Chen’s goal here is to create and forge a national identity different from that of mainland China, not so that Taiwan’s people can understand the national identity of their country, but mostly to ensure Taiwan’s recognition in the international community and by the United Nations. Taiwan recently made a bid at the UN’s sixtieth General Assembly to gain a seat at the table, as it has been trying to do every year since 1972, the year the People’s Republic of China replaced the ROC in the United Nations. Chen has said he will continue to apply for UN membership under the name of Taiwan. Former President Lee has also voiced his opinion, urging for the official change from Republic of China to Taiwan. Chen has also remarked, after the UN failure, that he “hope[s] to see a new and suitable constitution introduced in Taiwan.” This is especially alarming, as a new constitution might give Chen the power he needs to undertake greater changes of desinification in Taiwanese society.

It looks as though Taiwan’s 23 million people are tired of such politicization. On December 3, 2005, Taiwan’s KMT party won an overwhelming victory in the island-wide municipal elections—17 out of the 23 constituencies. This was strongly viewed as a mid-term test for Chen’s leadership. While the DPP won six constituencies, the election emphasizes the fracture in Taiwanese society as a result of the politicization of national identity by Lee and Chen. The DPP won only in the South while the KMT won in central-North Taiwan.

Solutions for the Future

Taiwan’s people have a right to be free and democratic if they so choose. But if this is ever to be accomplished, a coherent national identity must be felt by all 23 million people living on the island; one that brings all of them together. Without a national identity, Taiwan may still become a state in the future, but it will never become a nation. National identity has not been forged because of its politicization by the Chen administration; it has resulted instead in an even more divided Taiwanese society.

Chen and Lee’s policies have given Taiwanese people only two choices: to renounce China or not to renounce China. Taiwan can be described as a nation that is literally divided—North and South—the latter a bastion for “native” Taiwanese sympathetic to the DPP, the North home to many “Mainlanders.” Indeed, Chen’s rapid policies, seemingly intent on erasing Taiwan’s past in order to create the “Taiwanese man” will ultimately fail because, as we have seen throughout Taiwanese history, Taiwan has enjoyed much interaction and enrichment from Chinese culture and language; even its economy today is closely intertwined with markets in China.

This is not to say that all of Taiwan’s identity is simply Chinese identity. Taiwan should embrace the past and focus more on Taiwanification, not desinification. Taiwan’s 23 million people must gain a sense of what being “Taiwanese” really means, not just what a political party represents. However, given the presence of Chinese history and culture in the past, Taiwan should also find ways to integrate such influences into creating its distinct identity. This is ultimately inevitable, as any historian will know that much of Taiwan’s history and development is intertwined with pre-Communist China. Let Chen and the DPP pursue the policy of their choice with China, but let that be in the arena of foreign affairs. It is time for national identity to be a question on its own.