Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Georgia inherited a wide array of challenges inherent to the post-Soviet political, economic, and geopolitical landscape: entrenched corruption, unaccountable political elites, external manipulation, a lack of energy security, ethnic discord, and a government unable to pursue comprehensive reforms. The country also inherited something new for fledgling post-Soviet states: choices. Independence brought new opportunities for economic and political revitalization and also demanded that leaders form a comprehensive vision for the national future—a duty that had not rested in Tbilisi’s hands for seven decades.

Georgia both benefited and suffered from the collapse of the Soviet Union. It benefited because freedom and independence are inherently preferable to tyranny and central control. It suffered because, in the first decade after independence, Georgian leaders were unable to chart a strategic course for achieving national goals. In the ensuing political and economic vacuum, state weakness was easily exploited by foreign manipulation, domestic vigilantism, and criminal plundering.

Although chaotic and unforeseen, the collapse of the Soviet Union is generally viewed as relatively bloodless. Yet Georgia experienced a disproportionate share of violence in the massacre of pro-independence protesters during the tail end of the Gorbachev years and in the separatist conflict and civil war that ravaged the country through the early 1990s. The war in Abkhazia alone killed thousands, displaced one quarter-million Georgians from their homes, and swiftly deteriorated the quality of life for the diverse peoples of Abkhazia. The price paid for Tbilisi’s failure to demonstrate a better path was immense. These various challenges contributed to Georgia’s post-Soviet choice being sidelined, as the country limped along with little hope of reviving from a decade of stagnation.

A Georgian Vision

The Rose Revolution of November 2003 marked a turning point in Georgia’s modern history. It showed that the Georgian people did not lose the ability to choose for themselves the path for their future. Georgians exhibited unity and discipline, armed only with the belief that through fairness, equality, and determination, their country could regain its prosperity and dignity. As the protests grew and the awareness of the magnitude of the movement spread, it became clear that the people of Georgia were not merely protesting electoral fraud; we were coming together to right the mistakes of the past and transform society.

Two years after the Rose Revolution, Georgia is a transformed country, part of an emerging Black Sea region characterized by the advancement of democracy and robust economic growth. The return of the rule of law, human rights, transparency, and the delivery of basic public services signifies that Georgia can respond to the challenges posed by democratic governance. Finally, Georgians are making positive choices that are moving the country out of the shadow of its past. Georgia has provided the region and the world with a profoundly hopeful story—a story of nationwide participation, resurgence, and the irresistible power of democracy. Not least of all, we have proven to ourselves that we have the power to transform our society, which means there is no excuse for the failure to do so. Today, Georgia is no longer merely “post-Soviet” but is realizing its role as a Black Sea nation with a European future.

The Fight Against Corruption

Before the Rose Revolution, the authorities passively accepted corruption as an inherent part of Georgia’s economic and political system. We have rejected this outright. While a lack of accountability once allowed corruption to flourish at all levels of government, Georgia is no longer a corrupt state. Though corruption has not been totally eradicated, our anti-corruption strategy, rooted in the disciplined application of the rule of law, has changed the rules of the game to provide a fundamental accountability that brings corruption to light and makes it unsustainable.

In the past, in the absence of the rule of law, high-ranking officials known to be corrupt were never arrested. We decided, for the first time since Georgia’s independence, to respond to cases of blatant corruption regardless of rank. This meant the prosecution of dozens of former ministers, prosecutors, judges, regional administrators, and other high-level officials.

The petty corruption of rank-and-file public employees proved different, however, than the egregious corruption of the very powerful—it required an appropriate strategy. Though the effect of their actions is just as insidious as that of blatant corruption, perpetrators of petty corruption often act out of necessity rather than avarice since they may have no other way to feed their struggling families. As clear as it was that prosecution was the right approach for grand corruption, it was equally evident that petty corruption required a different approach. To ensure that survival would be neither a motivation nor an excuse for corruption, the underlying causes of corruption would have to be targeted.

The first part of our anti-corruption plan involved large-scale downsizing, which got rid of corrupt employees, reduced the institutional inertia that allows corruption to continue, and released funds for social improvements. Second, re-training and re-equipping created a professional institutional culture. Third, marked salary increases eliminated the incentives that led good people to make bad choices. Our strategy stood in contrast to another possible approach—forming an anti-corruption office of government and making it responsible for policing—because we knew that policing alone was not enough and that government corruption would survive until its causes were eliminated within each institution.

The government decided to implement this risky strategy with a level of commitment never before seen in the post-Soviet space. The most visible embodiment of Georgian corruption—the traffic police force—was fired en masse, as 12,000 officers were given their walking papers. New recruits were differently trained and equipped and paid at least five times the previous salaries. To ensure professional conduct, a Department of Human Rights and Monitoring was created with the authority to conduct inspections of all preliminary detention facilities. The difference is clear: public support for the police forces has risen from single digits in the period before the Rose Revolution to more than 75 percent, according to a recent Gallup/International Republican Institute poll.

Georgia’s success in driving out corruption is exhibited by the constellation of statistics that reflect today’s enhanced public confidence. Chief among them is the dramatic growth in the state budget, whose real figure hovered at just over Georgian Lari (GEL) 500 million (US$27.6 million) in 2003 and now stands at GEL 3.5 billion (US$1.9 billion). These added revenues demonstrate that Georgia’s borders and customs systems are functioning, that former tax evaders are becoming tax payers, that businesses are leaving the shadow economy, and that smuggling and contraband have been dramatically reduced.