In a recent interview with a reporter from Le Monde, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder pointed out that NATO is “no longer the primary means for dialogue in the transatlantic relationship.” While this is hardly surprising in a contemporary context, it would surely have shocked the US and European representatives who negotiated the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. Indeed, the US-European relationship has come a long way since the Cold War began. What started as a shield against possible Soviet aggression has transformed into something of an albatross around Europeans’ and Americans’ necks. However, assuming that NATO is in its death throes is spurious. The Cold War is over, and Europe is no longer under the clear danger it once was from the Soviet Union. Yet NATO remains the touchstone of the transatlantic relationship. While the current state of the bond between Europe and the United States is anything but rosy, US-European collaboration is a fundamental ingredient not only in their liberal ideals and freedom, but also in the stability of the world order.

NATO is not dead because it was never intended as a purely strategic relationship based solely on self-interested security policies. It was during the immediate post-World War II years that NATO was established, ostensibly to protect Europe from a possible Soviet invasion from the East. However, US Senate testimony by Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Senator Warren Austin before the Senate Foreign Relations committee in 1949 seemed to deny NATO’s “balance of power” underpinnings. Rather, Acheson stressed that NATO was not geared toward resisting the Russian state precisely because “it is aimed solely at armed aggression.” NATO was not defined as a marriage of convenience between a weak, war-torn Europe and a militarily strong United States. While substantively the alliance may have been a facet of Cold War containment policy, it took on a type of high-ground morality that has sustained the alliance very well. The key to understanding this type of mentality behind NATO lies in the North Atlantic Treaty itself. Signed initially in 1949 by Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the Treaty provides no mention of the Soviet Union. Importantly, Article 2 of the Treaty states that:

“The parties will contribute toward further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being.”

NATO cannot be placed in the tradition of realism, with its shifting alliances and balances of power. The North Atlantic Treaty, in its content and proponents, took on a tone of sweeping moralism that transcended the realm of pure geopolitics. While some articles of the treaty, like Article 5, are somewhat outdated—Europe, for example, is not in any danger of armed aggression—the fundamental goals of the Treaty were crafted so as to be without end or fulfillment.

Power and Polarity

The goals of any country do not always match up with those of its multilateral institutions, but the European Union as it stands has not rendered NATO obsolete. If anything, the European Union needs to rely on NATO for the military force that underpins any sort of cultural or “soft power” that Europe can lend to international politics. Currently, the military expenditures of the three largest countries in the European Union—the United Kingdom, France, and Germany—hover around US$40 billion. In stark contrast, the United States spent roughly US$370 billion equipping its military forces in 2004, more than the aggregate of the three countries’ military expenditures. Close association with the US ability to marshal massive resources is necessary if Europe wishes to invoke the threat of military force to back its diplomacy; it inevitably will need to when its influence and voice grow.

While the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy is starting to provide another basis for EU primacy in its own security affairs, NATO still stands as a key determinant in transatlantic security. That the United States is some sort of power mongerer wishing to emasculate transatlantic security for its own sake is a specious notion. In 2002, the administration of US President George W. Bush called for a highly responsive “rapid reaction force” within NATO, comprising 20,000 troops. At a time when the European Union is developing military capabilities of its own, it seems that US policy is trying hard to establish a diplomatic relationship with Europe that is reliant on a common multilateral institution.

Part of the problem, say pessimistic onlookers, is precisely that the United States is in a unipolar world. Simply put, it does not have to listen to anyone else. In a sense, it dominates policy across the globe. While it could be argued that it is the most powerful country in the world, the United States certainly is not above listening to the opinions of others. Contrary to the belief of intellectuals, the current Bush Administration is paying a great deal of attention to what Europeans think. Bush’s trip to Europe early in 2005 may have been pejoratively labeled a “charm offensive,” but it hints at an underlying issue that no recent presidential administration has been able to deny: Europe exerts a sizable influence in the world, and even on the United States.

The most obvious evidence that the European Union is not an US lackey is the poorly publicized EU-China relationship. Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit to France in 2004 was met with an elaborate parade and illumination of the Eiffel Tower, in stark contrast to Bush’s muted visit in 2005. Hu’s wonderful reception is just a symbol of Europe’s increasingly close relationship with China, who at present is the European Union’s largest trading partner. In a move that has become a bone of contention with the United States, the European Union is still entertaining the possibility of lifting the decade-old arms embargo on China. As of March 2005, renewed signs of Chinese aggression toward Taiwan have called this elimination into question, yet importantly, France and Germany, two EU mainstays, are still adamant that it should be pushed through, making it likely that the issue will reappear on the European Union’s agenda. If this indeed comes to fruition, it will be the first time that the European member-states and China can trade arms since the embargo’s inception in 1989. Economically as well, the United States is not totally dominant; the aggregate gross domestic product (GDP) of the European Union is capable of rivaling the United States’ nearly US $11 trillion national income. The United States is very conscious of the role of Europe in their foreign policy. Though critics increasingly believe the current administration is “going it alone,” the Bush Administration is well aware that consultation and multilateralism when possible is optimal.