Not only did Lukashenka seize upon nostalgia for tranquility and security, but he also exploited public memory and the only frame of self-understanding that ordinary Belarusians had to distinguish between what was good and bad. And so, his first referendum in May 1995 established Russian as the second official language and restored the Soviet-era flag and coat of arms as the country’s official symbols. The independence-era symbols—the white-red-white flag and the coat of arms associated with the Belarusian nationalist movement—were decried for their use by Nazi collaborators during World War II. Ipso facto, Lukashenka’s opposition became a collection of Nazi sympathizers. Remarkably, in the parliamentary elections carried out on the same day as the referendum, the nationalist Belarusian Popular Front opposition failed to win a single seat, partly because of the manipulation of the electoral process but largely because of the wave of anti-nationalist hysteria unleashed by officialdom and supported by the referendum.

Exploiting the symbolism, history, and mythology of World War II has a practical political purpose for Lukashenka. It helps squeeze the opposition from the moral, political, and physical high ground by portraying them as descendants of Nazi collaborators. Whenever possible, Lukashenka rallies the public by invoking memories of that war to denounce his critics, whether they are Western human rights advocates or Russian energy monopolies. And while popular support for democracy and democrats in Belarus has been equal to, if not greater than, that in many other former Soviet states, the opposition has not mobilized that public support because there is no popular national idea that creates a moral alternative to Soviet totalitarianism and, by extension, Lukashenka’s dictatorship.

Thus, Lukashenka met very little resistance on the streets in November 1996 when he carried out the constitutional referendum that endowed the president with absolute power and extended his term in office by two years. Likewise, only a few thousand people protested vote rigging after the presidential elections of 2001. In the aftermath of the constitutional referendum of 2004, the number of protesters fell to just several hundred activists. Moreover, the weakness of anti-Soviet (and anti-Russian) Belarusian nationalism means that overt Russian support for Lukashenka is not controversial with the public. Ironically, when the Kremlin tried to undermine Lukashenka by economic means—Russia briefly switched off gas supplies to Belarus in February 2004 over non-payment of gas arrears—Lukashenka successfully invoked “Soviet Belarusian” patriotism to rally the public against the “criminal” oligarchs in Moscow and increase his public stature.

Exploring the “Economic Miracle”

While culture provides an important source of domestic legitimacy for Lukashenka’s regime, his ability to maintain a considerable degree of economic stability and security for the population forges a certain type of “social contract” between the leader and the masses. Ironically, the economy was one area where Lukashenka was widely expected to fail at the beginning of his rule. The Belarusian economy is continuously ranked among the most controlled in the world, as the state officially controls almost 80 percent of assets and privatization has never been actively implemented.

Nevertheless, the command economy maintains impressive viability if not overall efficiency. The rapid and explosive economic growth of 1997 to 1998, when the economy grew at 8 to 11 percent per year, was largely due to inflationary stimulation and generous external subsidies provided by access to cheap raw materials in Russia. The economy was hit hard by the August 1998 financial crisis in Russia, and the command system appeared to be faltering; in 2001 Belarus had the lowest rate of economic growth among the countries of the former USSR. However, rapid growth soon restarted, with GDP increasing by 11 percent in 2004 and 9 percent in 2005. While international financial institutions sometimes doubt the validity of Belarusian statistics, they nevertheless recognize strong growth in the Belarusian economy.

Economic performance has become a central point of official propaganda. Real positive trends are unapologetically promoted by the state-controlled media and in official speeches without reference to the price at which they have been achieved. Problem spots, such as extremely high retail prices and the wage gap between Belarus and neighbors like Lithuania and Poland, are downplayed or ignored. On this basis, the propaganda presents Belarus as an “island of stability in the sea of storm,” working to persuade the population that any change in government would yield chaos and impoverishment.

Upon a closer look, political factors and favorable economic terms from foreign markets should be noted as primary reasons for Belarus’ remarkable economic performance. Throughout Lukashenka’s rule, Belarus has enjoyed huge discounts from Russia when paying for energy supplies. This lofty privilege, estimated by some economists to cost billions of dollars per year, was provided mostly for political reasons, as the Kremlin has consistently tolerated revenue losses to reward its most loyal ally in the former Soviet Union.

Cheap oil and gas allowed Lukashenka to preserve Soviet-era industrial giants through the economic crisis years of the 1990s. This policy eventually paid off, when skyrocketing oil prices generated strong economic growth in Russia, and expanding purchasing power in the Russian market created enormous opportunities for Belarusian exporters. Moreover, appreciation of the Russian ruble and the euro allowed Belarusian exports to be competitive on the Russian and European markets, which account for more than 80 percent of Belarus’ total trade. The introduction of protectionist measures by Russia to limit imports from outside the Commonwealth of Independent States has also benefited Belarus, which has a common customs area with Russia.

Despite these rosy trends, the inveterate problems of Belarus’ economic model remain. Belarus hardly has the resources to sustain its model once oil prices fall because internal sources of growth are weak. The outdated Soviet-style industrial facilities are artificially sustained at taxpayers’ expense. And wage hikes implemented by direct administrative order overstretch enterprise finances as the tax burden continuously increases.

Lukashenka tolerates the endemic flaws of the state-run economy for at least two reasons. First, since he never undertook the kind of privatization attempted in other former Soviet countries, such as Russia or Ukraine, he does not have to cope with a powerful, quasi-independent oligarchic class. Second, since the government controls nearly all assets, it employs the vast majority of Belarusians. The government has used public employment to ensure the loyalty of citizens. For many Belarusians, this means a return to the easy, understandable Soviet practice of an implicit social contract with the state—trading loyalty for guarantees of physical survival and prosperity.