The post-communist experience in Belarus offers two important lessons about non-democratic regimes in the former Soviet Union and beyond. The first is that dictatorships are not accidental and that authoritarian rule may be supported by the variety of historical, economic, and social factors that ensure its resilience to internal and external pressures. The second is that autocrats may be smart: Lukashenka has demonstrated a remarkable ability to learn from the downfalls of his colleagues and to avoid their mistakes at home.

His learning ability and resilience are not infinite, of course, and however hopeless democratic opposition seems, its network is solid, broad, and sophisticated when compared to that of communist-era dissidents. New opportunities in communication, as underground literature can be easily downloaded from the Internet, make the establishment of total control over the spread of information unrealistic. There is authentic home-grown support for democratic change inside the country; however suppressed this support may be, predictions about the democratic future of Belarus must take it into account.

For now, this future remains distant. Lukashenka has successfully foreclosed Belarus from the presently popular path of “electoral revolution.” Belarus will have to find its own lengthy and difficult road to democracy.