Finally, the most general form of accountability in world politics is reputational. It is the only form of external accountability that appears to constrain the United States’ political-military activities. Reputation is double-edged, because states may seek reputations for being tough bullies as well as for being reliable partners. The lack of institutionalization of reputational concerns makes reputation a relatively unreliable source of constraint. Yet reputational accountability has some significance because reputations of states matter for other activities. To be effective, states have to be included in the relevant networks. Hence, reputational accountability, albeit weak, is significant.

On any given issue, the United States can typically act unilaterally, dismissing any external agent’s demands for accountability. However, the United States has many objectives in the world, some of which require others’ voluntary cooperation to be successful. It would be impossible for the United States to coerce other states on all issues of concern. Failures of cooperation lead to retaliation, following practices of reciprocity. More diffusely, damage to the reputation of the United States as a potential cooperator reduces the incentives for others to cooperate with the United States in anticipation of cooperation on some other issues in the future.

Most generally, any country playing a long-term leadership role in global governance has a long-term interest in the legitimacy of global governance, as well as in its status as leader. To any sensible US administration, such concern for leadership would be a constraint—and, as Harvard Professor Joseph Nye writes, a reason to let itself be held accountable, to some extent, on other issues.

All three sources of accountability mentioned thus far—the need of poor countries for aid, institutionalization in international organizations, and reputational concerns arising from multiple issues for powerful states such as the United States—are augmented by globalization. Globalization may weaken internal accountability within democracies, but it is a condition for external accountability.

Here is another irony. Opponents of globalization often raise the issue of accountability as an argument against globalization. But they are thinking of a largely imaginary bygone world in which states actually controlled their borders and democratic governments regulated domestic activities through democratic means. Their imaginary world envisions the United States during the New Deal, as they would have liked it to evolve—without Nazism, fascism, communism, and World War II. In fact, the choice is not between globalization and none, but rather between relatively legitimate globalization with a measure of democratic and pluralistic accountability over powerful entities and illegitimate globalization without such accountability.

All that said, it would nevertheless be naïve to believe that the United States will be easy to hold externally accountable to any institution. For the United States to be held accountable, internal accountability will have to supplement external accountability. Its own people who are sensitive to world politics will have to demand it, both on the grounds of self-interest and with respect to US values. In view of contemporary US public attitudes, this hortatory comment does not necessarily offer much hope, at least in the short run. Indeed, my ironic conclusion is that two sworn enemies—Al Qaeda and the United States—have in common their lack of accountability relative to other actors in world politics.

The Way Forward

For the building of a more accountable global future, four observations are in order. First, external accountability tends to vary inversely with the power of the entities being held accountable. Inter-governmental organizations and weak, dependent states are most easily held accountable. We cannot expect to hold shadowy terrorist movements accountable. But we should pay more attention to the accountability of corporations, religious organizations and movements, as well as powerful states.

Second, to hold powerful states accountable, the world needs more mechanisms for multilateral governance. More interdependence on more issues would also help, by reinforcing reputational incentives and credibility to accept accountability. Both institutionalization and reputational accountability depend on globalization. US citizens should display “a decent respect for the opinions of mankind,” but as long as the United States remains as powerful as it is now, they are unlikely to do so consistently between the many issues that may arise.

Third, the United States especially needs to be held accountable, because its internal democracy cannot be counted on to defend the interests of weak peoples whom US actions may harm. Still, it is very difficult to hold the United States accountable, since one dimension of power is that it protects the power holder from accountability. The events of September 11, 2001, led to more concentration of power and more state action on the part of the United States. As a result, the world is now further from the ideal of transnational accountability.

Fourth, if we recognize that powerful states pose the most serious threats to accountability in world politics, we will see that well-meaning efforts to demand “more accountability” from international organizations can be problematic. “More accountable” often means “accountable to NGOs and advocacy networks,” rather than just to governments. Certainly some real benefits could result from making the WTO and the IMF more accountable to a wider range of interests and values.

However, we should be alert to the prospect that the political result of such a shift would be a reduction of states’ interests in such organizations. If states get less benefit from international institutions, they will be less willing to provide resources and to accept demands on them, through these institutions, for accountability. The ultimate result of such well-meaning moves, therefore, could be a weakening of the accountability, limited as it is, that multilateralism imposes on powerful states. Those who believe in accountability as a way of limiting abuses of power should work to build support within powerful, rich countries for acceptance of more effective and legitimate multilateral governance to achieve human purposes, and for the increased external accountability that is likely to follow.