s policies evince all of the key ingredients of an important and assertive regional power in good relations with practically all of its neighbors, including the "new" Iraq and Afghanistan—it acts primarily as a pillar of stability in the two main energy hubs of the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea basin.

Having succumbed to a caricature of Iran, the United States has failed to devise a sound Iran policy that realistically gauges the foreign policy interests and intentions of the Islamic republic. The United States has also been blind to the potential zones of policy agreement between Tehran and Washington with respect to fighting Taliban, the Sunni insurgency in Iraq, drug trafficking, and so on. Instead, by upping the ante and going as far as trumping Iran with the tactical nuclear weapon in the current nuclear poker, the Bush Administration constantly cancels out its own half-hearted initiatives to build a bridge to Iran short of regime change. Such flagrant threats, rationalized under the national security doctrine of "preemption" are bound to adversely affect Iran’s actions whereby a defensive Iran is pushed to entertain non-conventional methods in repelling the planned attacks on Iran.

As a result, the present crisis over Iran's nuclear program has a decent chance of being escalated to dangerous levels, imperiling world peace and the well-being of the world economy. The perdurability of the ill-will between Iran and the United States is guaranteed so long as both sides continue to demonize each other and overlook their shared and parallel interests. The two countries must discuss and compromise on viable options for a peaceful resolution of the nuclear crisis, above all the option of how to minimize the risks of nuclear weaponization through a multi-layered approach consisting of robust inspections, security guarantees, reliable foreign fuel supply to complement Iran’s domestic production, and international participation in the Iranian nuclear fuel production and fabrication. In the absence of such a compromise, the present nuclear crisis has the potential to escalate to the point that might lead Iran to emulate North Korea’s example by exiting the NPT. That would, indeed, be a fatal blow to the entire non-proliferation regime, which, despite its numerous shortfalls, has been a relatively successful international regime. In the mix of alternatives, the best option is one that would not seek in vain to preemptively halt Iran’s nuclear potential, but rather realistically keep the proliferation tendency in potential indefinitely.