A peaceful Sudan was the lofty goal of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed on January 9, 2005, between the northern government of Sudan and the southern Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). More than a year afterward, the situation in the country seems unpromising at best. Darfur remains one of the most troubled regions in the world, with frequent eruptions of violence from rebel groups against the government. Humanitarian crises abound as large numbers of internally displaced people and refugees return home to communities suffering from rape, property destruction, robbery, injury, and death. With suitable and adequate international pressure, the Sudanese government must ensure the rightful political development of the country while outside agencies promote peacekeeping and humanitarian aid.
The historic conclusion of the CPA ended over two decades of Africa’s longest civil war, a conflict between the non-Arab populations of southern Sudan and the Arab-controlled government. The CPA’s terms serve the interests of both southern and northern residents. The main provisions of the treaty arranged for the autonomy of southern Sudan followed by a referendum, the fifty-fifty share of oil revenue between the Government of South Sudan and the National Congress Party (NCP), the merging of armed forces between the north and the south, and the distribution of jobs in the government according to certain established ratios. Despite the formation of the new “Government of National Unity” and the signing of a new constitution, the commitments delineated in the treaty are empty if the ruling party does not carry them out.
Indeed, the ruling NCP has done little to improve the situation in southern Sudan. Dominated by the National Islamic Front (NIF), the NCP has expanded the role of the African Union and NATO in peacekeeping in the region while the new constitution has set the wheels of democratization in motion. However, without a sustainable economy to support its reconstruction, southern Sudan is stagnating. This seems to be precisely the goal of the NIF. It has reserved authority over two ministries, the Finance Ministry and the Ministry for Mining and Energy, which together control the incomes from the oil fields. Though southern Sudan accounts for 90 percent of the country’s total oil production, it receives less than the 50 percent of the profits guaranteed under the CPA. Some reports indicate that the south is obtaining merely one-tenth of the US$600 million advance in oil revenue. With numerous countries, including China, India, and Japan, expressing interest in purchasing Sudanese oil, the south could obtain its needed resources if NIF shared the profits equally.
The dynamic between the government and the military in Sudan is ominous for the peace progress as well. Even as the second Sudanese Vice-President Ali Osman Taha reaffirms his commitment to peace under the CPA, political and military concerns threaten to disturb national unity. The government arguably has links to Janjaweed, the Arab militias which are responsible for the main atrocities of the Darfur conflict and which continue to attack villagers in the northern regions of Darfur. Additionally, significant NIF troop pullouts from the southern Sudan region, as negotiated under the security agreements, have yet to begin.
The apprehension of the south is compounded by the uneven distribution of power in the current administration. Although the ministries are evenly divided in number, the NCP exercises control over those of significance, including Defense, Energy and Mining, Interior, and Finance and Justice, while establishing “shadow bureaucracies” over the SPLM’s control of the Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, Education and Scientific Research, and Health ministries. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan had ample justification for reporting to the Security Council in September 2005 that the NIF was “in violation” of the CPA.
While outside influences have limited command over Sudan’s inter-party and inter-agency relations, multilateral coercion is needed to push the NCP to adhere strictly to the terms of the CPA. Members of the international community should either collectively revoke economic assistance to the NCP if it disobeys the treaty terms or jointly provide economic incentives to a compliant NCP. They should also promote demilitarization, political stability, and eradication of hunger and disease. Concurrently, implementation of human rights will seal the coming of peace and will move the country toward a truly democratic representative government. It is in the interests of Sudan and the global community that the conditions for peace laid by the CPA be met, advanced, and maintained. 




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