Europe and the United States are increasingly framing prognoses of international politics using these ideas of multipolarity and unipolarity. French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine summed up the pre-eminence of the United States by coining the term “hyperpower.” However, a world with weak powers is inherently unstable. During the Thirty Years’ War in the 1600s, Europe’s population sank and social structure deteriorated, precisely because no one political entity could single-handedly end the war. Instability was pervasive until the French and the Austrian Hapsburgs became dominant powers in Europe. More than three centuries later, this small-states theory of an international system has lost none of its potency and danger. Europe, in a truly multipolar world, would not be militarily able to become primus inter pares. A truly multipolar world then, is not the solution to Europe’s problems with the United States. Rather, close integration with multilateral institutions like NATO is the best way to attain stability. Contrary to the central tenet of balance of power politics, conflict does not always lead to an equilibrium state of stability; however, interdependence ensures it.

The greatest misperception of the transatlantic relationship is that the United States is incapable of seeing eye-to-eye on any issue with Europe. The eminent political scientist Robert Kagan has pointed out that the prevailing attitude toward the transatlantic relationship is usually described as that between “cowboys” and stiff Eurocrats. That the two peoples are diametrically opposed is completely false. Both sides of the Atlantic have the same fundamental beliefs in free markets, liberal government, and democracy. This dedication to liberalism and open societies was not only evident in the joint NATO peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia and Croatia, but also most recently in Ukraine. Then-Secretary of State Colin Powell worked closely with his opposite numbers in Brussels—NATO’s headquarters—to ensure that the elections occurring in 2004 went smoothly and according to plan. NATO, while playing no military role in the Iraq War, recently has spearheaded the Training Implementation Mission in Iraq, which seeks to create a self-sufficient Iraqi army. If argument has made the relationship tenuous, it certainly has not paralyzed NATO.

European Estrangement

Despite these misconceptions, there clearly is a problem with US-European relations. NATO is the lifeline of the transatlantic relationship, but the recent US-European estrangement hints at something deeper than just the usual political squabble. The apparent incongruity of the NATO relationship is a function of the US and European mindsets that inevitably arises out of their past histories.

At least part of the problem is that national opinions clash, creating instability in the alliance. In reference to British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s supporting the Iraq War, French President Jacques Chirac delivered a stinging rebuke against Bush in November 2004 by saying that “…Britain gave its support, but I did not see anything in return. I’m not sure it is in the nature of our American friends at the moment to return favors systematically.” However, this antagonism is nothing new in the transatlantic relationship. During the period from the 1950s to the 1970s, French President Charles De Gaulle tried to steer French foreign policy away from its US counterpart. As an ardent nationalist, he strongly believed that “it is intolerable for a great State [France] to leave its destiny up to the decisions and action of another State [the United States]….” This sentiment paved the way for France’s development of, and subsequent transformation into, a nuclear power. France’s development of nuclear weapons underscored the fundamental problem in NATO at this period of time. Essentially, France then had the option of enacting an autonomous foreign policy free from US control, by virtue of its possession of nuclear arms.

De Gaulle ultimately failed to flex France’s newfound muscle, partly because Germany did not choose to join France and shift away from US foreign policy, and partly by way of US pressure. Nonetheless, De Gaulle’s Machtpolitik is a throwback to the European state system in the days of Metternich, the most visible foreign policy architect of post-Napoleonic Europe. Chirac obviously had France’s past history in mind when he told a NATO conference that a durable transatlantic partnership demands, “a close, steadfast and balanced relationship between America and Europe.”

US foreign policy stands in stark contrast to this belief in shifting alliances and unstable international order. Still enlisting Wilsonianism after roughly 90 years, the United States believes in a form of collective security in which all parties to alliance would be represented. During his tenure as President, John F. Kennedy advocated NATO cohesiveness, calling for a new initiative called the NATO Multilateral Force (MLF). This represents the quintessential US ideal of collective security. Essentially, the MLF was a group of ships acting as a weapons platform from which intermediate-range missiles would be launched in case of an emergency. As a key addendum to this initiative, Kennedy called for multinational crews to man these ships. While this project ultimately failed to gain the support of other European countries, one cannot help but see the parallels between this US initiative and the Bush Administration’s rhetoric today.

In a sense, NATO is a synthesis of European interest in self-protection and US aspirations for global security. However, the North Atlantic is not a hotspot for international conflict. Karl Marx, peering into the present, would have a great deal of trouble convincing any European that the Communist “specter” is haunting the West. Whereas past generals like Dwight Eisenhower gained great media attention while serving as the Commander-in-Chief of NATO in Europe, the most visible general today is General John Abizaid, commanding officer of CENTCOM in the Middle East. Recent US military action falls well outside the sphere of Europe, including Afghanistan and Iraq. While reviled for their regimes’ lack of human rights, these so-called “rogue states” did not pose massive threats to Europe. This feeling of insularity from US conflicts, concomitant with Europeans’ divergent security desires, has made NATO less effective as it had been at the onset of the Cold War.

A Revamped Role

However, the concept of NATO was not solely a military role. This means that it can change to meet the demands of the future. NATO can move beyond providing security in the heartland of Europe to working on projects in which the United States and Europe have common interests.