Chen and the Politicization of National Identity

Chen has continued the legacy of his predecessor by entangling national identity with politics. Chen frequently identifies a certain more pro-China national identity with the pro-China foreign policy of the KMT, thus merging national identity with a political party. As such, through his rhetoric and campaigning, Chen has caused many Taiwanese to view a national identity predicated on Chinese culture as taking sides with the KMT.

It is important to understand the divisions of Taiwanese society in order to comprehend how Chen has politicized national identity. One group of people living in Taiwan is known as either “Mainlander” or “waisheng ren,” literally meaning “external-province person.” These are individuals who emigrated from mainland China in 1949, as well as all of their descendants. Chen has used the “Mainlander” term to evoke a negative image of individuals hostile to Taiwanese independence that may not necessarily be trusted. Most notably, Chen told the Taiwanese population during his 2004 campaign that electing a KMT president would essentially sell Taiwan to China. His justification was that many of the party members are “Mainlanders” or “waisheng ren” who would sell Taiwan to China.

In contrast to “Mainlander” and “waisheng ren,” native Taiwanese are called “bensheng ren” or “sweet potato,” because of Taiwan’s shape. This is a diverse and fluid group, composed of native aborigines and speakers of Hakka and Holo. President Chen and former President Lee are part of this group. President Chen, for example, speaks only Holo in public and carries the banner of President Lee’s concept of “The New Taiwanese,” which believes that “waisheng ren” should assimilate into a Taiwanese identity that is separate from a Chinese one. Chen’s rhetoric continued when he suggested, in the latest parliamentary elections, that a vote for the KMT would be a vote for a Chinese takeover of Taiwan. Chen’s frequent use of Holo in national discussions (which seems out of place given that Mandarin Chinese is the national language) is a subtle but divisive attempt to show himself as a true Taiwanese and to ostracize not only KMT party members but also “waisheng ren” and other predominant speakers of Mandarin. Chen also refers to himself in public not as Shui-Bian, his given name, but by his Taiwanese nickname, A-Bian. Taiwan itself is split not only along linguistic lines but also along linguistic-political lines. Northern Taiwan, especially near Taipei, contains predominantly Mandarin Chinese speakers and many KMT supporters. Southern Taiwan, especially around Kaohsiung, contains mostly Taiwanese dialect speakers and mostly pan-green, or DPP, supporters.

Desinification in Taiwan’s Education System

Taiwan under Chen has recently planned to cut down on classical Chinese studies for high school students, primarily in the field of Chinese literature; this move is widely regarded as a tactic to split Taiwan from China. The Ministry of Education implemented a new policy where Chinese would be taught only four days a week instead of five. Classical Chinese works now make up half of the curriculum in Chinese language courses, down from around 67 percent. Quintessential Chinese authors such as Confucius and Mencius are also to be dropped from the mandatory literature course list.

Such moves by the Chen administration have been heavily criticized by the National Teachers’ Association of Taiwan. Yeh Chin-lung, deputy director of the Association, said, “I think the Ministry should listen more to teachers… some suspect the decision was motivated by political ideologies and emotions.” Many educators say that Chen is attempting to eradicate Chinese cultural and historical roots from Taiwan in his attempt to pursue Taiwanese independence. Many have also complained about the public hearings held by the Ministry of Education, arguing that they were no more than just announcements of the change in policy. Tan Jia-hua, a retired Chinese literature teacher from the Chung Shan Girls’ Senior High School, remarked that “since [DPP] officials never invite teachers who disagree with them, of course they can assert there were no objections in public hearings.” Besides more political complaints, many of Taiwan’s leading scholars are worried about the survival of the pedagogical and cultural value of the Chinese masterpieces that Chen’s policies are trying to abolish. The attempt to get rid of “Chinese Culture Basic Teachings” and Confucianism has also frightened many of Taiwan’s leading academics.

Other professors question the overarching rationale of the Chen administration in undertaking such reforms. Chien Ming-yung, a Chinese literature professor at National Taiwan Normal University, asked, “What’s the literary work before the Qing dynasty got to do with Chinese communism?” Such criticism highlights the possibility that Chen’s policies in this sector are going too far. Without a concrete knowledge of what exactly “Taiwanese” means, Chen is attempting to desinify the curriculum and inject political considerations into the education of students. Chen’s policies, for example, do not have measures for the “Taiwanization” of Chinese literature curriculum—they only take away, not add. Indeed, other, more fanatic supporters of Taiwanese independence (who compose Chen’s electoral base) push for the complete deletion of Chinese history, geography, and literature from all of Taiwan’s textbooks.

From this example, it is clear that questions of national importance—such as identity, culture, and education—are being used as tools to accomplish political agendas. The literature elimination is only the latest in a series of such government-sanctioned actions. Some sources claim that the founder of the Republic of China (Taiwan’s official name, abbreviated ROC), Sun Yatsen, is now being referred to in some areas as a “foreigner.” Until now, Taiwan had always recognized Sun as its national founding father.

Chen’s Goal for Political Recognition

One question remains: if Chen is tying national identity to politics and using it as a tool to divide the populace and accomplish political goals, what are these political goals? The answer is full sovereignty for Taiwan. To accomplish this, Chen has embarked on the aforementioned reforms, painting his oppositional party as a different, threatening national group, and speaking about his perception of Taiwan’s history, which he refers to as the “four stages of the Republic of China.” Talking to a group of young people in the Ambassador Programme of the Formosa Foundation of the USA, Chen first noted that the ROC was established in China in 1912. The next stage was in 1949, when the ROC moved to the island of Taiwan. The third stage saw the ROC gradually transform in meaning to the “ROC on Taiwan,” during the presidency of Lee. After 2000, Chen contends the new phrase should be the “ROC is Taiwan.” Chen desires to change Taiwan’s official name to Taiwan.