These organizations are therefore anything but “out-of-control bureaucracies” accountable to no one. Indeed, the real problem appears quite different. A large number of would-be principals, led by a variety of NGOs, demand accountability. But the NGOs are weak compared with governments, to which these organizations are chiefly accountable. When they lose the battle due to their institutionally weak positions, NGOs condemn the organizations as “unaccountable.”

What the controversies indicate is not that the inter-governmental organizations are unaccountable, but that accountability is a matter of distribution—who are the organizations accountable to? The organizations are accountable to the states that authorized their creation and provide financial support. The real issue is, are they accountable to the right groups? NGOs make a normative claim for accountability to groups that are affected or for accountability to principles such as “sustainable development” or “human rights.” Thus external accountability claims based on the impact of these organizations compete with internal accountability claims, largely by national governments, based on authorization and support from their constituents. These are serious issues, but they are issues not of a “lack of accountability” as much as they are issues of “accountability to whom?” Different types of accountability favor different accountability holders. Once again, accountability is largely a matter of power.

Ironically, people demanding accountability mainly target inter-governmental organizations because those organizations are weak and visible. They are good targets because they do not have strong constituencies. Indeed, it seems that the external accountability gaps are actually greatest for entities that are not conventionally held accountable on a transnational basis. Five such sets of entities can be mentioned:

First, multinational corporations are held internally accountable, more or less with success, to their shareholders, who authorize action and provide support. But their actions also have enormous effects on other people. The “anti-globalization movement” is right to be concerned about corporate power, even if its proposed remedies seem incoherent. If they are concerned about the effects of powerful entities on powerless people, scholars should ask how to hold corporations accountable, as national governments in capitalist societies have sought to do for more than a century. The effects are particularly pronounced for media conglomerates, but scholars have not focused on them. And globalization means it is more difficult for national governments to hold corporations accountable than in the past.

A second example is the Roman Catholic Church. The Church is a secretive, authoritarian structure that is not particularly accountable to any human institutions or groups, as its reaction to the pedophilia scandal in the US Church indicates.

Additionally, mass religious movements without hierarchical organizations constitute another set. Fundamentalist Islamic movements fall into this category—and unlike the Roman Catholic Church, they have no hierarchical organization to hold accountable.

Covert terrorist networks, such as Al Qaeda, are almost by definition not externally accountable. They do not accept the responsibility of identifying themselves, much less responding to questions or accepting others’ right to sanction them. They can be punished, but they cannot be “held accountable.”

Last, powerful states are yet another example of entities that have little accountability. The doctrine of sovereignty has traditionally protected states from external accountability although it has not necessarily protected weak states from accountability to the strong states, as Stanford Professor of International Relations Stephen Krasner has noted. Multilateral institutions are designed to make states accountable to each other, if not to outsiders. Even moderately powerful states, however, can resist external accountability on many issues.

It has been notably difficult for the United Nations to hold Israel accountable for its actions in the West Bank. Additionally, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have not been held accountable to the victims of the terrorists whose supporters they have often encouraged. Extremely powerful states seem virtually immune from accountability if they refuse to accept it. The United States is, of course, the chief case in point. All doubters have to do is look at the abuses committed in Abu Ghraib prison and the conditions of the US prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and reconcile it with the fact that no high-level US officials have been held accountable for the policies that enabled or even facilitated these violations of presidential pledges and international law.

Accountability of States

States are powerful and often not externally accountable, but institutions of multilateralism do hold them accountable on some issues. If we care about accountability, we should inquire as to how such institutions could be extended and made more effective. We should begin by recognizing, as political philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau did, that internal democracy will not assure accountability to outsiders whom the powerful democracy affects.

The United States, Israel, and other democracies are internally accountable to their populaces, but are not externally accountable to any institution. Held has astutely pointed out that the external accountability problem may even be greater as a result of democracy: “arrogance has been reinforced by the claim of the political elites to derive their support from that most virtuous source of power—the demos.”

Yet three mechanisms of accountability do apply to states. First, weak countries that economically depend on the decisions of richer countries are subject to demands for fiscal accountability. Professor Albert Hirschman pointed out more than 50 years ago that foreign trade, when it produces benefits, generates an “influence effect.” Here as elsewhere, accountability is a power-laden concept, for power comes from asymmetrical interdependence in favor of the power wielder.

The implication of the influence effect is that rich countries seeking to hold poor countries accountable are likely to become more “generous.” Dramatically increased efforts to increase the benefits that poor countries receive from globalization would create an influence effect, making it easier to hold these countries accountable for their actions. Of course, for the poor countries such generosity would be problematic, precisely because it would make them more dependent on the rich.

Second, there are pockets of institutionalized accountability in world politics. States that are members of regional organizations such as the European Union are subject to demands for accountability from their peers. Further, states that have joined organizations such as the WTO or the new International Criminal Court are subject to legal accountability. Europe, the United States, Japan, and other rich countries are targets of demands for accountability in trade, exemplified by debate over their agricultural subsidies and protection of old industries such as steel. The extension of some degree of accountability to powerful states, through multilateral institutions or other forms of governance, offers a glimmer of hope. It should be remembered, however, that these powerful states accept accountability not for its own sake but mainly because they gain benefits themselves from these institutions.