On October 1, 2004, Somalia’s newly established 275-member Parliament elected the country’s 14th president, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. Though Somalis and members of the international community hope that this new administration will bring peace to a region where intra-clan warfare has caused more than 300,000 deaths since the early 1990s, the history of failed attempts at establishing governments makes it unlikely that this new president will be successful. Not only will Yusuf’s dictatorial manner antagonize the myriad of Somali factions, but deep-seated structural issues within Somali society continue to make a centralized Somalia nearly unattainable.

Somalia’s demographic homogeneity has prevented the ethnic disputes seen in other African countries. Despite this, the region has been torn by inter- and sub-clan warfare. Clans control different regions of the country and often fight over natural resources. British and Italian colonization deconstructed the decentralized clan structure to form a centralized government, which also reconfigured the traditional peaceful manner of conflict resolution. As a result, an attempt at the unification of the two European-controlled territories within Somalia following its independence caused antagonism between the largest clans (Dir, Isaq, Hawiye, Darod, Digil, and Rahanwayn), which used newly-brought European firepower to resolve their differences.

After two failed presidents Army Chief Siad Barre staged a coup in 1961 and initiated a dictatorial regime that lasted until 1991. His notorious divide-and-rule approach was supplemented by the ruthless slaughter of opposition members and clans. General Muhammad Farah “Aideed” and Ali Mahdi Muhammad, both members of different sub-clans of Hawiye and of the United Somali Congress overthrew Barre in a coup, but conflicts left more than 14,000 Somalis dead. Since then, rival clans and warlords have aspired to gain power in the region but have failed because of a disregard for centralized governments and a haphazard, artificial subdivision of power within those governments.

The current agreement for the establishment of a national government seems to be following the same path. It has been brokered by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and, in particular, Kenya. However, the procedure of selecting government officials has been flawed. The peace talks, which began in 2002, were expected to go through three stages: recognition of key problems and setting up a cease-fire, dealing with issues of land ownership, disarmament, and drafting a constitution, and, finally, power sharing.

However, the “interests,” both internal and external, that ran the conferences, have sped up the initial two phases without true resolution. No reconciliation has been achieved between warring factions in Somalia. The failure is apparent as 23 members of the current parliament are still fighting within the southern region of Somalia. One of the largest mistakes made in the government was omitting a provision to disarm warlords. As arms trading has increased since 2001, especially due to the United States’ War on Terror, there remains a real danger that clans, unhappy with political decisions, may yet again resort to violence.

Furthermore, the majority of the members of parliament hold little legitimacy in the eyes of Somalis and the international community. Many have been sworn in, despite being disqualified by the Advisory Committee due to a lack of formal education, questionable humanitarian reputations, and records as war criminals. Agreements have been achieved through deceit and threats. This government is fighting for survival as it and its national military exist without structure and indifference is the status quo from the international community, foretelling that peace is unlikely to be acheived.

Additionally, many Somalis and international observers worry about Yusuf’s history as a militant dictator. Since 1998, he was President of the semi-autonomous region of Puntland. In his presidency, he eliminated much of his political opposition while playing up to pro-Ethiopian interests, which have been unpopular with Somalis. At the end of his term, he denounced Jama Ali Jama, the successor picked by the Congress of Elders to lead Puntland in 2001, and, a year later, removed Jama from power, reportedly with help from Ethiopia. Yusuf’s obvious disregard for democratic government is worsened by his reputation within Somalia. Due to his history of military coups and clashes in the Puntland border, as well as the obliteration of peace agreements in 2001, the Isaaqs, Ogadens, Marehans, and Hawiyes are staunchly opposed to his leadership.

A combination of an authoritarian leadership and an illegitimate, backwards Parliament will cause clashes within the decentralized Somali society. The stable region of Somaliland, north of Somalia, has shown that before the formation of government, the people of the country have to integrate members of civil society and communicate on basic humanitarian issues through traditional clan conferences. If the government fails to recognize this, the region will only continue to be ravaged by violence and poverty.