What, in your opinion, is the most significant international political event since the year 2000 and why?

Undoubtedly, September 11, 2001 has been an earth-shaking event and certainly one that, because it shook the United States, has ended up shaking a lot of the world given the United States' incredible power and influence over international relations. But I would argue that over time, 20 years from now, we may look back and say that the most important thing that happened in that time period was basically the convergence of a series of technological and economic forces that “flattened” the world, as I put it. These events leveled the competitive playing field in ways that have empowered and enabled hundreds of millions of people—from India, China, the former Soviet empire, and Brazil—that could not plug and play before in the global economy to plug and play more directly, to collaborate more directly on different kinds of work with people all over the world, and to compete more directly with the young US citizens and young Europeans than ever before. So, in the fullness of time, it may turn out that, while September 11 was a huge event, and undeniably so, structurally speaking, the most important thing to have happened will be remembered as this kind of leveling, or what I call the “flattening” of the world, that reached its culmination or tipping point during that period.

What, if any, are the most significant mistakes made by the Administration of US President George W. Bush?

I think that the Bush Administration is most vulnerable to the history books in Iraq, in that Iraq was a war of choice, not a war of necessity. One can make a strong argument for why it was a legitimate choice, and people like myself and others have done so. Because it was a war of choice, it was incumbent on the administration to make sure it undertook that war in the best context globally and with the most preparation in terms of military force possible.

We now know, through report after report by our own military, that there was insufficient planning for the post-war phase in Iraq, and because of the insufficient planning and the insufficient forces we have struggled at great cost to stabilize the situation there. But, despite the messy way we got here, I think the Iraqi elections demonstrate why this war of choice still has a chance to turn out to be a right and good choice—for Iraq, for the United States, and for the future of the Middle East. Everyone who believes, as I did and still do, that democracy is possible in the Arab world has to be heartened by the way that Iraqis have seized this opportunity. If we can produce a decent outcome in Iraq, and it is still uncertain, this is going to be an earthquake that will shake, rattle, and roll the entire Middle East—mostly, I am convinced, for the better.

What shortcomings in the administration’s worldview or decision-making process do the mistakes you mention reveal?

I am not sure that it had to do with their worldview. I think a lot of what went wrong in Iraq can be traced to the dysfunctional nature of the administration’s national security team in the first four years. The fact is that you basically had a low-grade civil war between the State Department and the Pentagon, and to some degree between the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency as well. When you are engaged in a war thousands of miles away in an extremely complex theater like Iraq, without a coherent and unified national security team, and have a Pentagon trying to run a nation-building operation that it has no real experience or skills in doing, you are going to get this kind of outcome. The last four years were the product of a dysfunctional national security team.

The war in Iraq is obviously a significant factor in the modern definition of the United States’ international role. What do you think that role is?

In terms of the United States’ role in the world, my simple principle has always been that there are a lot of bad things that happen in the world in which the United States plays a role, but there are few really big, important, good things that happen without a significant US contribution. Whether it is tackling the issue of global warming or tackling the issue of global terrorism, it seems to me that the United States needs to be a catalyst of multilateral solutions when possible and unilateral solutions when necessary. But to be a global leader like that, you have to be a good global citizen. People have to feel that you are listening and people have to believe that you are also taking their concerns and their interests into account as well. If you are going to be a global leader, you have to be the best global citizen that you can possibly be, and I am not really sure we have been that the last four years.

As the failed January test launch shows, the Bush Administration continues to push for a National Missile Defense. Does this position reflect the administration’s movement toward a so-called “Fortress America” and if so, how will this posturing affect our leverage and involvement in the international community in the years to come?

I have never been a fan of missile defense. I have not seen any evidence yet that the technology is even feasible; it seems to me like an endless game of constantly trying. As they say, missile defense is like trying to shoot a bullet with a bullet, and every time the other bullet gets faster you have to speed up your bullet. It just seems to me that this is a slight of hand and I certainly see no technological proof that it can work at the level that they want. There is nothing morally wrong with wanting to defend against incoming ballistic missiles and certainly we have had an anti-ballistic missile system in the past. The question is really can you defend yourself against every conceivable kind of attack and what is the cost of trying? Particularly, what is the cost of trying and failing, and where are the tradeoffs? One can see all too starkly that we do not have enough fighting men and women in the military in order to sustain the long-term engagement in Iraq right now. We are probably two or three divisions shy, and to expand the army by another two or three divisions and armor them will cost billions of dollars. So yes, in a perfect world, it would be great to have a missile shield. Who would not want that? Who could be against that? But what is the tradeoff to other weapons systems or military manpower demands? That whole issue does not seem to have been debated at all, but we are seeing the tradeoff on the ground in Iraq; we simply do not have enough people to send there. It is great to have a missile defense, but if the price of that is to lose the engagement in Iraq—to have that end in failure—then will anyone feel more secure?